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Abstract 
 
This study is about the place of French and French speakers in the Saskatchewan political 
community. Beginning with the political foundations of western Canada in 1870, it argues that 
exclusion of the French language and francophone culture became central to how Saskatchewan 
understood itself politically. Saskatchewan was to be part of a new British-Canadian nation 
which left behind the problems of language, religion, and culture plaguing central Canada. 
English would be the province's only official language.  
 Over the next century this understanding of the Saskatchewan political community was 
reinforced during key moments of provincial history. Whenever there was a crisis of state 
legitimacy or a threat to the cultural definition of the region -- the founding of Manitoba, Alberta 
and Saskatchewan (1870 and 1905 respectively), the First World War and the interwar years 
(1914 to 1931), and the rise of the new West (1968 to 1990), the English-speaking character of 
Western Canada was reinforced by successive provincial governments and their citizens, while 
the French language and francophone culture were cast as alien to the region's cultural character. 
From the beginning, however, this vision of Saskatchewan was threatened by proponents of a 
bilingual and bicultural Canada. These political leaders and activists believed equality of 
francophones and anglophones to be part of western Canadian history and an important value for 
the Saskatchewan political community.  
 The battle over official bilingualism and language rights between 1968 and 1990 provides 
new insights into how Saskatchewan understood itself and its history. Although after 1968 it was 
no longer fashionable for Canada to define itself as principally British, bilingualism remained a 
problematic notion for the provincial political community. New provincial cultural policies after 
1968 led to a pitched battle involving politics of memory. Saskatchewan francophones insisted 
that Saskatchewan declare itself bilingual because the Fransaskois had opened and helped found 
western Canada, while Saskatchewan governments insisted that multiculturalism was the real 
(hi)story of the West. Faced with increasing Fransaskois activism and the choice of making 
French an official language in the province during these years, both New Democratic Party and 
Progressive Conservative governments chose not to do so, arguing that such a move had no 
historical, political, or demographic justification. By 1990 the battle over bilingualism was 
largely over. The Fransaskois left their mark on the modern Saskatchewan political community 
by scoring key victories in certain areas, but also by surviving bitter defeats in others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
French in the Imagined West: Memory, Political Community, and Language 
 
The experience of prairie citizens during the past hundred years constitutes a relevant and important claim to a 
common prairie linguistic heritage, one based on shared experience of linguistic assimilation into the English of 
Canada or North America. 
 
- Gerald Friesen
1
 
 
...I would say that there is no question whether French language rights will become a 'problem' in Saskatchewan. 
The only question is whether it will be handled with foresight and generosity, or whether it will have to be 'solved' 
by the 'Feds'. 
 
- Peter Kilburn to Allan Blakeney, 1977
2 
 
 
 The decision was a defeat for the francophones of Saskatchewan and Alberta. On 20 
November 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in Caron v. Alberta, 
ruling that French did not enjoy constitutional status in the province.
3
 The case was a long one. 
In 2003 Franco-Albertan Gilles Caron refused to pay a traffic ticket printed in English, claiming 
that French was an official language in Alberta and western Canada. But Caron's arguments, the 
majority of six judges ruled twelve years later, "cannot be sustained in the face of the historical 
record and the underlying principles of constitutional interpretation."
4
 The three dissenting 
judges declared that "The historical context leads to the unavoidable conclusion that there was a 
historic compromise regarding legislative bilingualism."
5
 The ambivalent decision reflected the 
almost diametrically opposed historical interpretations of western Canada used by Caron and the 
Alberta government as the case wound its way up to the Supreme Court. 
                                                 
1
 Gerald Friesen, "The Prairies as Region: The Contemporary Meaning of an Old Idea," in River Road: Essays on 
Manitoba and Prairie History, (Winnipeg, Manitoba University Press, 1996), 177-178.  
2
 Peter Kilburn to Allan Blakeney, 19 July 1977. Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan [PAS], Allan Blakeney 
Fonds. 
3
 And, by extension, in Saskatchewan since both provinces share a single constitutional history inherited from the 
North-West Territories.  
4
.R.  v. Caron, [2015] SCC 56, para. 103.  
5
 Ibid., para. 11.  
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 Caron is the latest example of the controversial status of French in western Canada.
6
 It 
demonstrates an uncomfortable truth about western Canadian politics: the status and place of 
French in the region is not a dead issue. It is a spectre that haunts politics, neither fully alive, nor 
completely dead. Although Caron started in Alberta, it is clear that the Saskatchewan 
government has also had its share of recent conflicts with francophones: since 2010, for example, 
the courts have been asked to render six different judgments related to francophone school 
funding.
7
  
 Francophones in western Canada have never accepted the dominance of English in public 
life as legitimate. They view themselves as one of western Canada's "founding peoples" whose 
language and culture deserve equality with that of the English-speaking majority. A memory of 
French presence in the West, dating all the way back to the fur trade era and the celebrated 
adventures of La Vérendrye and his sons, continues to nourish the western Canadian 
francophone political identity. Provincial governments, on the other hand, are quick to advance 
their own understandings of western history: a region created by the efforts of many, where the 
adoption of English as the region's main language was a necessary part of building a new society 
under difficult circumstances.
8
  
 "'You Can't Have it All French, All At Once'" is about these competing historical 
memories of western Canada between 1870 and 1990. Using Saskatchewan as a case study, this 
dissertation examines opposing visions of the past, present, and future of the French language in 
                                                 
6
 Other notable examples include the Forest case (1979) in Manitoba and the Mercure case in Saskatchewan which 
is discussed in chapter five of this dissertation. For the Forest case and subsequent French-language crisis in 
Manitoba, see Raymond-M. Hébert, Manitoba's French-Language Crisis: A Cautionary Tale (Montreal and 
Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004).  
7
 For example, Conseil scolaire fransaskois v. Saskatchewan, [2011] SKQB 210; Conseil scolaire fransaskois v. 
Saskatchewan, [2013] SKQB 211; Conseil scolaire fransaskois v. Saskatchewan, [2012] SKQB 217; Conseil 
scolaire fransaskois v. Saskatchewan, [2012] SKQB 393; Saskatchewan v. Conseil scolaire fransaskois, [2014] 
SKQB 285.     
8
 The province's motto, "From Many Peoples, Strength", adopted in 1986, evokes this interpretation of 
Saskatchewan history.  
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the Saskatchewan political community. It argues that at pivotal moments in Saskatchewan 
history, debates surrounding official bilingualism and the status of French played a key role in 
defining the provincial political community. As renowned western Canadian historian Gerald 
Friesen explains, "history has borne heavily upon westerners and has shaped community self-
perception. Moreover, certain historical images are now a source of confusion because 
westerners utilize inherited concepts in circumstances where such notions no longer apply."
9
 In 
the case of Saskatchewan language disputes, the hand of history is indeed heavy.
10
 The 
province's early history, which favoured eliminating the French language from public institutions 
and the education system, later influenced how both francophones and English speakers viewed 
bilingualism.  
 For Friesen, popular and academic understandings of western Canada comprise three 
general categories: formal (geographic), functional (economic), and imagined. The present study 
focuses on the third category -- more precisely, on the imagined political community in western 
Canada. "A place must be imagined," Friesen argues, "before it can exist."
11
 Indeed, building any 
society requires ideas and vision. Yet, the place of the French language in the ideas and vision 
constituting the Saskatchewan political community have not been examined systematically by 
historians. As historian R. Douglas Francis noted, even as western Canadian historiography 
reached it maturity as a subfield of Canadian history during the 1980s
12
, few works dealt directly 
                                                 
9
 "Defining the Prairies: or, why the prairies don't exist," in Robert Wardhaugh (ed.), Toward Defining the Prairies: 
Region, Culture, and History (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2001), 14.  
10
 It is well accepted by Saskatchewan historians that the province's early years continue to play a determining role 
in how Saskatchewan society is lived today. See for example Gregory P. Marchildon (ed.) The Heavy Hand of 
History: Interpreting Saskatchewan's Past (Regina, Canadian Plains Research Center, 2005).  
11
 Friesen, "Defining the Prairies," 14.  
12
 J.R. Miller argued convincingly in 1985 that western Canadian historiography had entered into a new era marked 
by an increasingly mature scholarship. Miller, "Farewell to Monks, Eunuchs, and Vestal Virgins: Recent Western 
Canadian Historical Writing," Journal of Canadian Studies 20, no. 3 (1985), 156-166.  
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with the "mental ethos - the intellectual mindset and cultural milieu - of the region."
13
 Francis 
called on historians to look at "political, economic or social history from the perspective of ideas, 
beliefs or values motivating men and women to act," so as to make the connection between ideas 
and action.
14
 This dissertation looks at the mental ethos surrounding the place of the French 
language and cultural dualism in Saskatchewan for over a century, demonstrating various 
dynamics of continuity and change along the way.  
 Two major eras are crucial to understanding the place of French in the Saskatchewan 
political community: the founding political years (1870 to 1931) and the decades of political 
rebirth of the New West (1968 to 1990). Between 1870 and 1931, western Canada was created 
and became a "political" region.
15
 It was a time of broad visions and of major debates over the 
character of the political community in the newest part of Canada. During these years the region 
developed a political consciousness.
16
 The West was to be a British region, and Saskatchewan a 
British province; this understanding of the regional political community led to legislation and 
policies in Saskatchewan that ensured the predominance of English, especially in public 
institutions (the legislature and courts, for example) and education.  
 Between 1968 and 1990, western Canada was reborn due to economic renewal and 
constitutional politics. Saskatchewan debated the character of the political community and the 
place of French within its provincial borders. Although in 1968 Britishness was no longer 
                                                 
13
 R. Douglas Francis, "In Search of a Prairie Myth: A Survey of Intellectual and Cultural Historiography of Prairie 
Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies 24, no. 3 (1989), 44. On French Canadians and the West, Francis simply 
mentioned that "Considerably less work has been done on this subject." Ibid., 53.   
14
 Ibid., 44.  
15
 W.L. Morton, "The Bias of Prairie Politics" in Donald Swainson (ed.), Historical Essays on the Prairie Provinces 
(Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 289-300.  
16
 See for example Morton, Ibid.; Doug Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the 
Idea of the West, 1856-1900 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1980); Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: 
A History (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1984); Friesen, "The Western Canadian Identity," Canadian 
Historical Association Historical Papers (1973), 13-19; Friesen, "Studies in the Development of Western Canadian 
Regional Consciousness, 1880-1925," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1974. 
  
5 
 
fashionable as a social and political ideal for Saskatchewan, the influence of the province's 
formative years remained, as successive provincial governments reinforced the predominantly 
English character of Saskatchewan in major debates over language, identity, and the constitution. 
The complicated and protracted debate over bilingualism and the place of French in 
Saskatchewan between 1968 and 1990 was, in part, a product of the province's founding political 
era. Bilingualism, and official status for French, were cast by the government and applied in 
public policy as incongruous with the region's historical and contemporary character. At the 
same time, the Fransaskois
17
 community aggressively advocated for French as an official 
language in a number of policy areas. 
 At key moments of Saskatchewan's political history -- or, whenever there was a crisis of 
state legitimacy or a threat to the established cultural definition of the region -- successive 
governments ensured that official bilingualism would be limited. Even between 1968 and 1990, 
when the federal government made important strides towards expanding official bilingualism in 
federal institutions and francophone education, the Fransaskois community had difficulty 
advancing its own vision of bilingualism. Thus, between 1870 and 1990, although the debate 
over the character of Saskatchewan changed from a British-centric to province-centric, 
multicultural one, the problematic place of the francophones remained constant. 
 Fransaskois activism and memory were a constant threat to the Saskatchewan province-
building project, a persistent annoyance to grandiose plans. As this study demonstrates, the 
francophones were often seen as either leading challenges to anglo-centrism, or directly involved 
in challenging it in a number of ways. Francophone political aspirations and public militancy 
                                                 
17
 For the purposes of this study, the terms "Fransaskois", "francophone", and other terms related to individuals who 
speak French as their first language are used interchangeably. Although who exactly could claim membership and 
who was excluded from the Saskatchewan francophone political community varied over time, these divergences are 
not among the principal concerns of this study.    
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were lightning rods for those who articulated a particular cultural vision of Saskatchewan. The 
francophone understanding of western Canada as bilingual, where French speakers played an 
important role in founding the region, represented an unacceptable historical interpretation. It 
also reminded westerners of what bothered them most about Ottawa: meddling in economic and 
cultural matters, and showing favouritism towards Quebec in constitutional and political matters.   
 
French in the "Imagined West" 
  Recent historical scholarship on western Canada analyses various aspects of the 
"imagined West", such as the place of women, indigenous peoples, and immigrants. Scholars 
have also examined shifting popular and intellectual understandings of geography, mineral 
wealth, and science. They have examined the myth of the Mountie and the western myth in 
literature.
18
 Historians have not, however, taken a closer look at how the French language fits 
into the imagined West and the "mental ethos" of the region. Gerald Friesen, for example, noted 
how "the inevitable issue of French-Canadian and Roman Catholic influence in the country" 
helped influence westerners' perceptions of themselves and the region.
19
 Friesen, however, like 
other historians of the region, directed his attention toward labour history and other aspects of 
                                                 
18
 See for example R. Douglas Francis and Chris Kitzan (eds.), The Prairie West as Promised Land (Calgary, 
University of Calgary Press, 2007); Owram, Promise of Eden; Catherine A. Cavanaugh, "No Place for a Woman: 
Engendering Western Canadian Settlement," Western Historical Quarterly 28, no. 4 (1997), 493-518; G.S. Dunbar, 
"Isotherms and Politics: Perceptions of the North-West in the 1850s," in A.W. Rasporich and H.C. Klassen (eds.), 
Prairie Perspectives 2 (Toronto, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 80-102; Douglas Francis, "From Wasteland to 
Utopia: Changing Images of the Canadian West in the Nineteenth Century," Great Plains Quarterly (Summer 
1987), 178-194; D.J. Hall, "Clifford Sifton: Immigration and Settlement Policy, 1896-1905," in Howard Palmer, The 
Settlement of the West (Calgary, Comprint Publishing, 1977), 60-85; Bill Waiser, The Field Naturalist: John 
Macoun, the Geological Survey, and Natural Science (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1989). For more recent 
examples, see Steve Hewitt, Riding to the Rescue: The Transformation of the RCMP in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
1914-1939 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006); Adele Perry, Esyllt Jones and Leah Morton, Place and 
Replace: Essays on Western Canada (Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2013); Ashleigh Androsoff, "Spirit 
Wrestling: Identity Conflict and the Canadian 'Doukhobor Problem', 1899-1999," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
University of Toronto, 2011. 
19
 Friesen, "The Western Canadian Identity," 16.  
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social history, only briefly mentioning the role that francophones and the French language played 
in the formation of a "regional consciousness" in western Canada.  
 In the English literature, historians have paid limited attention to the French-language 
question in western Canada, leading some to conclude that it was not important. Celebrated 
Canadian historian Donald Creighton declared that bilingualism in western Canada was nothing 
more than "a claim exacted by Riel's dictatorship."
20
 Manitoban W.L. Morton wrote that Riel's 
push for official recognition of French was premature and that "there would have been a later 
and perhaps a greater Manitoba, without the Resistance."
21
 A.I. Silver, who built his reputation 
as a historian of the French-Canadian idea of Confederation, went as far to say that French 
Canadians had no interest in western Canada or business being there because they were "far from 
the condition of any of the great colonizing societies"
22
 and not up to the task.  
 More recent scholarship examining the economic choices of French Canadians in 
choosing to settle the West concludes that "Moving to the western frontier was much less 
economically attractive for francophones than anglophones."
23
 The English-language literature, 
and a handful of French-language works, tend to either blame the francophones for their own 
choices in the social development of the region, or sweep aside the region's language 
controversies as historical aberrations or accidents.
24
 The result is a gap in the literature, 
especially as it pertains to francophones in western Canada after the Second World War. More 
                                                 
20
 Donald Creighton, "John A. Macdonald, Confederation, and the Canadian West," in Minorities, Schools, and 
Politics, Canadian Historical Readings 7 (University of Toronto Press, 1969), 1-9.  
21
 W.L. Morton, "Introduction," in Alexander Begg's Red River Journal, (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1957), 147.  
22
 A.I. Silver, "French Canada and the Prairie Frontier, 1870-1890," Canadian Historical Review 50, no. 1 (1969), 
29.  
23
 Alan Green, Mary MacKinnon, and Chris Minns, "Conspicuous by their Absence: French Canadians and the 
Settlement of the West," Journal of Economic History 65, no. 3 (September 2005), 824.  
24
 A.I. Silver, The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900, 2nd ed. (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1997); André-N. Lalonde, "L'intelligentsia du Québec et la migration des Canadiens Français vers l'ouest 
canadien, 1870-1930," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française 33, no. 2 (1979), 163-185; Robert Painchaud, Un 
rêve français dans le peuplement de la Prairie (Saint-Boniface, Éditions du Blé, 1987). 
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generally, western Canadian historical literature does not concentrate strongly on the region's 
history after 1945.
25
   
 Francophone historians, especially in Quebec, have also taken little interest in the 
imagined West, focusing instead on why western Canada was a lost cause for French Canadians 
and official bilingualism. They cite in particular the treatment of Louis Riel and the French-
speaking Métis, the Manitoba Schools Crisis, and Franco-Catholic colonization schemes' failure 
to produce meaningful results.
26
 One of the more enduring ideas in French-language literature 
dealing with the francophone experience in the West is that "anglomania" or British Canadian 
nationalism discouraged many French speakers from settling in the region.
27
 But why did this 
happen? What exactly led to the prevailing idea that the West was not a place for French 
speakers? How did this idea start and how did it change over time? This dissertation offers some 
answers to these questions.  
 Western Canadian francophone authors have written some impressive social and political 
histories of their own communities.
28
 It is mainly concerned, however, with early twentieth 
                                                 
25
 See for example Friesen, The Canadian Prairies or Bill Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary, Fifth 
House, 2005). Friesen only gives one chapter to the prairies after 1945, while Waiser dedicates two-thirds of his 
book to Saskatchewan before 1945.  
26
 Robert Painchaud, "French-Canadian Historiography and Franco-Catholic Settlement in Western Canada, 1870-
1915," Canadian Historical Review 59, no. 4 (1978), 447-466. Edmund Aunger also underlined the tendency of both 
Québécois nationalists and English-Canadian historians to minimize the importance and role of French language 
issues in western Canadian history in "Obsèques prématurées: La disparition des minorités francophones et autres 
illusions nationalistes," Review of Constitutional Studies 7, nos. 1-2 (2002), 120-142.  
27
 See for example Dom Paul Benoît, L'anglomanie au Canada: Résumé historique de la question des écoles du 
Manitoba (Trois-Rivières, Imprimerie du Trifluvien, 1899); Noël Bernier, Fannystelle (Quebec, Imprimerie 
franciscaine missionaire, 1939); Jacqueline Blay, Sous le ciel de la Prairie, des débuts jusqu'à 1870, Tome I, 
Histoire du Manitoba français (Saint-Boniface, Éditions du Blé, 2010) and Le temps des outrages, Tome II, Histoire 
du Manitoba français (Saint-Boniface, Éditions du Blé, 2013); Donatien Frémont, Les Français dans l'Ouest 
canadien (Winnipeg, Éditions de la Liberté, 1959); A.G. Morice, Dictionnaire historique des Canadiens et des 
Métis français de l'Ouest (Quebec, J.-P. Garneau, 1908); Louis-Arthur Prud'Homme, L'élément français au Nord-
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century community history, especially the pioneering and settlement era up to the Great 
Depression. In Histoire des Franco-Canadiens de la Saskatchewan, for example -- currently the 
only scholarly survey history of the province's francophones -- Fransaskois historians Richard 
Lapointe and Lucille Tessier discussed the history of the Fransaskois community up to the end of 
the 1930s.
29
 In 1983, the Société historique de la Saskatchewan released Perspectives sur la 
Saskatchewan française, a scholarly and popular collection of writings on Fransaskois history. 
As with other community histories, it focused exclusively on Franco-Catholic colonization and 
the period preceding the Second World War. Even Éric Poliquin's Le Patriote de l'Ouest et les 
grands événements du XXe siècle
30
 -- a promising title and presentation of Saskatchewan's first 
French newspaper -- dealt only with the first half of the twentieth century.  
Western Canadian francophone historical literature focuses primarily on the construction 
of institutions such as the Catholic church, schools, and cultural associations. Despite the 
importance of the post-1970 era of Francophone history in western Canada, it has been largely 
overlooked.
31
 In 1972 Saskatchewan historian Michael Jackson wrote an article decrying the lack 
of studies on the Fransaskois despite their strong contribution to the history of Saskatchewan and 
western Canada.
32
 Jackson, however, misunderstood the Fransaskois propensity for resilience 
and argued that the community might eventually disappear. Measures taken to reinforce 
struggling Fransaskois communities, Jackson wrote, had arrived "ten or fifteen years too late" 
and all roads pointed towards linguistic and cultural assimilation.
33
   
                                                                                                                                                             
Crisis; Laurier Gareau (ed.), 50 ans de radio: tant de choses à se dire (Regina, Éditions de la Nouvelle plume, 
2002).    
29
 Regina, Société historique de la Saskatchewan, 1986.  
30
 Regina, Société historique de la Saskatchewan, 1997.  
31
 Georgina M. Taylor, “Editor’s Comments (the Francophone Population is Among the Previously Neglected 
Topics Covered in Current Saskatchewan History)," Saskatchewan History 52, no.1 (2000), 2-4. 
32
 Jackson, "Une minorité ignorée: les Franco-Canadiens de la Saskatchewan," Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue 
d'études canadienne 7, no. 3 (1972), 1-20.  
33
 Ibid., 19. 
  
10 
 
 Literature on francophone-anglophone relations and language politics in the latter 
twentieth century is lively. This stream of literature makes note of political campaigns for 
official bilingualism, but is primarily national in scope and mentions western Canada chiefly in 
passing. Historical events, people, and contexts surrounding language rights politics in western 
Canada remain to be explored systematically. Québécois social historian Yves Frenette, for 
example, only briefly discussed Saskatchewan's Mercure case in his classic social history survey 
of French Canada.
34
 Marcel Martel and Martin Pâquet discuss language politics in western 
Canada in their survey of the political history of language in Canada, but their account as it 
pertains to Saskatchewan is very brief.
35
 A number of other historical works that offer 
compelling analyses of various federal government language policies do not discuss western 
Canada generally or Saskatchewan specifically.
36
 
 This dissertation draws upon literature in a number of fields of study in western Canadian 
history, francophone history, and language politics in order to examine the longue durée of 
language politics in Saskatchewan between 1870 and 1990. What languages should be spoken in 
the West, and why? What language should be given official recognition in Saskatchewan? How 
do public institutions in Saskatchewan -- the Legislature, Courts, cultural policies, and schools, 
for example -- reflect continuity and change in the imagined West? In answering these questions, 
this dissertation explains where the French language fits into the imagined West. Both the 
historical trajectory of Saskatchewan and later understandings of the province's history have led 
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to political controversies over the place of French within the provincial political community. As 
a result of history and historical perception, Saskatchewan has a political culture resistant to 
official bilingualism and French as an official language.     
 This study also challenges the idea that francophones and the language question did not 
play an important role in the development of the region. It argues that francophones and the 
French language can be found in major political debates surrounding the nature of the political 
community in Saskatchewan. This study, therefore, offers a novel interpretation of Saskatchewan 
political history by showing where the French language fits into the province's political 
community. It demonstrates that the language question, rather than being peripheral or marginal 
to Saskatchewan's historical trajectory, was among the fundamental factors which shaped how 
Saskatchewan articulated and understood its own political culture and destiny. As historians 
Marcel Martel and Martin Pâquet argue in their work on the history language and politics in 
Canada,  
Language is a political issue because political actors assign it intrinsic value. 
Indeed, French, English, and indigenous languages in Canada and Quebec are not 
neutral modes of communication...languages reveal the socio-historical reality of 
struggles, of relations of domination, and inequalities within society...In Canada 
and Quebec the language issue, in all its facets and across history, has been at the 
very heart of political interactions.
37
 
 
Building on this assertion, the present study seeks to unveil and demonstrate the intrinsic value 
assigned to French in western Canada, using Saskatchewan as a case study. In doing so it reveals 
the extent to which French language politics played a key role in the way Saskatchewanians 
viewed themselves and their political culture.  
 
Memories, Politics, and Constitutions 
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 One of the more prominent themes discussed in this dissertation is the role of memory in 
political mobilisation and political action.
38
 Memory, built on a certain interpretation of history, 
is a critical piece in articulating vision and political demands. As the French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs wrote, 
We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually 
reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is 
perpetuated.
39
 
 
Historian Patrick Hutton, in History as an Art of Memory, takes a similar approach to 
understanding how memory influences perceptions of past and present.
40
 For Hutton, there is a 
confluence of history and memory, wherein intellectual and cultural traditions come together to 
create historical interpretations. All history, Hutton explains, has traces of different cultural 
understandings of the past. It is up to the historian to uncover "the deep sources of memory 
underpinning history" and uncover how memory motivates historical writing and human 
agency.
41
  
 It is at this level of analysis that memory is important in understanding how a political 
community is constructed. Whose history becomes official? What is the community's memory? 
Whose identity is perpetuated? Which interpretations are given the benefit of public endorsement 
in law, school curriculum, and public discourse? In the case of competing francophone and 
anglophone memories, historian Paul Romney's Getting it Wrong: How Canadians Forgot their 
                                                 
38
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Past and Imperilled Confederation
42
, shows the importance of memory and historical 
interpretation in divergent understandings of the Canadian constitution. Romney writes that  
Like Quebec nationalism, Canadian nationalism rests on a vision of history. The 
basic idea is that the Fathers of Confederation set out to found a great nation, with 
a strong central government having dominion from sea to sea and with provincial 
governments of subordinate stature exercising municipal powers. Such a notion 
leaves scant room for the idea of local autonomy inherent in the provincial 
compact theory, or for that of special status for Quebec.
43
 
 
While Romney's study focuses primarily on the national unity debate and French/English 
nationalisms in Canada, its conclusion that contemporary political ideas rest on memory or 
"visions of history" is instructive. This dissertation builds on Romney's work by demonstrating 
how both the Fransaskois community and the Saskatchewan government used different 
memories of province, region, and nation in order to advance their respective visions of 
bilingualism.  
 The study of memory, consciousness, ideas, and politics is not the sole prerogative of 
historians. This dissertation uses methodological tools from other disciplines in order to fully 
understand its topic. The work of sociologist Wilfrid Denis, for example, applies the Gramscian 
concept of ideological hegemony to political struggles for and against bilingualism and 
francophone schools.
44
 Denis, using an approach that spans several decades or a century, 
underlines the sociological processes of Anglo-hegemony in Saskatchewan. He argues that 
scholars should examine "the cumulative effects of legislation" on the province's francophone 
minority.
45
 According to Denis,  
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Languages respond to changes in environment; they flourish or die more as the 
outcome of power struggles, of relations of oppression and resistance among 
groups in specific socio-historical contexts, rather than through any intrinsic 
quality or weakness. Language regimes usually materialize from unrelated 
government policies which combine to support one language to the detriment of 
all others; the long-term effects of such regimes usually outlast the actual 
policies.
46
 
 
Denis views the combined impact of language legislation, in addition to cultural policies, as 
forming the basis of a province's "language regime."
47
 Because legislation has cumulative and 
long-lasting social effects, Denis explains, it is important to understand the historical formulation 
of a language regime. The language regime reflects ideological hegemony or "the manner by 
which a dominant class imposes its culture, ideology and world view on subordinate groups."
48
  
 As Denis points out, the link between ideology and practice is important in understanding 
power relations surrounding language in public institutions. In this vein, in order to examine the 
"mental ethos" or "regional consciousness" present in Saskatchewan, it is important to go beyond 
the enunciation of ideas and vision in politics and examine how these are put into place. Gerald 
Friesen suggests, for example, that one way of measuring how consciousness and mentalities 
have influenced history is to examine institutions which provide concrete examples of 
consciousness as a mechanism for change.
49
 Political scientists Linda Cardinal and Selma 
Sonntag suggest using the concept of language regime, which denotes "language practices as 
well as conceptions of language and language use as projected through state policies and as acted 
upon by language users."
50
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 Cardinal and Sonntag stress three key concepts for analysing language regimes: state 
tradition, path dependency, and critical junctures. State tradition denotes "the institutional and 
normative baggage and patterns of state action." Path dependency is what "marks the path that 
states take in policy-making."
51
 The notion of "critical junctures" refers to  
...pivotal points between tradition and policy. A critical juncture may be presented 
by social, political, economic, or environmental crises or dramatic change...At 
critical junctures, state traditions are often reinvented. What emerge are new 
patterns of governance -- but ones never completely divorced from the old.
52
 
 
All three concepts are germane for a historical study of language politics. Both state tradition and 
path dependency imply a specific historical context and trajectory, which must be understood 
through rigorous reference to documentary materials. This dissertation, as a work of history, is 
grounded in a systematic analysis of source materials in order to elucidate change and continuity 
in the Saskatchewan case: newspapers, Parliamentary debates, government policy documents, 
speeches, briefs, and francophone community organization documents.   
 Critical junctures help determine the periodization of a historical study. They are 
moments "when the state traditions that underpin the language regime are vulnerable."
53
 In the 
case of Saskatchewan, these moments are: the annexation and early political years of the North-
West Territories (1870 to 1905), the creation of Saskatchewan in 1905, the province's early 
political years (1905 to 1931), and Saskatchewan's emergence as part of the new western Canada 
and new Canadian constitutional order (1968-1990). The causes of critical junctures are not 
always the same, nor are they singular. Many different factors weigh into why a critical juncture 
occurs at one moment or another. Critical junctures do not apply uniquely to language regimes. 
Other western Canadian historians such as Steve Hewitt, for example, have studied key moments 
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in state development or change. In Riding to the Rescue Hewitt argues that between 1914 and 
1939 the Canadian government greatly depended on the RCMP in order to maintain Anglo-
Saxon values in a time of war, mass immigration, industrialization, and political radicalism.
54
  
 Hewitt's understanding of Saskatchewan's critical junctures demonstrates the necessity of 
a strong police force, at least as far as the government was concerned, in order to maintain the 
state's semblance of social order. Similarly, this dissertation argues that critical junctures in 
Saskatchewan history necessitated strong statements and action on the province's language 
regime. During times of political and cultural uncertainty, governments moved to maintain the 
vision of one official language (English) and unilingual schooling for society. This vision, like 
Hewitt's RCMP between 1914 and 1939, was a question of state power, social order and societal 
harmony. On the other hand, during critical junctures a language regime may be contested. The 
francophones used critical junctures to challenge Saskatchewan's provincial language regime, 
knowing they could possibly make advances towards official bilingualism. 
 According to Cardinal and Sonntag, in order to understand the various facets of a 
language regime, scholars need to  
look at the dynamic context -- historical, institutional, normative -- in which the 
state chooses language policies...What are the principles that inform state actions 
on language matters? What are the institutional and administrative parameters of 
how the state governs languages? How and why does the state intervene in 
language choice and language use? State traditions guide the path dependency of 
language policy choices; they frame how those choices are conceived.
55
  
  
In other words, the term "regime" should not be mistaken to mean only the constitution or 
institutions of a state. The notion of regime, rooted in Greek philosophy, was first elaborated 
upon systematically in Plato's Republic. Republic, a translation from the Greek politeia 
(Πολιτεία), denotes much more than the type of government in a state. It encompasses the values 
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of a political community or the "overall project of common life, including programs of 
education, the organization of labour and leisure, moral rules...."
56
 This dissertation, using a long 
historical perspective, offers an account of the values articulated in politics and society on the 
place of French in Saskatchewan. It also discusses how the state implements language ideology, 
and how language users interact with the state over time. More specifically, this dissertation not 
only looks at the historical context and overall government vision on the French language, but 
also how this vision was applied through internal government processes and policies. In several 
places, it stresses the contested nature of language and cultural policy by examining how the 
francophone community and other minority groups like the Ukrainians viewed government 
language policy and contributed to its elaboration through various means of political 
manoeuvring.  
 The major analytical concept tying all of these elements together -- mental ethos, western 
regional identity/consciousness, memory, language ideology, and language regime -- is political 
culture. While mainly employed by political scientists, it has also been used by some Canadian 
historians.
57
 Canadian political scientist Nelson Wiseman broadly defines political culture as "the 
way of life of a political community or polity."
58
 More specifically, Wiseman explains, "Political 
culture refers to deeply rooted, popularly held beliefs, values, and attitudes about politics."
59
 
Wiseman's analysis "is intended to cast light on how Canada, its people, and political institutions 
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came to be what they are today rather than what they ought to or could be in the light of 
contemporary norms and values."
60
 
 There is a key relationship between political culture and institutions. As Wiseman argues, 
the "radical distinction between 'institutions' and 'culture'" should be abandoned because  
Culture and institutions have a symbiotic relationship. Like cultures, institutions 
are customary structures and practices...Like political culture, institutions are 
inherited. They are not commonly the products of contemporary will but of 
heritage and tradition. They cut across time in a way that individual lifespans do 
not; like cultures, they are constantly evolving, declining, forming, and being 
renegotiated. To see culture as determining institutional form is too one-sided. 
The causal arrow points both ways because culture is a response learned from 
living under certain conditions.
61
 
 
At the same time, government and political institutions are not simply dominated by society, nor 
are they shaped passively by societal practices. Governments enjoy a certain degree of 
autonomy. They set agendas and use extensive economic and political resources to achieve ends 
that may or may not reflect societal realities. Since the 1980s American political scientist and 
sociologist Theda Skocpol, along with other authors, have argued that the role of the state in 
shaping society needs to be taken more seriously. Skocpol's work calls for a more complex 
understanding of politics and the state, wherein the latter enjoys much more autonomy and 
freedom to act that previous authors believed.
62
 
 Wiseman's concept of political culture borrowed heavily from Louis Hartz' classic 
"fragmentation thesis." In The Founding of New Societies
63
, Hartz argued that New World 
societies, broken off from the Old World, retain key political-ideological elements that 
dominated the Old World. French Canada (Hartz refers almost exclusively to Quebec), for 
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example, was a society that retained much of its feudal origins. But, Hartz explained, fragmented 
ideology, detached from its original Old World context, had more possibilities in the New World 
than it did in the Old. In the New World, ideological fragments no longer had the same political 
and ideological competition. As a result, detached from its original context, fragmented ideology 
becomes an implicit and dominant assumption that is almost universal. New World fragment 
societies provide the ability to move beyond old ideological battles that characterized the original 
society. Lacking competition, fragment ideologies tend to evolve into a "new nationalism" which 
uses certain understandings of history and society in order to integrate newcomers and assure 
social cohesion.
64
  
 Hartz applied his theory to a number of New World societies, but it was not until the 
1980s that western Canadian historians began to explore how the fragmentation thesis could 
explain the history of the region. During the 1980s fragmentation became a well-used 
perspective in western Canadian historiography. A number of works understood the West as a 
fragment of British Ontario or Britain. In the case of ranching, for example, historian David H. 
Breen argued that an upper middle-class and distinctly British-Ontarian form of ranching took 
hold in the West during the region's early settlement years.
65
   
 The fragmentation thesis competes in the western Canadian literature with Frederick 
Jackson Turner's classic frontier thesis.
66
 Turner and contemporary proponents of this thesis 
argue that the frontier was a place of freedom and new ideas, where the hold of Old World 
institutions was weak. Legal authority was dubious and environmental and climactic factors 
played important roles in determining the shape of society. University of Calgary historian 
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Warren Elofson, for example, used the frontier thesis to demonstrate similarities between 
Canadian and American ranching practices at the turn of the twentieth century.
67
 
 This study engages both the fragmentation and frontier theses in order to understand the 
way in which the French language question fit into the history of western Canada as a region and 
Saskatchewan as a province. Both theories, though often opposed to one another in the literature, 
are useful to understanding the place of the French language in the Saskatchewan political 
community. In the case of the frontier thesis, this study is inspired by Canadian historian Doug 
Owram's assertion that the western Canadian frontier was an intellectual one -- an imagined 
frontier.
68
 The region was seen by expansionists as a social tabula rasa where British-Ontarian 
society could be implemented and flourish, free from the divisive and never-ending political 
battles between English and French speakers in Ontario and Quebec. The fact that expansionists 
believed the region to be "empty" and waiting to be populated through mass settlement meant 
that, in the new West, British Ontario had an opportunity to break away from the problems of 
older Canada.  
 The Hartzian fragmentation thesis and political culture are also useful tools for 
approaching the French language question in Saskatchewan. By examining the ideological 
fragment broken off from the "Old World" of central Canada and implemented in the "New 
World" of the West, it is possible to understand why French language rights and official 
bilingualism were so controversial in the region. Breaking away from Old Canada meant leaving 
bilingualism and French language rights behind. The new fragment retained the British Ontarian 
desire for one nation and one language that was constantly thwarted and frustrated by Quebec in 
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central Canada. In the West, however, it was possible for the British-Ontarian fragment to 
triumph.  
 In this vein, by examining continuity and changes in the Saskatchewan political 
community, this dissertation explains why official bilingualism was, and to an extent remains, 
controversial in the province. Political culture and the fragmentation thesis both allow for a fuller 
understanding of the prairie cultural reality. According to historian J.E. Rea, "From the clash of 
the early pioneers with the métis, the most persistent social theme of the Prairies has been the 
struggle for cultural dominance."
69
 Rea argued that the West was more fragment than frontier, 
but accepted that both theories contributed to understanding the region's history. W.L. Morton, a 
pioneer of the "region and nation" approach to western Canadian history
70
, also hinted at the 
importance of the past in setting the stage for contemporary clashes over bilingualism and 
biculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s.
71
 While both Rea
72
 and Morton did not explicitly reference 
political culture, in 1981 Canadian political scientist David E. Smith published a chapter on the 
topic. Smith argued that western political culture and bilingualism were  
Perhaps the most critical question at this time...the attitude of the west to Canada's 
fundamental norm of cultural dualism, a norm present for over two hundred years, 
confirmed in the last decade by the federal government's language legislation and 
challenged in the west since the beginning of this century.
73
 
 
Smith concluded that more studies of western Canadian political culture as it related to 
bilingualism, multiculturalism, and language were necessary. Smith also called for more studies 
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on the values promulgated by British Canadians in the early history region so as to better 
understand why the West so strongly rejected cultural dualism after the 1960s.
74
  
 Wiseman's method for analyzing political culture resembles Smith's 1981 paper. 
Wiseman looks at the relationship between province, region, and nation using a multifaceted 
approach: "probing history" or investigating which political/social movements succeeded or 
failed over time, and why; examining fundamental political beliefs and how they shape society; 
and analysing cultural meanings in constitutions and institutions.
75
 Applied to this dissertation, 
Wiseman's framework and the concept of political culture allow for a study that combines the 
key notions discussed above: the "mental ethos" (Francis) or "western regional 
identity/consciousness" (Friesen), "language ideology and hegemony" (Denis), and "language 
regime" (Cardinal and Sonntag). This study probes history by examining where the status of 
French fits into the bigger Saskatchewan historical picture. Political and social movements in 
favour or against bilingualism are analysed. It examines fundamental political beliefs by 
unveiling where French and francophones fit into the "mental ethos" of western Canada and 
Saskatchewan. Fundamental beliefs are also unveiled through studies of the rhetoric and ideas 
advanced by proponents and opponents of bilingualism. This study also describes the 
Saskatchewan language regime by analysing how political movements and beliefs over time 
were translated into concrete policies, laws, and institutional practices.    
 
Dissertation Structure and Chapter Overview 
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 Two fundamental questions underpin this study. The first is: what is the place of the 
French language in the Saskatchewan political community? Answering this question may, at first 
glance, seem straightforward based on social factors such as a small French-speaking community 
or the lack of French-speaking immigration to western Canada during its formative years. But 
governments also help form society, and politics is the arena in which competing visions of the 
social sphere fight for primacy. Governments decide what versions of history students learn, 
what languages are used in the education system, and what languages are recognized as having 
official status in public institutions. If social forces are the only deciding factors in deciding who 
speaks what language, why do governments legislate on language use at all? The answer lies in 
the politeia, the process of building a community and searching for an ideal society. While today 
Saskatchewan may be an English-speaking province, this status was anything but secure during 
its history. A study of the nature of government intervention in official languages and cultural 
policy over time answers this first question.  
 The second question of this dissertation is how a small linguistic and cultural minority 
organizes itself and makes its voice heard. The Fransaskois were never passive bystanders in 
debates over the character of Saskatchewan society.  Yet, the community underwent fundamental 
changes in how it applied its activism. When the ACFC was founded in 1912, it was modest in 
its demands on government and quiet in its political strategy; by 1990, the organization was a 
small but important player not only in provincial debates over official languages but also national 
debates on the constitution and national unity. Over time, the Fransaskois acquired the necessary 
political expertise and professionalism that allowed them to effectively influence the provincial 
government in their favour. Thus, the second fundamental question is answered in this study by 
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looking at continuity and change in Fransaskois community leadership, in addition to 
Fransaskois-government relations.    
 This study is divided into two major parts: the founding political years of Saskatchewan 
(1870 to 1931) and the rise of the new West (1968 to 1990). Chapters one and two form the first 
part of the study, and provide the general context and outline of the major tenets of Anglo-
centrism during key events in Saskatchewan's early history. Chapter one discusses the French 
language during the Territorial years, while chapter two covers Saskatchewan's first generation 
of politics. Chapters three to five comprise part two, and are individual case studies of key areas 
of cultural policy between 1968 and 1990 when Saskatchewan dealt with official bilingualism 
and Fransaskois community activism in various ways. The periodization of these chapters is 
arranged thematically.   
 Significant contextual differences exist between the two parts or periods under 
examination. During the early years (1870-1931), the Fransaskois community made active 
attempts to influence the outcome of debates on political community and the French language. 
The clergy and secular leaders opted for good relations or la bonne entente in order to 
accomplish their goals. This strategy entailed, for the most part, working behind the scenes in 
order to broker compromises and keep the most extreme anti-French elements in society at bay. 
The provincial rights movement in national politics and federal non-intervention in provincial 
language issues gave the Fransaskois community little choice in this strategy.  
 The years between the two eras - 1931 to 1968 - have been excluded from this study 
because between 1931 and 1968, the question of the character of the Saskatchewan political 
community was seen as largely settled. Although some events such as the creation of larger 
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school units in 1944 contributed to the assimilation of francophones and other minority groups in 
the province, there were no major debates over the identity of the province itself.     
 The second part of the dissertation demonstrates a fundamental change in both 
Fransaskois community activism and overall national context regarding language. Between 1960 
and 1980, the Quiet revolution and the rise of separatism as a political movement -- in addition to 
major federal intervention via the 1969 Official Languages Act and the official languages in 
education program -- rejuvenated Fransaskois activism. The Fransaskois community underwent 
changes as a new generation of well-educated, secular leaders took control of institutions such as 
the Association culturelle franco-canadienne (ACFC). The francophones seized advantage of a 
favourable national political context in order to advance their own vision of Saskatchewan 
history and official bilingualism within the province. They were vocal and persistent in their 
demands on the provincial government, using local and national media, position papers, 
meetings, and protests in order to have their voices heard. Successive Saskatchewan 
governments, realizing that they had a duty to uphold national unity but also understanding how 
unpopular some federal government policies were -- including French education and official 
languages policies -- took the middle road between expanding the place of French in some areas 
of Saskatchewan society and resisting its advance in others.  
 Chapter one of this study discusses the founding political years of the North-West 
Territories from 1870 to 1905, the year the federal government created Saskatchewan as a 
province. During these years, British Canadian settlers and a new English-speaking political elite 
did their best to ensure that the region would be British. Many political leaders not only believed 
that French Canadians should be discouraged from coming to the region during the major 
settlement era, but also vigorously resisted any attempts to give official status to the French 
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language.
76
 As western Canadian historian Doug Owram explains, hostility to the French 
language in both government institutions and schools made evident 
...a deep-seated conviction that there was no room in the West for a recognized 
minority. The developing sense of identity had excluded the Métis Catholic 
traditions of Red River in favour of English Protestant traditions...The new 
Canada, it seemed, had not provided an answer to the questions that had plagued 
the older Canada. On the contrary, the new Canada was to be dragged into these 
old, eastern controversies. Rather than establish a society above racial and 
religious jealousy, the development of the west perpetuated animosities rooted in 
the colonial era.
77
    
 
Between 1870 and 1905, western Canada was racked by bitter and recurrent battles over French 
language schooling and French as an official language. The region did not escape from the bitter 
political struggles which also shaped eastern Canada. They would appear again and again -- in 
the first and second resistances led by Louis Riel, in Frederick Haultain's push for responsible 
government, and in the crisis over the Autonomy Bills.  
 Chapter two focuses on Saskatchewan's early provincial politics. It argues that the place 
of French was highly controversial in the new province as a result of major debates originating in 
the founding era of Territorial politics. As Saskatchewan historian Bill Waiser wrote in the 
province's centennial history, "the autonomy bill fiasco had unleashed the twin demons of 
religion and language, and future Saskatchewan governments would not escape them."
78
 In some 
Saskatchewan political circles, deep resentment towards Ottawa's imposition of separate schools 
fuelled anger towards francophones. The bitter controversies over separate schools and the 
French language during the Autonomy bills debate in 1905 dogged Saskatchewan until the late 
1920s, when the Conservative government of J.T.M. Anderson dealt definitively with both 
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questions. Other provincial and national events stoked the fires of British Canadian nationalism, 
which in turn caused further problems for Saskatchewan's French-speaking minority: Quebec's 
position on conscription during the First World War, non-English language education, and 
cultural diversity owing to immigration. While the francophones quietly organized and did their 
best to fight back, they had few options for opposing this movement.   
 Chapter three analyses bilingualism and education policy in Saskatchewan between 1968 
and 1990, when the government and the Fransaskois struggled over the place of French in the 
province's education system. During these years Saskatchewan began to move away from an 
education system based on former Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton's philosophy of 
"national schools" and assimilation towards a system based on diversity. Unfortunately, the 
transition was not smooth. Although Premier Ross Thatcher's Liberal government made, in 1967, 
some modest provisions for French education following the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism, the Fransaskois found the changes unsatisfactory because French was still not 
an equal language with English in education. Like Thatcher's Liberals, both the NDP and 
Conservative governments that followed failed to make any changes to the provincial education 
system that would satisfy the Fransaskois' new demands for cultural and linguistic equality with 
English speakers. After many years of political and administrative struggles with various 
governments, the Fransaskois decided that the only solution was to turn to the courts. The 
difficulties in achieving full educational rights for francophone education are demonstrated by 
the CEF v. Saskatchewan case (1985 to 1988). Even with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms on their side, the Fransaskois had to fight a pitched battle with a recalcitrant provincial 
government in order to gain control over French-language education.    
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 Chapter four looks at arguments for and against the multicultural character of 
Saskatchewan, and discusses the influence that bilingualism had in influencing Saskatchewan's 
multiculturalism policy. Multiculturalism in Saskatchewan was a reaction against Ottawa's 
increasing presence in cultural policy. Saskatchewan's motto, Multis E Gentibus Vires ("From 
Many Peoples Strength") has been touted since its adoption in the 1980s as recognition of the 
province's proud multicultural foundations and heritage.
79
 Yet, as Saskatchewan historian Bill 
Waiser points out, this view of provincial (and regional) multiculturalism glosses over the 
Britishness of the province's founding era: 
...the North-West Territories were to be the future home of countless millions of 
Anglo-Canadian farmers, a land where the best features of British civilization 
would take root and flourish...Western Canada was to be a kind of agricultural 
wonderland based on one dominant culture (Anglo-Canadian), engaged in one 
dominant activity (wheat farming) in one dominant region (the southern 
Prairies)...Saskatchewan was to be a bastion of British values and traditions 
[which] was the dominant theme at the Saskatchewan inauguration ceremonies.
80
 
 
In establishing multiculturalism policy, the Saskatchewan government argued that the West was 
settled by many different groups with an array of cultures, religions, and languages. Why should 
francophones receive special rights when there are so many other founding groups and minority 
traditions? For the francophones, this argument missed the mark for a number of reasons. The 
first is historical: the francophones believed that, owing to the fur trade era, they were the first 
Europeans in the West. Secondly, francophone political aspirations were not only based on 
history, but on contemporary redress for historical wrongs. The multicultural definition of 
Saskatchewan, the francophones argued, strategically picked its examples from history, 
overlooking the nationalism and British-centric identity of the province's political founders. 
Unfortunately for the Fransaskois, multiculturalism was not only a popular policy, it was also 
                                                 
79
 Waiser, "The Myth of Multiculturalism in Early Saskatchewan," in Gene M. Porter (ed.), Perspectives of 
Saskatchewan (Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2009), 57-73.  
80
 Ibid., 58-61. 
  
29 
 
useful to the provincial government in limiting federal government demands for bilingualism in 
the name of national unity. Bilingualism for national unity met its match with Saskatchewan 
multiculturalism.     
 Chapter five analyses the Mercure case, an eight-year-long battle (1980 to 1988) between 
the Fransaskois community and the Saskatchewan provincial government over the constitutional 
status of French in the province. Father André Mercure refused to pay an English-only speeding 
ticket and demanded a trial in French. While the case itself was decided by the Courts on judicial 
minutiae, Mercure was important because it provided an opportunity for the Fransaskois to have 
their own historical memory recognized within the province's highest institutions: the legislature 
and the courts. The case represents a pivotal moment in Saskatchewan's language regime because 
the Quebec referendum of 1980 and the Meech Lake accord (1987 to 1990) created opportunities 
for the Fransaskois to challenge the unilingual character of Saskatchewan political institutions. 
The stability and continuity of Saskatchewan's language regime was confirmed in 1988 when the 
Supreme Court ruled that the province could decide the question for itself. Saskatchewan opted 
for English only, with limited opportunities for bilingualism.  
 Ideas and beliefs in any political community develop over years, decades, even centuries. 
In the case of Saskatchewan, understandings of the province as multicultural, bilingual, or 
unilingual are products of a long process. Major political debates and subsequent government 
action between 1870 and 1931 created a British province. Between 1968 and 1990, 
Saskatchewan created a new identity for itself, one better suited to the times. But during both 
eras the place of French and francophones within the provincial identity was problematic.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Roots of Conflict: Founding a Western Canadian Political Tradition, 1870-1905 
 
...on many occasions when it was thought the fire was out a small spark still remained, working gradually and surely 
under the surface and when fanned by a slight breeze breaks out again and creates a conflagration greater than the 
original one. What I want to see done in the present instance is some measure taken by this House which will 
extinguish this spark forever. 
 
- Edgar Dewdney
1
 
 
What I want is that the future rules of the Northwest may be put in such a position that when passions are aroused 
and prejudices fomented by such men as we have in this House, by such newspapers as we have in this country, 
these future rulers of the Northwest will be in a position to say -- when passion is too strong or when they are not 
strong enough to oppose it -- 'What is the use? there is a law protecting the minority'. 
 
- Henri Bourassa
2
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The West was not turning out the way it was intended to. On July 15 1870, Manitoba and 
the North-West Territories entered into Confederation under difficult circumstances. Louis Riel 
and the Métis had forced Prime Minister John A. Macdonald's hand, gained recognition of their 
existing rights, and achieved provincial status for Manitoba. Among these rights was equal status 
for the English and French languages before the new province's legislature and courts.
3
 This 
chapter examines the Red River Resistance (1870), the North-West Territories Act (1875), early 
politics in the North-West Territories (1885-1892) and the Autonomy Bills controversy (1905). 
At each of these moments, proponents of French-English dualism threatened the British-centric 
blueprint for western Canada. British Canadian political leaders, wishing to break free of the 
controversies that dogged central Canada, did what they could to ensure the ascendency of the 
English language and British political values. British Canadian victories established a political 
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culture hostile to dualism
4
 and the French language in western Canada. Language politics 
quickly became one of the most important issues during the formative years of western Canada's 
political institutions. Far from ending the divisive politics which plagued central Canada since its 
earliest days, language politics in Manitoba and the North-West Territories laid bare the 
bitterness that existed between the various strains of nationalism and identity in Canada.
5
  
 
The Red River Resistance and the Manitoba Act, 1870 
 Ontarian loyalist frustration and thirst for revenge were palpable in Parliament as 
members debated the Manitoba bill. In the House of Commons, opposition members railed 
against the government's so-called compromise with "rebels" who had "humiliated" Parliament 
and the country.
6
 Alexander Mackenzie, a prominent member of the opposition who later 
became Prime Minister in 1873, gave a commentary that is illustrative of the debate's tone: 
He opposed the Bill which had been introduced by the Government, because it 
was evidently conceived wholly in the interests of the dissatisfied portion of the 
people, and wholly with a view to secure the pacification of those who, without 
any just cause, raised the rebellion, and committed the most heinous crimes 
known to the law, (hear).
7
 
 
Ebenezer Bodwell, Liberal opposition member for South Oxford, Ontario, was scathing in his 
criticism of the bill: 
                                                 
4
 In chapters one and two, "dualism" refers to the "Dual Language" question, e.g., the place of French in 
Saskatchewan between 1870 and 1931. The terminology later changes to bilingualism between 1968 and 1990, 
although during both periods the two terms refer to the place of French as a public language in the province.  
5
 A sure sign that the Red River troubles had not been settled was the government's stubborn refusal to grant a 
written declaration of amnesty to Louis Riel and the Red River resistors. Macdonald preferred to wait until after the 
upcoming federal election. See Richard Gywn, Nation Maker. Sir John A. Macdonald: His Life, Our Times, vol II 
(Toronto, Vintage Canada, 2012), 146.  
6
 Governor-General John Young noted in his address to the House that ."..the question should be considered with 
moderation, but the issues were too important if the future of the Dominion was so deeply involved, that it would be 
criminal to remain silent. He was not astonished at the feeling in Ontario, for the people had only felt that the 
country had been humiliated by the insurrection, and that a loyal Canadian had been murdered, but that the future of 
the magnificent North-West Territories was trembling in the balance." Canada, House of Commons Debates, 5 May 
1870, 1385-6.  
7
 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 11 May 1870, 1516.  
  
32 
 
...it seemed as if the Government desired to place the new Province under the 
control of the French Canadians. If that was not their object it looked like it, for it 
granted special privileges to that race, such as setting aside 1,400,000 acres of 
land for the half-breeds and their children. [Bodwell] denounced such a policy as 
one calculated to create a division among the people of the Dominion. He had 
been pained during the discussion on that Bill to hear members of the Government 
speak in terms of contempt of those who had proved themselves loyal to Canada 
in the Red River country, while those who had rebelled against them, and 
murdered and imprisoned their countrymen, were treated with the utmost respect 
and consideration. Such a course was humiliating to the House, and discouraging 
to those brave man [sic] who were ready to sacrifice their property, and if 
necessary their lives, in support of their connection with Canada.
8
  
 
In Macdonald's absence from Parliament
9
, George-Étienne Cartier defended the government's 
track record, arguing that its intentions were to "adopt a most liberal policy with respect to the 
settlement of the territory."
10
 Some French Canadians held less flattering interpretations of the 
government's handling of the Resistance. In the Senate, Luc Letellier de St-Just expressed his 
suspicion of negotiating with the Red River delegates while, on the other hand, sending a 
"menace in the shape of an expedition."
11
 What purpose lay in sending a military detachment to 
Red River if not to intimidate those who had demanded respect for their rights?
12
 
 For proponents of expansionism who held a certain blueprint for the political community 
of the new West, a great deal was at stake. Federal political leaders recognized that the debate on 
the Manitoba bill was a crucial moment in determining the future of the region's political 
institutions. What would be the dominant ethos and culture of the new province and region? The 
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future of the young nation hung in the balance. Would Canada be united in language, religion, 
and creed or would it be sundered by divisive forces?
13
  
 British Canadian political leaders remained optimistic, however, since Manitoba 
represented the first concrete political realization of the dream of a British North-West. They 
were pleased that provincial institutions would be British in design. More importantly, the 
federal government would retain control of public lands in order to provide for settlement. 
Potential for mass settlement meant that the expansionist ideal, which stretched back over two 
decades to the Palliser and Hind expeditions of 1857 to 1860, was one step closer to realisation.
14
 
Expansionists, who could be found in most British Canadian political circles, viewed the West as 
a fertile agricultural frontier which would be the foundation for a British Canadian empire. The 
region was to be a hinterland for British Canada, populated by people of British origin and 
characterized by British civic values.   
 At first, expansionists perceived the Métis and their French-Canadian supporters as 
potential allies in their cause due to their opposition to the Hudson's Bay Company's 
administration of the region. They were soon viewed as one of the movement's principal 
enemies, however, because of their participation in the Red River Resistance.
15
 Expansionists 
and British Canadian nationalists were convinced that the French-speaking Métis and French 
Canadians should have no part in settling the new region. In his study of British-Canadian 
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nationalism between 1867 and 1914, historian Carl Berger explained the British Canadian 
nationalist outlook in 1870: 
The issue at stake at Red River was no less monumental than the conflict of free 
soil versus slavery, for it also hinged on the question of what institutions were to 
be permanently stamped upon the garden of the west...Since the French Canadian 
lacked the dynamic impulse which made for material progress, his presence in the 
west would only stultify its development until 'the swift extension of American 
settlement and the intrusive fingers of American ambition' grasped it from 
Canada...French-Canadian claims were not only incompatible with the rapid 
settlement of the west; they were also irreconciliable with the requirements of the 
Canadian national sentiment which the Canadian Firsters espoused.
16
 
 
These views on the "national character" of the Métis and French Canadians were not new at the 
time
17
, nor did they deviate from more general tendencies in Victorian thought which 
emphasized a hierarchy of the national character of various "races."
18
 Nations were composed of 
races, and the strongest nations were unified in language, creed, and religion. The latter was 
especially important for British Canadian nationalists, since they viewed Catholicism, the faith 
of most French Canadians and many Métis, with deep suspicion. They believed that the Catholic 
church stultified the material progress of states and played a key role in stoking Métis resistance 
to the westward expansion of Canada.
19
 Moreover, Catholic secret societies and Papal loyalty 
were viewed by militant Protestants as proof that they could never rest in safety, for the 
possibility of Catholic repression was always near. As long as a significant proportion of the 
population in western Canada remained Roman Catholic and continued to exercise considerable 
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political influence in the region and at Ottawa, the great national project of expansion was 
endangered.
20
  
 Tensions over the future of western Canada were rooted in competing visions of the 
region, the Canadian state, political ideology, and religion. But for some proponents of a united 
British Canada, religion was not the only important factor, nor was it the most urgent. As 
University of Saskatchewan historian J.R. Miller notes, the language question in the latter 
nineteenth century cannot be reduced solely to religion: 
As time passed, however, it became increasingly the case that Canadian 
Protestants reacted to indigenous stimuli, and not necessarily always to strictly 
religious ones...Protestant critics concerned themselves more with problems that 
Catholics were perceived to be creating at home...from the 1870s onward the 
preoccupation was more with the Catholic church in Quebec and its role in 
preserving and, it was feared, extending the French-Canadian presence within 
Confederation.
21
 
 
The Resistance was therefore, in the eyes of British Ontarian nationalists, not only a clash of 
religions but of civilizations.
22
 Religion divided the country, but not as much as race and 
language. The French-speaking and Catholic Métis, and to some extent their French Canadian 
political supporters, were seen as products of a different time, of a past that needed to be left 
behind in order to fulfil a new British Canadian destiny. It was up to British Canadians who 
could wield their power as a majority in order to create a new region that left behind the old 
divisions that plagued an older Canada.
23
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 Why, then, did French language rights pass into the constitution of the first western 
Canadian province despite the growing importance of British Canadian nationalism and 
expansionism as a political force by 1870?
24
 One factor is expediency. Macdonald and the 
federal government had little choice but to acquiesce to some of the local population's demands. 
The Prime Minister was seriously ill and his political future was uncertain. Canada had no real 
military force to speak of. No police force yet existed for the purpose of keeping order in the 
region.
25
 Without significant hard power to rein in Riel, an immediate political compromise was 
necessary. In any case, from the government's perspective, the important matter was to ensure 
that the North-West did not fall into American hands. The true character of the region's political 
institutions could be dealt with later. Manitoba could enter into Canada as bilingual since the 
government's main goal was to assert sovereignty over the region.
26
  
 The Manitoba language provisions can also be explained by dynamics in central 
Canadian politics. In Ontario, the expansionist movement's influence ensured a certain urgency 
on the part of Ottawa in opening the West. While extending dualism and separate schools to 
Manitoba could be controversial in Protestant Ontario, the federal government could easily 
justify both moves by underlining the importance of asserting Canadian sovereignty in the area 
which overrode other considerations. At first Quebec paid little attention to the Resistance and 
viewed the Métis as uncivilized, but French Canadians in that province quickly adopted a pro-
                                                                                                                                                             
homogenize the population within a given territory and the citizens' will to live collectively and participate in the 
political community through the exercise of rights and liberties...." Speaking Up, 45-46. 
24
 Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 provided for the official use of both English and French in the legislature, 
courts, and legislative documents.  
25
 The creation of the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) was actually delayed because of the Red River 
Resistance. In 1870, Macdonald saw no immediate need to create the force since Canada now had a militia presence 
in the North-West. See S.W. Horrall, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Mounted Police Force for the Northwest 
Territories," Canadian Historical Review 53, no. 2 (1972), 179-200.   
26
 As Lewis H. Thomas bluntly put it, "Expediency rather than political conviction produced the Manitoba Act." The 
Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-1897, 43. When Macdonald introduced 
the legislation, he remarked that "All these clauses and stipulations are, of course, subject to alterations by the 
people themselves...they may alter their Constitutions as they please." Canada, House of Commons Debates, 2 May 
1870, 1301. 
  
37 
 
Métis outlook to counteract British Protestant fervour and anti-Métis sentiment.
27
 By the time the 
Manitoba Act was proclaimed, the French Canadians perceived the Métis cause as a religious 
and linguistic question that echoed some of their own struggles. Quebec therefore understood the 
adoption of the Manitoba Act, with its guarantees for the French language and Catholic schools, 
as a political victory for their vision of Confederation. Like Quebec, Manitoba now had 
institutions which protected the rights and interests of French-speaking Catholics.
28
  
 The Red River resistance and creation of Manitoba, however, initiated a new political 
tradition in the region: conflict over language and the place of French. As Manitoba historian 
W.L. Morton argues, 
The Manitoba Act of 1870 was a victory for the duality of Red River, but it was a 
defensive victory. It was a means to buttress the French element in Red River. 
Moreover, it was a rearguard action fought to gain time until the French element 
might be strengthened after the transfers by aid from Quebec, and so perhaps itself 
in the Northwest. The Act would prevent the immediate overrunning of the métis 
by English land-seekers and the consequent establishment of a western Ontario 
which might not think it desirable to protect a minority language or to preserve a 
system of denominational schools...To most the Act was viewed, it would seem, 
as a necessary concession to the French of Red River, perhaps as a good-natured 
gesture to the French of Quebec. But Ontario could have no doubt whose 
emigrants would dominate the Northwest. The English therefore bowed to 
political expediency, and waited for the actual pioneers to make the final decision. 
That is, they did not accept duality as a principle, but waited for the actual 
circumstances to change.
29
 
 
Even if it was conceded in 1870, dualism in Manitoba did not fit with Sir John A. Macdonald's 
plan for the region's political institutions. It represented an unacceptable principle. Expansionists 
in Ontario believed that French had no place in the North-West. As historian P.B. Waite put it, 
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by 1880 Ontario was prepared to remake the West in its own image, one very different from the 
one imagined by Riel in 1870.
30
 The Manitoba case was instructive to British Canadian 
nationalists because it demonstrated the dangers inherent in the nascent political West. The 
ascendency of a British political community and the English language could not be taken for 
granted. Thus, by 1880, Manitoba's new English-speaking and Protestant majority set about 
paring back French as an official language and French-language schools.
31
 In the Territories, 
French speakers were roughly equal in demographic weight to English speakers
32
, but the 
direction in which regional and national politics were heading did not bode well for French 
language rights there either. French Canadian migration to the West was anemic.
33
  
 
The North-West Territories Act Amendments and the Rise of Territorial Democracy (1877-
1888) 
 In the North-West Territories, a vastly dispersed population, squabbling political 
leadership within the Catholic Clergy, and the spectre of incoming British Canadian settlers 
spelled trouble for the future. Manitoban politics trended towards the complete elimination of 
French as an official language, and little could be done by French speaking political leaders. The 
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Métis-French Canadian political coalition collapsed following the latter's disinterest or inability 
to resolve the lands question and other issues that the French speaking Métis faced.
34
  
 But there was some hope for francophones in the territories. As the language question 
simmered in Manitoba, Parliament considered revisions to the North-West Territories Act of 
1875. Legislation had been delayed by opposition, led by Sir John A. Macdonald, to the 
government's choice of Fort Pelly as the Territories' first capital.
35
 As David Mills argued when 
he tabled the new bill, the 1875 legislation had some considerable deficiencies, especially with 
regards to the Lieutenant Governor's powers
36
; the goal of the 1877 legislation was to clarify 
them. It was routine business. No major objections were brought to the legislation during second 
and third reading in the House of Commons, and the bill was sent to the Senate for approval. 
Some members of the Upper Chamber, however, had different ideas on the contents of the new 
act. The strong proponent of French language rights and long time Manitoba politician Marc 
Girard argued during second reading that:  
He would also call attention to the fact that the French language seemed to have 
been totally ignored in the bill, although the majority of the people of the 
territories were French, and they had as much right to have their language 
acknowledged there as they had in Quebec and Manitoba by having a translation 
of all the ordinances passed for their guidance.
37
 
 
Ten days later during third reading, Girard proposed an amendment to the bill that would allow 
either French or English to be used in the Territorial Council debates, publishing of Council 
proceedings and journals, and before the territorial courts.
38
 The government was annoyed at the 
amendment but reacted with indifference. David Mills was the only member to offer a comment 
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on the amendment, arguing that "Almost every one in that part of the country spoke Cree...and if 
the proceedings were to be published in the most prevalent language, Cree should be chosen for 
the purpose."
39
 The measure passed without opposition. 
 Dualism did not last long in the territories before it began to garner controversy. The 
arrival of the railway brought in waves of new settlers, fed the establishment of the first major 
urban centres on the Prairies
40
, and triggered an economic boom in the first half of the 1880s. 
These were times of important economic and social change in the region. The bulk of the 
population emigrating to the Territories was British-Ontarian in origin, and the political 
community reflected this reality. Every major newspaper established during the 1880s was 
printed in English. "Progress," as the Saskatchewan Herald trumpeted in one of its earliest 
editorials, meant giving increased administrative and political importance to the new British-
Ontarian settlers rather than the existing and Indian populations in the Territories.
41
 As Gerald 
Friesen argues, this idea of progress emphasized the building of a new society in an "empty" 
land: 
With a clean slate to receive their designs, and the comforting doctrine of progress 
to maintain their optimism, westerners set out to establish a uniform society upon 
not one but several paths. They ignored the ideal of a natural spontaneous world, 
but instead welcomed their heritage of law, religion, and government; Mounted 
Police, Protestant churches, legislative assemblies, and national schools soon 
garrisoned their outpost of civilization...Whatever their hopes, these men 
understood that the West was leading Canada toward a new and greater 
nationality.
42
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This conception of the region included keeping languages other than English out. As historian 
P.F.W. Rutherford explains in his analysis of western Canadian newspapers between 1870 and 
1896,   
Most important, they asserted that the language, culture, and ethos of the west 
must be English. The west was destined to become 'a modern, democratic, Anglo-
Saxon community'. Even more than Ontario, the west seemed committed to the 
ideal of a thoroughly English Canada. Thus the francophone minority constituted 
the major threat to their community.
43
 
 
Most threatening were francophone political leaders such as Joseph Royal or Archbishop 
Alexandre-Antonin Taché, both prominent defenders of the francophone community in Manitoba 
and well connected to both the Catholic church and the Quebec political community. The press 
portrayed them, and other francophone leaders as "interlopers without any stake in the 
community."
44
  
 Weak francophone settlement from Québec, as well as Anglo-Canadian frustration with 
the lack of representative government following the 1885 Rebellion, contributed to a movement 
against French and dualism in the region. English-speaking political circles in the West conflated 
Riel with the more general cause of the French language in the region, even if many 
francophones did not support Riel. Sympathy for Riel in Québec led to an increased suspicion 
among Anglo-Canadians of francophones in the Territories. English-language newspapers in the 
region did not take kindly to Quebec's defense of Riel and the Rebellion. The Saskatchewan 
Herald declared that the francophones were already receiving special treatment that they did not 
deserve:  
Speaking for the North-West especially, we say that the liberality of the majority 
has conceded to the French element rights and privileges not accorded to any 
other race; their prejudices have been consulted to the detriment of the majority; 
and they have been favored in many ways in a manner to which their numbers 
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give no claim. If, however, they demand absolute control of all the affairs of the 
country as a peace-offering for what they consider a national insult in the 
hanging of Riel, it will certainly lead to a revision of this state of affairs, and 
they will be forced to take their place in confederation on an equal footing with 
the other Provinces.
45
 
 
The francophones would simply have to accept whatever form of dualism the majority 
determined for them. John A. Macdonald took a similar view, arguing to Minister of Justice 
Joseph-Adolphe Chapleau that dualism was a thing of the past in the region, and for 
francophones, "as to their rights, they have been more than recognized."
46
 The Territorial press 
wrote that while the French Canadians were not to blame for the Rebellion, French-Canadian 
sympathy for Riel meant that they could not be trusted in the region.
47
 Their loyalty to the North-
West and its development remained open questions.  
 One such example of this sentiment was the wave of protest that followed the 
appointment of Joseph Royal as the new Territorial Lieutenant Governor.
48
 For Territorial 
opinion leaders, there were few illusions as to why Royal was chosen. As the Edmonton Bulletin 
put it, "Mr. Royal's claim to the lieutenant governorship lies in the fact that he is of French race, 
while the chief opposition that he will encounter will probably be on the same account."
49
 By 
putting a French Canadian in the highest office of the Territories, Macdonald was likely hoping 
to settle down the political storm in Quebec following Riel's hanging. Macdonald could also 
assure his allies in Quebec that French-Canadian rights would be protected by a lieutenant 
governor chosen from among their people.
50
 The Regina Leader argued, however, that Royal or 
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any other French Canadian would be a poor choice for the position since Royal's cultural 
background left him sympathetic to Riel's plight: 
...we say it cannot be a matter of surprise if the excitement got up in Quebec about 
the execution of Riel, because he had a little French blood in his veins, has stirred 
up kindred sentiments in the bosoms of the people here in the North-West...Under 
those circumstances French Canadians need not be surprised if the rumor that we 
were to have a French Canadian Lieutenant governor has amongst an English 
Canadian population created some excitement. Perhaps it would have been 
received without a murmur had there been no such manifestations as have taken 
place in Quebec.
51
   
  
Royal would be even more repugnant as lieutenant governor given that democracy had yet to 
arrive for the Territories. "To give the people of the North-West a ruler who would not be 
welcome to them," the Leader fumed, "would be an act of high-handed tyranny."
52
 The French-
language question would eventually be caught up in the regional movement for representative 
democracy. The fact that Royal was a loyal Conservative and probably held little sympathy for 
Riel did not deter the territorial press from its objections, nor did it stop former lieutenant 
governor Edgar Dewdney from privately expressing his disgust about the appointment to John A. 
Macdonald.
53
 
 The attacks on Joseph Royal expanded into attacks on francophones in the region. P.G. 
Laurie, editor of the Saskatchewan Herald, argued that French speakers in the territories had 
already been given too many rights that no other groups enjoyed, and that francophones should 
"not be carried away with the idea that they can over-ride all law and govern the country by 
resolutions and manifestoes emanating from the slums of eastern cities."
54
 In the minds of 
political leaders, French had nothing to do with the blueprint of western Canada. Like their 
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present political institutions, the French language had been imposed on them by Ottawa and 
Quebec, and lacked democratic legitimacy. Royal's presence at the head of the Territorial 
political machinery, in addition to the official status of French, were simply unacceptable to the 
type of society being constructed in the West. As the push for responsible government gained 
traction in the 1880s and 1890s, one of the core ideals for the movement was the elimination of 
French as an official language in the name of economy, but also in the name of democracy and 
self-determination. 
 "Democracy" arrived in the Territories in 1888, when the Legislative Assembly of the 
North-West Territories was established by federal statute in May. Elections were held at the end 
of June and the results yielded no francophone representation. Charles Borromée Rouleau, a 
judge who worked as a stipendiary magistrate in the North-West since 1883, sat as one of the 
Assembly's three "legal experts" but had no voting power.
55
 As lieutenant governor, Joseph 
Royal was well-positioned to defend the status of French because the newly-elected Territorial 
Assembly had little real powers at its disposal. Aside from a small advisory council composed of 
a few elected members of the assembly, all executive authority remained with the lieutenant 
governor with the exception of some financial matters.
56
 Moreover, as long as the status of 
French remained under federal jurisdiction rather than local legislation, the new assembly could 
not modify it. Royal was therefore a popular choice for the local francophone population, 
although some francophone leaders worried that his appointment would cause a backlash against 
French.
57
 Macdonald advised Royal not to keep another prominent francophone, Amédée Forget, 
as Clerk of the new Assembly. Two francophones in high executive and administrative positions 
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could arouse suspicions.
58
 Forget was appointed as assistant Indian Commissioner instead, but 
was also retained by Royal in order to revise and consolidate the Territorial Ordinances.   
 The expansion of local government powers in the Territories did little to quell 
nationalistic sentiment among British Canadians in the region. They expected to use their new 
legislative powers to confirm the true character of the region's political community. As the first 
session approached, several newspapers attacked separate schools, particularly their instructional 
use of French.
59
 Shortly after the elections in June and Royal's swearing in to office in July, the 
Qu'Appelle Vidette urged legislators to foster unity by adopting "one nation, one language" as the 
Territorial motto and by abolishing the official use of French in schools and legislative 
institutions.
60
 The Regina Journal bluntly argued for a complete end to the use of French and 
Catholic schools.
61
  
 
Territorial Democracy and the French Language (1888 to 1890) 
 The first session of the first Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories opened 
on 31 October 1888 with Royal reading the Speech from the Throne in both English and 
French.
62
 Members gave little attention to this show of dualism, instead turning their attention 
towards the use of French in schools as they updated the School Ordinance. They made it 
mandatory for at least one primary course to be taught in English. Trustees were no longer 
allowed to choose curriculum, making it difficult to encourage the teaching of French.
63
 Two 
more changes to the ordinance were proposed but dropped due to Royal's insistence: that 
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religious instruction be outright prohibited in the Territories, and second, that the Board of 
Education be replaced by a minister from the Assembly.
64
 While neither of these amendments 
specifically attacked the French language, the first would have irreparably damaged the Franco-
Catholic clergy's ability to keep a francophone character in Catholic education, while the second 
would have granted even greater power in educational administration to an entirely Anglo-
Protestant and hostile Assembly. At the end of the session in December, Royal and other French 
Canadian leaders worried about what lay ahead given the intellectual and political climate.      
 In 1890 the Manitoba government passed legislation to abolish French and separate 
schools. The Territorial press was pleased. "It is fitting," the Prince Albert Times read, "that a 
progressive western Province like Manitoba, whose population is now being acquired, should set 
the example by declaring that as for us we are determined to be one people, with one language 
and one school..."
65
 It was also a fundamental question for national, but also Territorial political 
leaders. As political scientist Edmund Aunger argues, "the North-West language question 
touched on such fundamental issues of Canadian nationhood that it provoked a bitter national 
crisis, and the original territorial concerns were quickly overshadowed."
66
  
 In a 1890 speaking tour in the West, Member of Parliament and ardent anti-francophone 
nationalist D'Alton McCarthy did his best to stir up trouble in the region. His ideas were popular 
in the North-West Territories. Royal wrote to Macdonald that, following McCarthy's efforts, he 
would "not be surprised if the members [of the Assembly] do memorialize the Dom. Parliament 
to do away with the printing in french of public documents. The wave has reached here."
67
 The 
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Territorial newspapers certainly wanted action on the question. They called on the assembly to 
use Manitoba as a model for progressively eliminating Catholic schools and dualism, while 
others such as the Regina Journal attacked separate schools as hindering the further national 
development of the region. National unity, the papers argued, ought to be the priority in the 
education system. One system of schools was required in order to foster one unified national 
identity. French language teaching, on the contrary, was divisive and endangered national 
unity.
68
 
 Fearing the worst, francophone political leaders outlined their main priorities. Joseph 
Royal, like the Catholic clergy, put more importance on the protection of Catholicism and the 
French language in separate schools than he did in public institutions such as the assembly.
69
 
Before the opening of the second session in October 1889, for example, he told Macdonald that 
printing documents in French, "in so far as all the public documents are concerned, is in most 
cases a useless expenditure of public money."
70
 Royal believed it would be more useful to have a 
select number of ordinances printed in French, such as the School Ordinance, so as to keep costs 
at a reasonable level. But Royal knew where the politics of the Territories were headed. He 
lamented to Macdonald that  
Before immigration commenced to set in, the proportion of the french speaking 
population in the N.W.T. was very large; as a matter of fact they were the 
majority. This condition has been, seemingly, materially changed of late, as 
evidenced by the fact that our present Legislature, although composed of 22 
members elected by the people, does not contain one single french speaking 
representative. It is true I have heard loud complaints against the manner in which 
some districts had been formed, the assertion being that - amongst others - the 
districts of Edmonton and Prince Albert have been so arranged as to leave but a 
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very faint chance to the french speaking electors of being able to elect one of them 
to the Legislature [sic].
71
 
  
 Royal opened the second session on 16 October 1889, this time reading the Speech from 
the Throne in English only, probably in anticipation of the wave of anti-French politics that 
would follow.
72
 The decision would return to haunt him later when the status of French was 
debated in the Assembly. Members took the French language question seriously, making it one 
of their first priorities. A resolution was adopted at the session's opening to petition the House of 
Commons, the Senate, and the governor general to repeal section 110 of the North-West 
Territories Act, "owing to the unanimous opinion of the House on this question."
73
 Apparently, 
there was also "no doubt as to the feeling of the country on the question."
74
 Frederick Haultain, 
James Clinkskill, and James Neff, all able political leaders who were vocal about their 
opposition to dualism, were given responsibility of drafting the resolution.
75
 
 Separate schools were next to come under attack on October 24, when the Legislature 
moved that a second address be presented to the governor general, the Senate, and the House of 
Commons, this time demanding that the provision respecting separate schools be repealed from 
the North-West Territories Act.
76
 Ontario-born B.P. Richardson, member for Wolsely, authored 
the motion. He argued that repeal of separate schools in the territories was necessary because the 
region had changed fundamentally, and it was time to settle the permanent character and 
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constitution of the land.
77
 R.G. Brett -- another Ontarian immigrant, physician, educator, and 
proponent of politics "by the people"
78
 -- argued that the Catholic minority would simply have to 
trust the majority not to abuse its power, and that a unified education system was important 
because it "was the corner stone of our future prosperity and it should be laid properly."
79
 It was 
time to solidify the new political community in the Territories by taking decisive, permanent 
action on these important questions. Perpetuating an education system that had no place in the 
territories would be bad for progress and hamper future development of the region.   
 On 28 October Hugh Cayley, a political Conservative who believed "in high license, 
local responsible government for the Territories,"
80
 presented the special committee's resolution 
on the dual language to the Assembly. The wording was simple and requested that dualism be 
repealed by the federal government because the vast majority of the public was already opposed 
to it, and "the needs of the Territories do not demand the official recognition of a dual language 
in the North-West, or the expenditure necessitated by the same."
81
 During the debate on the 
resolution, Cayley asked that members try to keep their personal feelings out of the discussion. 
Judge Rouleau, however, felt obliged to defend dualism, arguing that the French Canadians were 
as loyal as any other Canadian and should not be punished for speaking a different language 
from the majority. Moreover, Rouleau claimed that the French had special rights. They could not 
be placed in the same class as other immigrants to the North-West. They were equal partners, 
owing to their long history as Canadians.
82
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 Frederick Haultain's defense of the resolution demonstrated the deep intellectual and 
political commitment to eliminating French as an official language. For Haultain and his 
supporters, the dual language provisions of the 1877 North-West Territories Act had been 
imposed on the territories by Parliament, and lacked local democratic legitimacy. It was a 
question of democracy and equality with other Canadians. The goal of the assembly, Haultain 
argued, was to gain "the power to deal with the question themselves, without any restrictive 
clauses."
83
 Dualism was doubly offensive to Haultain and other proponents of responsible 
government, since it was not only imposed by the federal government, but was also paid for out 
of the territorial budget, over which the Assembly exerted a limited amount of control. 
Furthermore, the lieutenant governor was a French Canadian who refused to relinquish executive 
control over finances and expenditures at a time when the assembly was increasingly frustrated 
about its lack of constitutional powers. In the same vein, farmer and Member for Moosomin 
James Neff explained that dualism had no legitimacy in the North-West since "..when section 
110 was put into the Act the North-West had no representation at Ottawa. There was no such 
idea as the taking away their language from anybody, but to have the dual language forced upon 
them was what he objected to."
84
 More moderate members such as Frank Oliver, who 
represented a considerable number of francophones in the Edmonton constituency
85
 and later 
succeeded Clifford Sifton as Minister of the Interior in 1905, insisted that the language question 
was a local matter. The Assembly, Oliver explained, was the best place to decide how to deal 
with minority rights. Judge Rouleau was desperate to oppose the motion; in a last-ditch effort to 
bring it down, Rouleau moved that it be read six months later, but his motion was rejected and 
the resolution adopted. 
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 The language question was part of a larger attempt by Haultain and the assembly to wrest 
more powers out of Ottawa. On 29 October, Haultain and the other three members of the 
Advisory Council tendered their resignation to Royal, arguing that Council had failed in some 
aspects of administration, that the Council's actions did not have the approval of the Assembly, 
and that the powers granted to the council were "concessions" rather than "rights." Responsibility 
without right of financial control, Haultain wrote, was worthless.
86
 Royal dug in. On the advice 
of Parliament, he ignored the Haultain group and nominated a new Advisory Council, creating a 
ministerial crisis and major power struggle between himself and the Assembly.
87
 On 19 
November, Haultain presented to the assembly a special committee report on the structure and 
nature of the Territorial government to be forwarded to Ottawa. The first resolution was the 
repeal of dualism in the Legislature. Territorial Assembly members firmly believed that they 
should be the principal authority on not only the language matter, but a number of others such as 
terms of the Assembly, enfranchisement, powers of the Advisory Council, and control over 
public property.
88
    
 The Assembly's 1889 session made one thing clear: agitation for responsible government 
and constitutional reforms were synonymous with the elimination of dualism and separate 
schools. Questions viewed by the Assembly as essential to the cultural and political foundation 
of the region -- notably, one language and one school -- could not be solved except through 
greater local powers. As W.L. Morton argued, it was a matter of reversing the colonial status that 
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Ottawa had imposed on the region
89
; part of that status was two official languages, which 
members saw as needlessly imposed on them by a distant government.   
 Other francophone leaders in the Territories decried the unfolding situation. At the end of 
the session, Monseigneur Vital-Justin Grandin, Bishop of St. Albert since 1871, sent a letter to 
the Archbishop of Quebec complaining of the difficulties that the francophone population faced 
at the hands of the Assembly. It was a tragic document. Grandin's discouragement and disbelief 
were palpable. "Are not these French Canadians and Half-breeds the men who made possible the 
settlement of the North-West," Grandin wrote, "who rendered more easy the intercourse between 
the white man and the Indian, and who are this day the connecting link between them?."
90
 Where 
was recognition and appreciation for the historical role of the French in helping to open up the 
region? Grandin deplored the "fanaticism" of the Assembly, but did not spare the Quebec clergy, 
lamenting their half-hearted attempts at sending French Canadians out West: "If even one-fourth 
of those who emigrated from your Province during the past ten years had come to us, we would 
still constitute the majority, or at all events be a powerful minority which would have to be taken 
to account and against which none would think of enacting extraordinary laws."
91
  
 
Haultain, Responsible Government, and the Status of French (1890 to 1892)  
  In January 1890 the House of Commons considered the petitions sent by the North-West 
Assembly on dualism and schools. Members of the Commons had relatively little to say about 
any of the proposed amendments to the North-West Territories Act, except for sections relating 
to language. D'Alton McCarthy moved to eliminate the offending language provisions from the 
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act. But despite knowing the volatility of dual language issues in the country, he opted not to 
choose his words carefully and railed against the 1877 amendment to the North-West Territories 
Act, arguing that "if a constitution were framed for a new country, it would never occur to any 
person to do so foolish a thing as to stipulate for two official languages."
92
 Moreover, the French 
language had been "imposed upon the Territories; of course without any consent of theirs...."
93
 
The rest of his speech was an assault on the history of the French language in Canada, ranging 
from the Treaty of Paris to Lord Durham's report up to the present day. It was, McCarthy 
maintained, a question of the deepest importance. Canada could never be united as long as more 
than one language continued to be spoken; moreover, the French Canadians were becoming 
increasingly ambitious, and eventually would have to be put in their place.
94
 
 McCarthy's proposed amendment to the North-West Territories Act sparked a lively 
debate. French-Canadian members assailed McCarthy's vision of Canada and vowed to defend 
their countrymen in the North-West. Some English Canadian MPs sided with McCarthy in 
principle, but found his approach unacceptable and unnecessarily inflammatory. Members 
representing the Territories saw the question somewhat differently from their central Canadian 
colleagues. Prominent journalist and territorial politician Nicholas Flood Davin opposed 
McCarthy's attempt to have Parliament impose a solution on the region because "This is, Sir, 
after all, a North-West question."
95
 To the eyes of a prairie politician like Davin, McCarthy and 
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Ottawa were imposing change on a region seeking to build its own political community. To 
Davin, it appeared that McCarthy hardly even knew much about the Territories before he began 
his one language crusade:  
I am not aware that he ever took a very great interest in our welfare until very 
lately. He himself tells us that he sat in this House time and again when this 
measure was before it, and that he actually did not know that the 110th clause 
existed until the spring of last year. Well, in an ordinary member that would be an 
extraordinary thing, but in a distinguished advocate it is a very marvellous thing 
indeed.
96
 
             
"This question", Davin continued,  "is a local one, and for that reason I consider that it should be 
dealt with by the Local Legislature."
97
 Local legislators had a better understanding of Territorial 
needs, and would know how to deal with dualism. McCarthy, on the other hand, had little 
patience for proponents of provincial rights and those who encroached on federal government 
jurisdiction; in his view the language question in the Territories ought to be settled in Parliament, 
the ultimate authority on the Territories and the nation.
98
  
 Edgar Dewdney, another member with a great deal of experience in the North-West, also 
sought to introduce a more western Canadian perspective into the debate. "During the ten years I 
lived in the North-West Territories," Dewdney argued, "I never, on one single occasion that I 
recollect, heard any objection to the printing of the ordinances in French."
99
 Dewdney believed 
that settlers to the region were attempting to leave behind central Canadian prejudices in favour 
of a new life in a new land. More importantly, however, he explained that members of the 
Territorial Assembly were likely causing a fuss over the French language because they needed 
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more money and flexibility of power in government."
100
 Dewdney even admitted that he would 
have read the Speech from the Throne himself when he was Lieutenant Governor of the 
Territories but his abilities in French were insufficient for the duty and "my audience would not 
know whether I was speaking in Blackfoot, Cree, or French, and I thought it better to leave it 
alone."
101
 He still believed, however, that the language question should be dealt with in a 
permanent manner, and the best way to do so would be giving the Territorial Assembly the right 
to perpetuate or dispense of French according to its wishes.
102
 
 Leader of the Opposition Wilfrid Laurier believed that local autonomy was dangerous for 
the francophone minority in the Territories. In a speech which foreshadowed his vision for the 
creation of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, Laurier argued that Parliament should wait until 
the regional political community took on a more concrete form, or have a major discussion as to 
what rights and liberties should be protected: 
What has occurred is this: a population has gone into those Territories; they have 
been given a Legislature; and that Legislature has demanded certain measures--
not only on the question of language, but on that of the schools, and on the system 
of Government. Bearing these facts in mind, it seems to me that the proper time to 
deal with this question will be when we are prepared to give the Territories, 
perhaps not absolute, but a more extended form of local self-government; and 
when that time comes, we must be prepared to deal with this question upon the 
broad principle of this Constitution, which has been devised for the safety of the 
minority and the protection of the minority, and in the light of the condition of 
things which may exist at that time in the Territories.
103
 
 
Laurier kept his comments focused on broader principles rather than the practical issue at hand. 
Indeed, most members said little at all about the Territories, preferring to meditate on long-
standing grievances between English and French Canadians in Ontario and Quebec. In the 
Senate debates on the bill in April, Marc-Amable Girard, a long time defender of francophone 
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rights in the West, explained that "It would be but fair and just that a voice from the west should 
be heard on this occasion on behalf of the claim of the French people to be allowed the use of 
their language in all parts of the Dominion."
104
 He used an argument in favour of language rights 
in the West grounded in the region's history. The francophones were the first to open up the 
region, Girard argued, and they were its first settlers. It should follow that the rest of Canada 
respect the historical character of the region rather than impose some sort of unilingual status on 
it: "It seems but reasonable, therefore, that the right to maintain our language should be respected 
by the population of the Dominion."
105
     
 In the end, Minister of Justice Sir John Thompson introduced an amendment to give the 
Territorial Assembly power to regulate its own proceedings, the recording of proceedings, and 
publishing. The amendment passed with Davin, Laurier, and Dewdney all voting in favour; 
McCarthy opposed it. The Territorial newspapers followed the debate but interpreted its outcome 
differently. It seemed to settle neither the language question nor the related problem of self-
government. The Edmonton Bulletin found Thompson's amendment to be underwhelming, 
leaving the question almost exactly where it was before.
106
 Nicholas Flood Davin's newspaper, 
the Regina Leader, characterized McCarthy's bill as completely unnecessary since time and 
immigration would eventually accomplish more peacefully what McCarthy was trying to do 
politically.
107
 The Moose Jaw Herald Times argued that "Scarcely any of the speakers in the 
lengthy debate appeared to understand the question or the position of things in the North-West, 
and drifted off into side issues that had no bearing whatever on the question."
108
 The Calgary 
Herald, however, was more optimistic about the amendment and called it "a knock down blow to 
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French pretensions, a great discouragement and mortification to the French race throughout 
Canada."
109
  
 During the November 1891 Territorial election the Prince Albert Times encouraged 
electors to demand candidates' views on dualism. Voters ought to take their decisions seriously, 
since "the foundations of the future are being laid."
110
 Candidates representing constituencies 
with notable francophone populations, such as Frank Oliver in Edmonton, were careful to make 
few promises and take conciliatory positions. Other candidates, especially Haultain, were 
unequivocal in their public declarations to abolish the separate school system and French as an 
official language.
111
 Franco-Catholic clergymen, especially Bishop Grandin, vowed to throw 
their support behind candidates who were sympathetic to French interests; in constituencies with 
large francophone populations, the francophone clergy challenged candidates to make their 
views on schools and French explicit.
112
  
 As in 1888, the challenge for the francophone community was having enough pro-
francophone candidates eligible for office. Joseph Royal suggested to the clergy that some of 
them consider running for office as a last resort. Archbishop Alexandre-Antonin Taché overruled 
the idea.
113
 The francophone vote did have some effect on local races. In Saskatchewan, James 
Clinkskill and John Felton Betts, both strong anti-dualism incumbents, almost lost because of a 
strong francophone turnout. Betts won by a margin of 47 votes, while Clinkskill won by only 34 
votes.
114
 There was, however, an important victory for proponents of dualism. In the St. Albert 
electoral district, a young francophone lawyer named Antonio Prince narrowly beat Daniel 
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Maloney, an Irishman and fellow Catholic who enjoyed the support of the area's business 
community.
115
 Prince and Métis member-elect Charles Nolin (Batoche) would be the only two 
francophones in the Assembly, but it was better than having no representatives.
116
 
 The second Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories met on December 10. 
Royal read the Speech from the Throne in English only
117
, then later called upon Haultain to 
form an Executive Committee, a body now authorized by virtue of the updated North-West 
Territories Act. Haultain chose Clinkskill, Tweed, and Neff.
118
 They immediately set out to solve 
the Assembly's two most burning questions -- the French language and separate schools. Daniel 
Mowat, the member for South Regina who was formerly Mayor of that City, asked if the 
Executive Committee would determine "whether the debates of the House shall be in English."
119
 
With a hint of frustration, Haultain reminded Mowat that the Executive Committee could not 
introduce any ordinances except those regarding expenditures, since the Committee was not a 
government per se, and Parliament had not yet granted the Territories full provincial status. He 
also reminded the Assembly that "The fullest liberty should be allowed any member to address 
the House in French or Hebrew or Greek if he saw fit. It was a matter that could very well be left 
to the good sense of the members themselves."
120
 In terms of printing the journals in English 
only, however, Haultain assured the Assembly that a resolution was being prepared. On January 
19, pleased that Assembly now had the power to do so, he moved that "it is desirable that the 
proceedings of the Legislative Assembly shall be recorded and published hereafter in the English 
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language only."
121
 For Haultain, the motivation was clear enough: the journals were "rarely, 
perhaps never, needed by any person who was unable to read them in English."
122
 The money 
would be better spent elsewhere. On division Haultain's resolution passed by twenty votes to 
four.  
 The Haultain resolution was an important step in the abolition of French in the Territorial 
political community. But the Assembly was not ready to stop there. Next, it attacked dualism in 
separate schools. Under the new School Ordinance, no clergyman could act as a superintendent, 
inspector, or trustee; there were few areas where the clergy could now participate in school 
governance. More important, however, was the amendment making English the sole language of 
instruction in all schools, regardless of denomination.
123
 In December the Territorial Assembly 
adopted section 83 of the amended School Ordinance, which provided that "All schools shall be 
taught in the English language" with one clause allowing trustees to permit one primary course to 
be taught in French.
124
 Royal assented to it on December 31. This provision on language of 
instruction would remain on the books in Saskatchewan, in more or less the same form, until 
1967.  
 1892 was a bad year for francophones in the Territories. They had seen the end of 
dualism in the Legislative Assembly; now it had ended in education. Caught in the crossfire 
between British Canadian nationalists such as McCarthy and proponents of Territorial autonomy 
such as Haultain, francophones in the Territories could do little to defend the progressive erosion 
of dualism. For nationalists, French was in the way of a British west; for Haultain and 
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proponents of Territorial autonomy, French was in the way of wresting more power away from 
Central Canada.  
 Almost a century later, some scholars dispute whether or not Haultain's resolution 
actually had the effect of repealing the official status of French.
125
 Royal only gave royal assent 
to the School Ordinance. As such, according to some authors such as Claude-Armand Sheppard, 
French still enjoyed official status in the Territories even after the Haultain resolution. From the 
point of view of the values of the political community, however, this assertion misses the mark. 
Whether or not Haultain's resolution had legal force matters less than the reality that after its 
adoption, the Territorial Assembly governed as though French no longer had any official 
status.
126
 
 
The Education Question in the Autonomy Bill debates, 1905 
 The changes to the North-West Territories legislation did not end controversies over the 
place of French and separate schools in the western political community. In 1905, as Parliament 
prepared to grant provincial status to the southern half of the Territories, the debate was divisive 
and acrimonious. It laid bare the differences in political vision and blueprints for western 
Canada, and ensured that antagonistic opinions on the place of the French language in the region 
would characterize western politics for another generation.
127
 While this topic has been 
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examined thoroughly in the literature
128
, it is worth recalling the two competing visions of 
Canada and the North-West which emerged during the autonomy bill debates. As historian H. 
Blair Neatby argues, the Autonomy Bills controversy should be understood as more than another 
educational crisis or the sequel to the Manitoba case in the 1890s: 
...the similarity of the Manitoba school question of the 1890s to the school 
question of 1905 is misleading. The situation in the Territories in 1905 more 
nearly resembled the situation in Manitoba in 1870. At both times the problem 
was the creation of a province, and the determination of the educational system 
within the province.
129
 
 
In other words, in 1905 as in 1870, the political crisis was more a question of character, or the 
nature of the political community to be created in the new provinces rather than of constitutional 
politics. While the Manitoba Schools question was undoubtedly a major political crisis in 
Canadian history that involved competing notions of Canada and western Canada, the autonomy 
bills crisis of 1905 bears a closer resemblance to the crisis in national legitimacy that led to the 
creation of Manitoba in 1870. During the creation of Manitoba, as during the creation of 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Canadian state and its leaders were called upon to state their 
philosophy and understanding of Canada itself. In 1905, however, proponents of a British 
Canada, and those who favoured a bicultural Canada, were both determined not to repeat the 
"mistakes" of 1870.  
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 At first, the schools question did not figure prominently in any discussions of provincial 
autonomy, though Laurier remarked in a letter to Sifton that "everybody fears it."
130
 Haultain's 
main concerns were provincial control over public lands and natural resources, provincial rights 
that at the time fell outside of the Territorial Assembly's jurisdiction.
131
 As for dualism and 
separate school rights, Haultain believed that they had both been modified and dealt with to his 
satisfaction.
132
 He did, however, think that the new provinces should have the right to deal 
exclusively with education.
133
 Laurier hoped that provisions related to separate schools would 
pass easily through Parliament even though education was, in his mind, "perhaps under existing 
circumstances the most important of all that we have to deal with."
134
  
 On 21 February 1905 Laurier introduced the Alberta Act and Saskatchewan Act. 
Speaking on separate schools, Laurier appealed for Protestant-Catholic reconciliation. 
Compromise between Protestants, Catholics, English and French speakers, Laurier argued, was a 
key principle of Confederation. By perpetuating Catholic school rights in the new provinces, 
Parliament would be fulfilling the promise of compromise embodied in Confederation. Laurier 
was in a difficult position. He was under a great deal of pressure from all sides. One of the major 
tenets of his political philosophy was provincial rights, a stance which made him popular in 
Quebec but caused him all sorts of trouble when francophone minorities in the West came under 
attack. It would again cause him problems in 1905. As the House of Commons prepared for the 
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new session in February, local francophones in the Territories, in addition to the national 
Catholic hierarchy, put pressure on Laurier.
135
 They wanted separate schools and the official use 
of French enshrined in the new provinces' constitutions.
136
 Opponents of French as an official 
language and separate schools were equally adamant in their belief that neither had a place in the 
region.
137
 
 The opposition, led by Robert L. Borden (who later succeeded Laurier as Prime 
Minister), immediately pounced on the legislation. Borden accused Laurier of raising "in the 
Northwest of Canada for all time to come that question which happily has been entirely absent 
there in the past."
138
 Meanwhile, Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton rushed back from his 
vacation in the United States and promptly realized that Laurier was attempting to entrench full 
equality of separate schools in the new provinces' constitutions. Sifton found the move 
unacceptable and immediately resigned.  
 Sifton did not share Laurier's view that Canada was a compact or compromise between 
two founding peoples. This principle, as Sifton understood it, simply could not apply to the 
West.
139
 The West was a new land, transformed by Sifton's own immigration policy since he 
took over the Interior portfolio in 1896. English-only "national schools"
140
 teaching civic, British 
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values were the only option for the region flooded with newcomers from all over Europe. Sifton 
cut his political teeth in the charged atmosphere of language politics in Manitoba during the 
1880s and 1890s, and his mind was made up about dualism and separate schools.
141
 He was no 
ideologue, but his resignation shows the extent to which the autonomy controversy struck at the 
heart of the western Canadian political community in the making. What sort of character would 
the region's schools, politics, and society have? Would French-speaking Catholics be given a 
privileged place in western institutions along with English Protestants, or would they simply be 
one minority among many in a British region? Sifton understood the implications of mass 
immigration on civil society in the West. He believed schools should be the cornerstone of a 
British political community in the region. In order to build a strong and united Canada, it was 
important that all Canadians, no matter what their origins, be "inculcated with a common set of 
British values."
142
 Furthermore, unlike Laurier, Sifton saw Confederation as limiting French 
Canada, as well as confessional schools, to the province of Quebec. 
 The Regina Standard understood the schools question from Borden's point of view: a 
province's right to determine its own education system. It argued that Laurier was attempting to 
"tie the hands" of North-Westerners by refusing them freedom to choose their own path on 
schools.
143
 The Edmonton Bulletin, a Liberal paper owned by Frank Oliver (who succeeded 
Sifton as Minister of the Interior), noted the increasing clamour in the Territories surrounding the 
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school question.
144
 The anger over schools fit into a more general discontent surrounding public 
lands and the division of the two provinces.
145
 Separate schools were seen by many as having no 
real legitimacy in the North-West, either from a cultural or political point of view. "A system 
imposed upon them in 1875," fumed Robert Borden, "which has continued from that time to the 
present, is now sought to be made perpetual. The people did not freely establish separate schools 
in the Northwest, but these were established under the terms of a statute in framing which the 
people had no voice."
146
 Frederick Haultain took a similar position on schools in an open letter to 
the press on 11 March. The proposed legislation 
...has, further, the effect of petrifying the positive law of the Province with regard 
to a subject coming within its exclusive jurisdiction and necessitating requests for 
imperial legislation whenever the rapidly changing conditions of a new country 
may require them...I recognize neither right nor justice in the attempt to dictate to 
the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan the manner in which they shall 
conduct their own business...The new Provinces have their own futures to work 
out, and I deplore the possibility that they may commence their careers torn with 
dissension upon such subjects as these.
147
 
 
The West was under construction. According to Haultain and other opponents of the legislation, 
it was important to recognize that the region was in its political and social infancy; the newness 
of the region required local flexibility. Enshrining separate schools in the provincial constitutions 
perpetuated the British-Protestant and French-Catholic dualism of central Canada. Ideally, at 
least in the mind of leaders like Clifford Sifton, the West would leave behind the bitter disputes 
between the two nationalisms which plagued other parts of Canada.
148
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 In Parliament, Maitland S. McCarthy, member for Calgary, and R.S. Lake (Qu'Appelle) 
argued that the autonomy bills were unacceptable since Sifton had resigned and the West now 
had no ministerial representative in Cabinet.
149
 John Herron, a former founding NWMP officer, 
rancher, and Member of Parliament for the Alberta provisional district, argued against the 
French-Canadian idea that the francophone minority in the region had special rights or deserved 
any kind of special consideration. The history of the region, at least as Herron understood it, did 
not permit that kind of interpretation of minority rights.
150
 
 On 28 March Henri Bourassa took the floor. Bourassa, a young Liberal member already 
well-known to Laurier because of his knowledge, potential, and passion for politics, was the 
most ardent defender of separate schools during the autonomy bill debates.
151
 He held nothing 
back in his defense of the French Canadian nation. "The men who are committing a crime 
against this nation," he thundered, "are those who, having opinions of their own, are trying to 
shelter themselves under a constitutional pretense."
152
 The West, Bourassa explained, did not 
belong solely to English Canada. The Territories "were purchased and paid for by the people of 
Canada as a whole." 
153
 Bourassa reminded the House that the history of the Territories showed 
little proof that the majority would be kind to the French Canadians: 
We have frequently been told: Why can't you trust the majority of the people of 
the Northwest? Well, Sir, here again I must speak frankly, and I say: No, we 
cannot...continuing myself to a survey of past events, I say now that we cannot 
trust the present majority of the people of the Northwest to stand for right and 
justice. Their record is before us...I have no confidence in Mr. Haultain, who now 
comes here posing as our friend, but who was one of the first men to start a 
movement in the legislative assembly to abolish the separate schools.
154
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 What did the Liberal members representing western constituencies believe? Laurier let 
Walter Scott, who later became the first Premier of Saskatchewan, take the lead for the Liberal 
caucus. Scott was conciliatory in his defence of the autonomy bills. He reminded the House that 
before second reading the education clauses were amended to perpetuate the existing Territorial 
legislation. Even Haultain, Scott pointed out, agreed with the status quo. Scott was also one of 
the only members of Parliament to say that the Territorial legislation protected not only Catholics 
in areas where they were a minority, but also Protestants when they found themselves in the 
same situation.
155
 As for the French language, he had no doubts that the question had been settled 
by the Territorial Assembly.
156
 The debate on second reading ended on 3 May. That day Borden 
proposed amendments to the bills that would allow both new provinces to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over education; on division they were defeated by a large margin, with western MPs 
voting along party lines.
157
  
 
English-speaking Provinces: The French Language in the Autonomy Debates, 1905   
 As the House of Commons went into Committee of the Whole on 30 June 1905, members 
debated the place of French in the new provinces. Frederick D. Monk, Conservative member for 
Jacques Cartier and ardent nationaliste
158
, proposed an amendment: either English or French be 
official in the legislature, courts, printed laws, and journals of the assembly.
159
 Basically, the 
amendment repeated provisions made for French and English in the North-West Territories Act, 
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1877. The goal of the amendment, Monk explained, was to enshrine French in the constitution, 
giving it a status "which has always existed from time immemorial."
160
 Monk's amendment for 
dualism would "secure the maintenance of the solemn agreement which was entered into when 
Rupert's Land was incorporated into and became a part of the Dominion of Canada."
161
 
 Monk's proposal kicked off another long debate over the history of the West. Like 
Bourassa, Monk understood French Canadians as responsible for the region's early development. 
Monk gave a detailed account of the Red River resistance in 1869-70 and explained how 
constitutional protections for French were among the inhabitants' concerns. Referring to earlier 
debates in Parliament and in the West over the French language, Monk argued that anti-French 
politicians were simply wrong in their view of the region's history.
162
 Dualism, Monk 
maintained, deserved special protection because it was French speakers who opened the 
territory.
163
 He also criticized the argument that the francophones did not deserve special rights 
because there were many other ethnic groups in the west. Monk raised a final argument against 
people who placed the French language on the same level as other minority group languages 
because the francophones "were the pioneers of the country and, as I stated before, they obtained 
that guarantee which to us ought to be sacred."
164
  
 Predictably, Monk's speech started a firestorm of protest from almost everyone, including 
some French Canadian Liberals and Conservatives. Wilfrid Laurier characterized the amendment 
as unacceptable because it would, in his view, "limit the right of the new provinces in the matter 
of language and to do for the French language what we have done for the schools."
165
 In other 
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words, if Parliament tried too strongly to protect French, it could create a backlash.
166
 Laurier's 
position on French was ironic. He used the local legislature or provincial rights argument to 
support not entrenching French, while on separate schools he had argued against the principle. 
The question, Laurier added should "be dealt with by them as they see fit in the best interests of 
the public."
167
 Why? The British North America Act provided for some separate school rights 
across the country, while it only mentioned Quebec in terms of language rights.
168
 Moreover, 
Laurier argued, Monk "..has failed in his attempt to show that the French people in the Northwest 
Territories can claim the right of the use of their language upon any authority in the British North 
America Act or upon any reasons which are to be found in the history to which allusion has been 
made."
169
 
 Once again Henri Bourassa rose to defend the principle of dualism in the West. "What 
are we doing," Bourassa asked, "at the present time by this legislation? We are not creating two 
provinces for five or ten years. What will be the character of the population of those provinces in 
the future?"
170
 It was a question of justice for the two founding peoples of the country. 
Furthermore, "..if it is true that in 1901 only four per cent of the population was French, it is 
equally true that only 47 per cent was English speaking, including Scotch, Irish, and Welsh."
171
 
Having English as the new provinces' sole official language was not a neutral measure, it was a 
calculated one which took into consideration the desired character of Alberta and Saskatchewan.  
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  Before voting on Monk's amendment, Robert Borden added his own thoughts to the 
debate. The new provinces, Borden told the House, were not the same as Manitoba, nor did they 
represent the Confederation pact of 1867 -- if there even was one. The Territories were different. 
Borden even said that he valued the French language in principle, but the principle of provincial 
rights, of the right of the new provinces to determine their own destiny, was paramount.
 172
 
 On division, around midnight, Monk's amendment was easily defeated by the government 
by 69 to 6 votes. None of the Territorial members voted in its favour. On 5 July both Bourassa 
and Monk again attempted to introduce French as an official language into the autonomy bills 
before third reading, and again they were defeated by wide margins (140 to 7 and 149 to 7). 
None of the Territorial members on either side of the House supported any of these amendments 
to make French the second official language of the new provinces. As a result, with section 16 of 
the new Alberta and Saskatchewan acts carrying over Territorial legislation and ordinances into 
the new provinces' legislative frameworks, the status of French in the new provinces remained 
ambiguous. 
 The autonomy bills were a major political defeat for proponents of a pan-national, 
bilingual Canada and a victory for a British West. As western Canadian historian D.J. Hall 
explains,  
[Laurier's] one attempt to entrench and possibly extend minority rights had been 
firmly limited. The occasion of granting provincial autonomy was symbolic for 
the French-Canadian minority, because it was probably the last chance that the 
federal government would have to guarantee or expand minority languages in the 
West, even in the limited area of education. It seemed to be the last opportunity to 
give substance to the ideal of pan-Canadian dualism, to give effect to the role of 
the federal government as protector of minority interests, and to recognize the 
aspirations of many French Canada.
173
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The autonomy bills mark the end of the first era of political controversies over French language 
rights and dualism in western Canada. Laurier's failure to entrench full equality for confessional 
schools, and Monk's attempt to have French recognized in the new provinces' constitutions, were 
major losses for the now small minority of French speakers in Saskatchewan and Alberta.  
 It is worth here to briefly discuss one other point. Clifford Sifton's resignation made 
explicit the difference in principle, policy, vision, and historical memory that drove the schools 
and language issues in the autonomy bill debates. Sifton saw the West as a different land, one 
that did not adhere to the definitions many central Canadian politicians applied to it. Considered 
in this light, Sifton was instrumental in determining the principles of the political community of 
Saskatchewan. Given his background as a provincial politician in Manitoba, as well as his role in 
the autonomy bills crisis, he should be considered a founding father of the region along with 
Haultain. While Sifton's vision for the West was not particularly unique or original -- it reflected 
widely-held beliefs of his time -- he was in a privileged position to see that vision fully 
realized.
174
 His categorical refusal to allow dualism or full separate school equality in the West, 
first in Manitoba and then Saskatchewan and Alberta, along with his bringing in of thousands of 
peoples from across the world to settle the region, fundamentally changed the region's character.  
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter outlines the importance of controversies over dualism and the place of 
French in western Canada between 1870 and 1905. It contends that during these years, the region 
was a major battleground for local and national issues related to the French language. At pivotal 
moments in this period of western Canadian political history, the status of French was part of 
major debates over the character of the region. Dualism was more than a legal, constitutional, or 
                                                 
174
 Hall, "Cifford Sifton's Vision of the Prairie West," 78.  
  
72 
 
even administrative concern -- it was a question of the deepest symbolic, cultural, and political 
meaning. What kind of political community would western Canada be?  
 The primary driving force behind the elimination of French as an official language in 
Manitoba and the North-West Territories was British Canadian nationalism and the Territorial 
autonomy movement led by Frederick Haultain. Although historians of western Canada have had 
much to say about Anglo-Saxon nationalism and racism towards minorities during the settlement 
era
175
, this chapter argues that the movement for a British western Canada had a first enemy: the 
francophones. Much earlier than the first real massive waves of settlement which arrived in 
western Canada after 1896, debates on the place of French as an official language figured 
prominently in the regional politics.  
 It would be erroneous to argue, however, that it was only extremists or the most zealous 
British Canadians who were against French. Rather, eliminating dualism along the lines of "one 
language, one nation, one school" was an idea that the English-speaking majority could rally 
behind. British Canadian nationalism joined with local political grievances in the West to create 
a potent anti-French politics. The struggle for responsible government in the North-West 
Territories, for example, used anti-French discourse as part of its political strategy to rally the 
population and wrest more power out of Ottawa. In the North-West Territories, the French 
language served as proof to local legislators of the "colonial" and "inferior" status that the 
Territories had vis-à-vis Ottawa. 
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 For francophone leaders there was a similar confluence of local and national political 
factors which shaped their workings on the language question. The pan-Canadian nationalism of 
the Franco-Catholic clergy and French Canadian nationalists in Quebec such as Henri Bourassa 
fed into a small, local western Canadian movement to preserve French as an official language. 
Francophones in the West, however, unlike their French Canadian allies in Quebec who saw 
French language rights and separate schools as stemming from a long history dating back to 
1763, viewed language rights as based in the old order of the Prairie West. Territorial 
francophone leaders such as Joseph Royal, for example, although originally from Quebec, 
defended the status of French and Catholic schools from a regional historical perspective rather 
than a national one. The French had opened the region, had been its first settlers, had acted as 
crucial intermediaries between Indians and Europeans from the earliest days -- why would they 
not be recognized as a founding people of the region? This interpretation of history and politics, 
while drawing somewhat from the knowledge of Quebec as the centre of French Canada and 
francophone culture, also sought to legitimize the place of French in a region whose historical 
and social circumstances differed greatly from la Belle province.  
 In other words, dualism did not necessarily mean for western francophones what it meant 
for those in Quebec, since it had a different history. Knowledge of this historical difference, 
however, did not preclude francophones in the region from espousing elements of broader 
French-Canadian nationalism, and they often looked to Quebec for political and demographic 
support. But once western francophone leaders realized mass immigration from Quebec would 
not be forthcoming, they became more interested in defending what they felt were their existing 
and hard-won rights rather than making the region liveable for new francophone immigrants. 
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 British Canadian nationalists and political leaders did their best to ensure that the western 
Canadian political community would reflect their vision for cultural and linguistic homogeneity. 
In this respect, anti-French leaders in the Territories differed little from their allies in Ontario and 
other parts of Canada. But they differed in how they interpreted the language question as 
affecting their own political circumstances. Regional responses to the language question did not 
always follow what central Canadians thought. For British Canadian political leaders in western 
Canada, French was not only a local problem stemming from the Riel and Métis agitations, it 
was also something imposed by Ottawa. They could not stand that Ottawa had forced dualism on 
western institutions even though the region's settler population was overwhelmingly English-
speaking. Western leaders in Manitoba and the Territories certainly believed in the importance of 
British institutions in the West, but they had no interest in perpetuating what they saw as a facet 
of central Canadian history and politics -- dualism and separate schools. What was needed for 
conciliation between Ontario and Quebec, they thought, had little to do with the region. Neither 
dualism nor separate schools had any place in the new society being created in the West.  
 Thus, in a way, although British Canadian leaders in the region had succeeded in ridding 
themselves of what they believed had nothing to do with them, they failed in their goals because 
language and religion, rather than being questions of another region and another past, dominated 
the political foundation of western Canada. Indeed, D.J. Hall's conclusion that autonomy was the 
last fight over language in the West cannot be accepted. In 1905 people in Ottawa worried that 
the schools question in particular would drag on for years. Senator James A. Lougheed, 
representative for Calgary (Alberta after 1905) argued that separate schools would be "a bone of 
contention" in the new provinces because it seemed to perpetuate Territorial legislation which 
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was meant to be temporary.
176
 As the following chapter demonstrates, the controversies of the 
1870-1905 period spilled over into provincial politics in Saskatchewan. Provincial autonomy did 
not usher in a new era of religious and linguistic peace for the new provinces; rather, both 
Saskatchewan and Alberta inherited a troubled history of language politics.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
"The Shadow of Politics": Saskatchewan's French-Language Question, 1905-1931 
 
Nos adversaires savent, comme nous le savons nous-mêmes, que l'influence de l'école est toute-puissante. Du 
maintien de nos écoles dépend l'avenir de notre race. Si nous voulons que nos enfants conservent l'idéal français, si 
nous voulons qu'ils parlent et qu'ils aiment la langue française, il est nécessaire qu'ils l'apprennent à l'école; car une 
langue qui ne s'enseigne pas à l'école est une langue appelée à disparaître; une langue qui ne se lit pas, qui ne s'écrit 
pas, est une langue appelée à s'oublier. La langue est en même temps la plus sûre gardienne de notre foi religieuse. 
Nos adversaires le savent; c'est pourquoi ils s'attaquent à l'enseignement de notre langue, sapant ainsi à la base les 
assises fondamentales de notre race. 
 
- Raymond Denis
1
 
 
It is essential to national unity and solidarity that the people of any country should be able to converse and conduct 
their business in a common tongue. That such a condition does not exist throughout the Dominion of Canada no one 
can deny. In every western land office, and in almost every judicial district, we find official interpreters...Of course, 
these conditions are temporarily unavoidable, and nothing else could be expected owing to the heavy tide of 
immigration during the past decade. But the future of Canada depends upon the betterment of these conditions. 
There must be one medium of communication from coast to coast, and that the English language. 
 
- Dr. J.T.M. Anderson
2
 
 
 
Introduction 
 Frederick Haultain, the former Territorial Premier, was angry. Not only had his plan for a 
single western province and provincial control of crown lands been foiled by Prime Minister 
Wilfrid Laurier and the federal Liberals, but Ottawa had also imposed separate schools on the 
new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta.
3
 Haultain was also denied the first provincial 
premiership when Forget asked Liberal politician Walter Scott to form a ministry.   
 This chapter examines key events in Saskatchewan's first generation of political history: 
the first Saskatchewan general election (1905), the First World War (1914 to 1918), post-war 
school/language controversies (1918-1925), and the Anderson government's rise and fall (1925-
1934). During this period, a determined British-Canadian movement hostile to the French 
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language, dualism, and Quebec made its mark on the province by reinforcing the path 
established during the 1870 to 1905 period. Although Saskatchewan political leaders held a firm 
consensus on what type of society they wanted to create, they believed that the cultural character 
of Saskatchewan was fragile and that the work of creating a British West was not yet complete.   
 Francophone involvement in these political events was inevitable because political unrest 
and regional political fervour in Saskatchewan centred on separate schools and non-English 
language instruction. The francophones, well-organized and supported by the provincial Liberal 
machine and francophone-dominated Catholic clergy, were viewed in some British-Canadian 
circles as particularly dangerous because they had a powerful ally in Quebec and in Wilfrid 
Laurier's Liberal government. As western Canadian historian Gerald Friesen explains, 
Relations between French and English-speaking Canadians, and between Roman 
Catholics and Protestants, have often posed serious problems for the Canadian 
nation. In the West, the issue was complicated because very few French-speaking 
and large numbers of east European immigrants arrived during the period of 
settlement. Western defiance of biculturalism, and western suspicions of Roman 
Catholicism contributed to the popular allegation that French Canadians were a 
malevolent force in national councils...The western ideals of provincial rights and 
a new nationality had little in common with the national necessity of French-
English harmony, and distrust of eastern rule could easily be translated into 
distrust of French Canadian Roman Catholics.
4
 
 
British Canadians took decisive action to counter what they saw as increasing French-Canadian 
and Central-Canadian political influence in the region. In their view, under no circumstances 
could French-speaking, Catholic Quebec be extended to western Canada.  
   
The Land of New Beginnings? Saskatchewan's First Provincial Election, 1905 
 Frederick Haultain's frustration over federal government control of resources and separate 
schools was contrasted by the enthusiasm at the provincial inauguration ceremonies in 
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Saskatchewan in September 1905. Feelings of British Canadian nationalism and triumphalism 
were palpable, as though the movement for expansion and settlement of the West had finally 
succeeded. But there was still work to do. In the minds of Governor General Lord Grey and 
many others, the blueprint for the political community of Canada's newest provinces was 
unmistakeable. Saskatchewan, and neighbouring Alberta, ought to be British in language, 
religion, creed, and overall character.
5
 In Saskatchewan and Alberta, British Canadians finally 
had a chance to create an ideal society along British lines and unfettered by the problems of older 
Canada.
6
 As Gerald Friesen argues, 
This militant view of British civilization was a crucial aspect of the western 
Canadian image. But, if western Canadian leaders were proud of their British 
heritage, they were not complacent about British social achievements. They 
insisted that they lived on a frontier and had the freedom to improve upon the 
parent culture...The frontier, in western Canada as in the United States, was the 
land of new beginnings.
7
 
 
 In Saskatchewan, however, bitterness over the autonomy bills lingered, and the separate 
school question dominated the 1905 general election.
8
 Haultain, now leader of the new 
Provincial Rights Party, cast himself as the province's foremost defender of non-sectarian 
schools and provincial rights. "Asked as to the issue," the Toronto Globe reported, "the reply was 
'Provincial rights', and when queried as to whether the school question was not the issue, Mr. 
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Haultain said it was one of the main issues."
9
 During the election campaign, Haultain charged 
that the Liberal party of Saskatchewan had fallen under the influence of the Catholic church and 
that Walter Scott had made a political "compact" with Catholic leaders to "effect the destruction 
of the national school system by granting special privileges in minority schools to the Roman 
Catholics."
10
 The allegation was based on a memorandum released and published in a Regina 
newspaper by Archbishop Langevin of St. Boniface, who argued that Haultain was no friend of 
French Catholics and that francophones should vote as a bloc for the party most sympathetic to 
them: in this case, the Liberal party.
11
 Meanwhile, newspapers sympathetic to Haultain 
lambasted the Catholic church for "meddling" in the election.
12
 Other militant British groups 
such as the Orange Order
13
 sent circulars to Saskatchewan Protestants arguing that Rome and 
Catholic Quebec were colluding to determine the outcome of Saskatchewan's political future.
14
 
To the Orangemen and other anti-French groups, the gaining of provincial status had little effect 
in reducing the menacing influence of French Canadians and Quebec on western Canada. In 
1912, for example, the Grand Orange Lodge of Saskatchewan outlined its view of dualism as one 
of the principal challenges for the province: 
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We have the danger of bilingualism or rather polylingualism in our province -- 
There are schools in this province today where English is treated as a foreign 
language -- As Canadians we desire to see the children of our foreign population 
develop into good citizens of the Dominion. We cannot hope to make the foreign 
element absorb the British ideals until they first master the means of 
communication of those ideals, the English language. The preliminary teaching of 
which should be acquired in schools.
15
 
 
The Liberal party fired back with a circular stating that the Provincial Rights party was making 
"rankly false" declarations about separate schools. It reminded readers that under the new 
provincial constitution, "No better system of national schools has been devised."
16
 The Liberals 
assured Saskatchewanians that the province's schools would serve their intended purpose of 
assimilation.   
 The Provincial Rights party strategy played directly into the hands of the Liberal party.
17
 
Well-organized and supported by its federal counterpart, the Liberals staked their electoral 
success on minority settler communities by promising patronage and some cultural protections, 
and won easily.
18
 They won sixteen seats, seven of which were in ridings with large numbers of 
Roman Catholics and other religious minorities, while all nine of the Provincial Rights Party 
seats were in predominantly British Canadian and Protestant ridings.
19
 Both the Liberal and 
Provincial Rights parties believed that electoral success could be found by exploiting the schools 
and language question in one form or another. Indeed, although Haultain lost the election, his 
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party still received over 47% of the popular vote.
20
 The partisan and sectarian split was more 
than a simple invention of the warring political parties. It was a legacy of territorial politics 
before 1905. Saskatchewan remained divided between those satisfied with some form of 
accommodation for religious and linguistic minorities, and those who felt that only one language 
and one faith could triumph. 
 From a purely legal or constitutional point of view, it is somewhat curious that Haultain 
and the Provincial Rights Party made such a fuss over separate schools in Saskatchewan. Only 
months earlier during the autonomy bill debates, Haultain said publicly that he was happy with 
the 1901 Territorial legislation. He knew very well that the 1901 School Ordinance adopted by 
the territorial assembly was quite restrictive on both religious instruction (none allowed during 
regular school hours) and teaching in languages other than English.
21
 Why, then, did Haultain 
make it his primary cause? The answer lies in a burgeoning regional consciousness, a 
"westernness" amongst some members of the population. Haultain thought he could win on an 
anti-Ottawa stance that included anti-Catholic and anti-dualism biases. The idea that Ottawa and 
Quebec continued to meddle in western politics was a source of deep resentment to supporters of 
the Provincial Rights party, and Haultain believed that he could capitalize on it. No matter how 
strong the hope for a united British future was, western Canada had failed to escape the religious 
and linguistic battles that plagued central Canada throughout its history. The achievement of 
provincial status did little to eliminate these battles; on the contrary, they simply took on a new 
form that followed partisan lines. Haultain, for example, believed that Wilfrid Laurier's vision of 
minority rights, so narrowly thwarted by Clifford Sifton during the autonomy debates, was now 
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being carried out by the provincial branch of the Liberal party in Saskatchewan.
22
 The schools 
compromise of 1905, he charged, was proof of the West's colonial status and Liberal 
Party/Quebec/Franco-Catholic domination of western politics. Even provincial politics, Haultain 
charged, were not safe from outside influence.
23
  
 For Francophones in Saskatchewan, however, the splitting of the language and schools 
question along partisan lines in 1905 was actually an improvement from the old days of 
territorial politics, when the lack of partisanship meant that French language rights were dealt 
with in a consensus-based and often anti-French manner.
24
 Now the Liberal machine counted on 
francophone electoral support in ridings where the community had demographic importance and 
would have to take into consideration the community's views on separate schools and French 
language rights.
25
 French-Canadian political leaders in the West and central Canada knew how 
flimsy constitutional guarantees were without the necessary population and political clout to 
enforce them; the best logical choice for protecting what little guarantees they had left was to 
publicly throw their support behind the Liberal party. 
 
Early Fransaskois Political Organization in Saskatchewan (1905 to 1912) 
 But could francophones actually exert any influence over early politics in Saskatchewan? 
The provincial government did give consideration to the francophone community. William 
Ferdinand-Alphonse Turgeon, for example, was recruited as Attorney General in 1907.
26
 A 
                                                 
22
 The reality, of course, was much more complex. As is often the case with political compromises, nobody was 
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young francophone lawyer, Turgeon was raised in New Brunswick and New York. He 
understood the challenges facing francophone minorities in predominantly English-speaking 
societies, and his legal education in Quebec introduced him to contemporary ideas on dualism 
and French Canadian nationalism. Turgeon was a key link to the Francophone community and 
ensured its representation within the government.
27
  
 In addition to political representation in the form of a prominent cabinet minister, the 
francophone community in Saskatchewan had other reasons to be optimistic. Francophone 
population growth was considerable during recent immigration to the region. 
 
Table 2.1 Saskatchewan: Total Population and Population of "French Origin"
28
 
 
Year Total Population 
French Origin (and % of total 
population)
29
 
1901 93, 064 2,692   (2.9) 
1911 492, 432 23, 251   (4.7) 
1921 757, 510 42, 152 (5.6) 
1931 921, 785 50,700 (5.5)  
 
This increase in population was part of a third and final wave of francophone settlement in 
western Canada, when a number of French bloc settlements were established in the region.
30
 The 
French-speaking clergy hoped that these settlements would serve to reinforce existing 
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francophone Métis communities where Catholic parishes and schools already existed, or to 
create new autonomous enclaves where the French language and Catholic faith could flourish. 
Settlement patterns were diverse in Saskatchewan; a considerable amount of francophone 
immigration came from European sources such as France, Belgium, and Switzerland, while 
French Canadians from Quebec and the United States made up the largest share of new arrivals. 
The effect of immigration on the social and political fabric of the region's existing francophone 
population was considerable.
31
  
 The francophone community in Saskatchewan experienced substantial population growth 
in absolute numbers. During the same era of settlement, however, the province also saw an 
explosion in general population, leaving the francophones as a small minority -- a position they 
continue to occupy to this day.
32
 A final disadvantage for political organization of francophones 
was the geographic distribution of settlements. The distance and isolation of pioneer settlement 
ensured that some francophone settlements could maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy, but 
the lack of concentrated francophone settlement made communication and organization difficult. 
Enclaves were established successfully in some areas. In Saskatchewan settlements were split 
almost evenly between the northern and southern halves of the province.
33
  
 One area where francophones could boast of considerable demographic weight was the 
overall provincial Roman Catholic population.  
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Table 2.2 Saskatchewan: Total Roman Catholic Population and Population of French 
Origin
34
 
 
Year Total Roman Catholic Population Catholics of French Origin (%)
35
 
1901 17, 116 2,692 (15.7) 
1911 90, 092 23, 251 (25.8) 
1921 147, 342 42, 152 (28.6) 
1931 233, 979 44, 680 (19.2) 
 
The preponderance of French Canadians in the Catholic clergy in western Canada
36
 also assured 
that Catholic mass would continue to be conducted in French in a number of communities and 
that the church hierarchy would help secure French education and political representation in the 
province. Thus, if francophone demography could not be brought to bear in the larger provincial 
political arena, the francophones could at least count on representation within the politically 
engaged church. Francophone prominence in Catholic institutions, however, did not preclude 
struggles with other communities. The Irish in particular did not share the Franco-Catholic ideal 
of Catholicism as an institution designed to protect the French language and French-Canadian 
culture. The place of the English language emerged as a major issue between Irish and French 
Catholics as the former group pushed for more English-speaking clergymen in western Canada 
based on the belief that English would be the main language of Canada.
37
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 New francophone settlers helped revitalize the existing communities where French was 
used. The clergy acted immediately to capitalize on the increase in population. In Saskatchewan, 
however, lack of a newspaper and an effective provincial voice made political organization 
difficult for the francophone community. The initiative fell on the one group with a solid 
organizational structure, regular communications, and a shared vision -- the Franco-Catholic 
clergy. Under the leadership of Father A.-.O Bérubé, Saskatchewan chapters of La Société Saint-
Jean Baptiste organized a provincial congress in 1909. Delegates voted to unite all of the Saint-
Jean Baptiste chapters of the province in order to form "La Société Saint-Jean Baptiste de la 
Saskatchewan." An executive committee was given the mandate of expanding the movement and 
creating a French language newspaper for the province.
38
  
 Early in 1910 a number of priests, some of whom had arrived in Saskatchewan with the 
specific goal of establishing a French language newspaper, pooled $10,000 and formed La 
compagnie de La Bonne Presse.
39
 On 22 August 1910, Saskatchewan francophones got their first 
provincial newspaper when Le Patriote de l'Ouest published its first issue. Its slogan, "Notre Foi! 
Notre Langue!," left little question as to its origins and political vision.
40
 Like Le Courrier de 
l'Ouest in Alberta
41
, Le Patriote's founders believed that the newspaper would give legitimacy to 
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the idea of a bilingual Canada and historically-rooted language rights in the region.
42
 The 
newspaper expressed solidarity for French speakers in all of western Canada, since "la cause" in 
Saskatchewan resembled what was happening in Alberta and Manitoba. Le Patriote also vowed 
to recall the importance of history and the memory of the early days of French in the West. For 
proponents of French language rights, this history was crucial to remember because it 
represented the foundation of dualism in the region.  
 
Founding the Association catholique franco-canadienne (ACFC), 1912 
 The dominance of separate schools as a political issue in western Canada played an 
important role in encouraging political organization of the region's francophones.
43
 Danger was 
never far as separate schools remained on the provincial political agenda. In 1912, for example, 
the Saskatchewan Conservatives blamed their loss in provincial election on the Catholic church 
campaigning against their party.
44
 As long as anti-Catholic rhetoric continued to be a regular 
occurrence in provincial politics, the francophone community feared outbreaks of majority 
Protestant anger against its religion and language.
45
 Most community members and leaders 
agreed that the best defense for the French language and culture was its perpetuation through 
education. Politics was, for the most part, a lost cause. The community could influence the 
outcome of elections in constituencies where francophones enjoyed numerical strength, but there 
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could be no "French" government in Saskatchewan. Having Turgeon as a francophone cabinet 
minister was as much as anyone could hope for. Turgeon, ever faithful to the local francophone 
community, continued to show his friendship in a number of ways. He awarded Le Patriote de 
l'Ouest Liberal patronage in the form of advertising and printing contracts.
46
 Turgeon also 
ensured that the government's interpretation of the School Act in 1912, which allowed a primary 
course in French, would not be contested.
47
  
 The community needed a concerted effort to establish, staff, maintain, and administer 
French-language teaching in schools. The church could not carry the task on its own, and aside 
from the newly reorganised provincial chapters of La Société Saint-Jean Baptiste and La Société 
du Parler français in Saskatchewan
48
, no province-wide francophone organisation existed. Both 
societies were founded and based in Quebec which prompted some western Canadian 
francophones to question their appropriateness in a western Canadian context.
49
 The impetus for 
a homegrown francophone political organization was now clear: secular political leadership 
would aid the clergy on the schools portfolio, and effective political organization would take into 
account the particular social and political needs of francophones in Saskatchewan.  
 In February 1912, 450 delegates from across Saskatchewan
50
 met at Duck Lake to discuss 
the founding of a Saskatchewan chapter of La Société du Parler Français. Delegates were 
divided, however, on strategy and structure. Members of the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste de la 
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Saskatchewan preferred expanding their own group to founding a new one. Others argued that 
the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste was too focused on Québécois settlers and French Canadians, 
poorly suited to the specific challenges posed by western Canada, and had little significance for 
European francophones.
51
 Thus, in June 1912, one month before the Saskatchewan provincial 
election, members convened again and founded the Association Franco-Canadienne de la 
Saskatchewan (AFC). Members chose "Franco-Canadienne" rather than "Canadienne-française" 
because they believed that the name was more inclusive of European francophones and offered a 
more accurate reflection of the diverse origins of the province's French-speaking population.
52
 
Catholic influence in the ACF was reaffirmed during the organization's second congress in 1913 
when it changed its name to the Association Catholique Franco-Canadienne de la Saskatchewan 
(ACFC).
53
  
 Province-wide organization yielded results. The ACFC now had opportunities for 
alliances and partnerships with other cultural minorities. Representatives of the German Catholic 
association Deutsche Katholische Volksverein, for example, were present at the ACFC congress 
in 1913 and stated their commitment to standing "shoulder to shoulder" alongside francophones 
in order to defend separate schools.
54
 This partnership was very much a western Canadian 
necessity. Well outnumbered by the Anglo-Saxon majority, it was important for minority groups 
to know who they could count on as political allies. Indeed, although the francophones viewed 
themselves as distinct from other minority groups because of their history, they were not above 
working with others in order to advance their cause.  
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 The early political actions of the Saskatchewan francophone community are notable for 
several reasons. The new French-speaking settlers, while sharing linguistic, religious, and even 
cultural traits with the settled French Canadians, did not share their history. Immigrant 
francophones were thrown into an uncertain social, geographic, and political context that bore 
little resemblance to the places they had left behind. European francophones who joined the 
drive for political organization and la survivance were, however, guided by the French Canadian 
clergy to adopt a political cause that was characteristically French Canadian.
55
 
 Francophones in Saskatchewan could also count on the existing francophone footprint in 
the region from the territorial days. No other minority group could say the same for itself. All 
minorities, including the francophones, shared the pressures of assimilation and feared the 
tyranny of the majority, but the francophones were the only minority who could look to the past 
for support.
56
 Furthermore, unlike other minority groups in Saskatchewan, the francophones 
could count on the political support of Quebec, especially during the early 20th century when 
ardent nationalist Henri Bourassa's vision of a pan-Canadian French Canada was popular among 
many of his compatriots.
57
 Quebec may have let western francophones down by not sending 
many immigrants west during the territorial period, but the regional clergy maintained an 
aggressive and energetic mentality in favour of French education and language rights.
58
 In many 
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ways, then, the creation of the ACFC in Saskatchewan was a quintessentially "western 
Canadian" event: it combined the newness of a different and challenging socio-political 
environment, and new settlers and cultures with the weight of history, older traditions, and 
established institutional structures/models.  
 
A "Wedge for Bilingualism": French and Education During the First World War   
 The founding of the ACFC was timely, as the organization would soon be needed to 
defend francophones against a number of threats. British Canadian nationalism was on the rise
59
, 
movements for direct democracy were gaining in popularity
60
, temperance was at a fever pitch
61
, 
and Canada was at war. The First World War was a transformative event for western Canada. It 
exacerbated many of the existing issues and tensions, including the language and separate school 
questions.
62
 In Saskatchewan, political leaders appealed for unity in order to win the war, but it 
did not take long before suspicion of minorities gripped the politics of the province.
63
 Many 
Anglo-Canadian political leaders believed that the existing legislation, which granted only 
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piecemeal rights to non-English speakers, was too much; schools were not doing their job of 
assimilating the non-British population.
64
 
 During the war, French-language education was a politically explosive issue. A brief 
example serves to illustrate this point. In 1915 the government moved to update the School Act. 
The proposed amendment would allow school boards to hire full-time teachers who were 
competent in languages other than English. This change would help boards save money by 
allowing them to pay for just one teacher rather than a teacher and a language instructor. The 
government believed that it was helping boards that did not want to employ extra staff to teach 
minority language courses.
65
 The conservative-leaning press understood the amendment much 
differently. Interpreted as a "Wedge for Bi-lingualism", it would allow non-English majorities in 
some school districts to hire teachers of their own nationalities, nothing less than a "dastardly 
attack upon the public school system."
66
 Premier Walter Scott subsequently withdrew the 
amendment as opposition to it intensified. In 1916, the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' 
Association, Saskatchewan School Trustees Association, and the Saskatchewan Association of 
Rural Municipalities all adopted resolutions condemning the use of "foreign languages," 
including French, in Saskatchewan's schools.
67
  
 1917 was the war's pivotal year in both regional and national politics. By 1917, popular 
opinion towards minorities was hostile in Saskatchewan. The new School Attendance Act made 
primary school compulsory as the Liberals hoped to quiet anger surrounding minority 
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education.
68
 Schools, race, and assimilation were the key issues as Saskatchewan prepared for a 
provincial election. Many British Canadians could not tolerate their "sons fighting for British 
institutions while foreigners were perpetuating their national languages in Saskatchewan 
schools."
69
 The Loyal Orange Lodge No. 267 of Prince Albert, for example, submitted 
questionnaires -- entitled "One School, One Language, One Flag" -- to all candidates, asking 
whether or not they favoured separate schools. The Order also pledged its support to any 
candidate who favoured eliminating "sectarianism," regardless of party affiliation. The wording 
used by the Lodge illustrated the Orange Order's beliefs on bilingualism in Saskatchewan: 
Are you prepared to resist any special privileges being granted to any section of 
the population of Saskatchewan either on account of race or religion? Are you 
opposed to all bilingual teachings in the schools of the Province and in favour of 
placing the French language on the same footing as other foreign languages? Are 
you in favour of a law providing that all School Trustees must be able to read and 
write in the English language?
70
  
 
The Liberals, not wanting to alienate their electoral supporters but also aware of anti-minority 
sentiment, promised that all children would be given a sufficient knowledge of English in 
schools but that true friends of the British Empire should not appeal to intolerance and racial 
discrimination.
71
 The plan worked and the Liberals returned to the legislature with an increased 
majority.  
 The June election, however, did not settle outstanding social and political issues in 
Saskatchewan, in particular the festering language and school questions. On the contrary, it made 
things worse. The 1917 Saskatchewan election, provincial Conservatives informed Prime 
Minister Robert Borden, was lost because too many British Canadians were overseas fighting in 
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the war.
72
 Their absence left "foreigners," Catholics, and French Canadians to re-elect the Liberal 
party. Conservatives knew for example that Father Louis-Pierre Gravel, a Quebec-born priest 
and founder of the Gravelbourg settlement in southern Saskatchewan, promised to have every 
French Canadian in that part of the province vote Liberal.
73
 One possible solution to this 
problem, the Saskatchewan Conservatives recommended, was disenfranchising non-British and 
non-allied citizens. Several months later Borden introduced the War Time Elections Act, which 
stripped all "enemy aliens" of the right to vote who had not been in the country since 1904.
74
 
William Turgeon thought the law was repulsive, not least because it threatened the party's 
electoral base and "'outraged' the spirit of Confederation."
75
  
 National politics also left Saskatchewan's francophones increasingly vulnerable as the 
conscription debate polarized the country.
76
 Most western Canadians were torn between their 
anger against Borden's Conservatives for campaigning against reciprocity in 1911
77
 and their 
loyalty to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who gave Saskatchewan provincial autonomy and favoured 
reciprocity but now appeared to be pandering to Quebec's anti-conscription stance. Western 
views on federal politics quickly split on cultural and linguistic lines. Laurier's position was 
simply unacceptable to the majority of British Canadians in western Canada, even those who 
considered themselves political moderates. Quebec's position against conscription was a vote 
cast against the Canadian nation and against the Empire. This offensive political vision simply 
could not be reproduced on the Prairies under any circumstances, especially not during such a 
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calamitous war.
78
 The conscription crisis confirmed to western Canadians that the francophones 
in Canada could not be trusted. By the time of the December election, westerners had made up 
their minds: they would have to vote for Borden's Union government. The federal Liberals did 
not support conscription. Western Canadians favoured conscription, and they believed that 
voting Liberal would be allowing French Canada to dictate the entire nation's position on the 
issue.
79
  
 Saskatchewan francophones were ambivalent towards conscription. Many who retained 
cultural, social, and political affinities with France and Belgium readily joined the war either for 
Canada or their home countries. Yet they also opposed conscription, especially the way in which 
the federal government went about getting public approval for it. In a heated letter to W.F.A. 
Turgeon, for example, Father P.E. Myre, a founder of Le Patriote de l'Ouest and strong defender 
of francophone rights in Saskatchewan, denounced the Saskatchewan Liberals who supported 
conscription. It was, Myre fumed, "une acte de trahison au Canada et à Laurier."
80
 In the end 
Borden won the bitterly-contested federal election with massive support in Saskatchewan.
81
  
 The angry atmosphere generated by the 1917 conscription election fuelled 
discontentment with the language and schools questions. Revenge against French speakers soon 
became a rallying point for British Canadians of different political stripes in Saskatchewan. 
Eliminating French and Catholicism in schools was viewed as the first step in dealing with other 
problems facing the province.
82
 As with conscription, British Canadians in the West viewed 
language and schools as more than narrow political questions. They were linked to fundamental 
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beliefs on how the political community ought to be constructed.
83
 The war awakened an already 
nascent suspicion of the "other" in Saskatchewan western society; the conscription crisis in 
particular reaffirmed to British Canadians the dangers posed to their vision of western Canada by 
francophones. Reverend Murdoch MacKinnon, who already disagreed publicly with Premier 
Walter Scott over separate schools and language on a number of occasions during the war
84
, 
summed up the British Canadian position: "French must go. Quebec failed us in the war. We do 
not want Quebec reproduced in Saskatchewan...Let all enlightened citizens speak, write, and 
wire until French goes with German."
85
   
 As the war entered its final year, public clamour for educational reform grew louder and 
could no longer be ignored. In 1918, when the new legislative session opened, Premier W.M. 
Martin presented draft amendments to the School Act to cabinet. All classes would be taught in 
English, and no other language could be taught within school hours with the exception of French 
for one hour a day.
86
 W.R. Motherwell, who held the Agriculture portfolio since 1905, resigned 
from cabinet immediately. The School Act amendments were, he wrote Laurier, "the last straw"
87
 
in Martin's appeasement of Saskatchewan's anti-francophone movement. The bill was completely 
unacceptable, Motherwell argued, since it would take away the teaching of French in grade one. 
Saskatchewan could now boast that it was giving fewer rights to its francophones than "rabid 
mad" Ontario.
88
 Turgeon almost followed Motherwell. As a French Canadian, he was not only 
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opposed to the amendments, but personally offended by them.
89
 He decided to stay only because 
Archbishop Mathieu convinced him that the first year of French instruction could be sacrificed in 
order to keep a francophone representative in cabinet.
90
 In any case, Turgeon's resignation would 
have likely been unnecessary since Motherwell's resignation had some effect on Martin. The 
provision eliminating French in grade one was removed from the bill. English would remain the 
sole language of instruction in schools, but French would be permitted in grade one and could be 
studied as a subject for one hour per day in all other grades.
91
 
 The legislative debate on the new School Act demonstrates how provincial leaders in 
Saskatchewan viewed the status of French in Canadian and western Canadian history at the time. 
Martin defended the new bill, arguing that it did nothing more than codify the tradition of 
granting limited concessions to French speakers passed down by legislation in the North-West 
Territories. He was careful to remind the assembly that the legislation gave nothing more than 
"privileges," not rights, to French speakers.
92
 Martin argued in his speech, however, that it was 
also important to recognize that francophones were special among the minority groups: 
To my mind to treat the French people in the same law as you treat all the other 
peoples who have come to this country and treat them all in the same way would 
be to deal very unfairly with the French people (Hear, hear)...One must take into 
consideration the historical position of these people in Canada and be prepared to 
deal with them in a fair and just manner...The French language in this country 
occupies altogether a different position from the language of people who come 
here from other countries.
93
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Motherwell, pleased that Martin had withdrawn the most offensive sections of the bill, explained 
that it would have been "a tremendous blunder" to take away the French language in schools 
since it was part of the Saskatchewan's history and made no sense at a time when "France and 
Great Britain are being thrown into each others arms more and more as a result of the world's 
war and the outgrowth thereof."
94
 Motherwell argued that the question of the French language 
could not be viewed parochially. Provincial, national, and international contexts had to be 
considered, and the place of French in the West went beyond the region itself. It had major 
political implications for Canada as a nation. With the Liberal caucus supporting the bill, it 
passed easily even though the government had to vote down an Opposition amendment to 
completely abolish French as a language of instruction.
95
 
 Martin's defense of the new School Act did little to pacify opposition to French language 
instruction in Saskatchewan. Many people were simply unwilling to accept the Premier's 
argument that French "privileges" had any place in the province. Both the Regina Daily Post and 
Saskatoon Daily Star argued that the compromise over French was not enough, and that French 
should be banned from public schools along with all other "foreign" languages.
96
 The 
francophone community, led by Archbishop Mathieu and the ACFC, opted against full-on 
confrontation with the government and more militant British groups. Mathieu, in particular, 
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preferred to work behind the scenes in order to avoid stirring up anti-French sentiment.
97
 As a 
leader he eschewed grandiose gestures and political grandstanding.
98
 The ACFC, for its part, 
mounted a promotional campaign about francophone linguistic and educational aspirations. The 
ACFC also created l'Association Interprovinciale in order to help with recruiting French-
speaking teachers from Ontario and Quebec for the province's schools.
99
 Finally, the ACFC 
created an organization for francophone school trustees, l'Association des Commissaires d'Écoles 
Franco-Canadiennes (ACEFC).
100
 Founded as a result of the anti-francophone rhetoric heard 
during the Saskatchewan School Trustees' Association (SSTA) congress in 1918, the ACEFC 
sought to support and train new teachers of French in the province and encourage the study of 
French.
101
 The ACFC approach sought pragmatism above all by working with government. 
 The debate over schools and the French language in 1918 demonstrated that the 
francophones were outsiders to the political community and like other minorities.
102
 By 
portraying francophones as Quebecers, anti-francophone advocates could argue that the French 
language had no place in the West and should remain restricted to Quebec. Admitting that 
French Canadians as a people had a history in western Canada was not an option. Those 
francophones in the West that fought for schools were seen by British Canadian nationalists as 
either foreigners undermining the ascendency of British institutions, or Quebecers hampering the 
war effort.  
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A British Province: Mobilising Against French After the War, 1918-1925 
 The end of the First World War did not spell the end of the controversy over separate 
schools and French as a language of instruction.
103
 War propaganda, nationalism, suspicion of 
foreigners, and distrust of Quebec and French Canadians meant that a renewed battled over 
language was just beginning. A growing chorus of well-organized militant groups, dedicated to 
making western Canada British, steadfastly refused to forget Quebec's resolute opposition to 
conscription and vowed to take revenge for it.  
 The 1920s in western Canada were years when debates over identity dominated 
provincial politics. Feelings of regional discontent were at a new high. The French language in 
particular remained a crucial rallying point for many British Canadian groups since it carried 
with it a number of grinding questions of political controversy: separate schools and the role of 
Catholicism in provincial education systems, assimilation of minorities and the teaching of 
languages other than English, and the role of Quebec in national and regional politics. Quebec in 
particular was the source of much fear and resentment. British Canadians refused to allow 
Quebec to reproduce itself as a society in western Canada.
104
 Ironically, Quebecers also believed 
that they had little influence on the outcome of western Canadian events. Father Lionel Groulx, 
one of French Canada's leading intellectuals, lamented that western francophones "no longer 
know what is meant by the old province of Quebec because our intellectual and spiritual 
influence hardly extends beyond our borders."
105
 Leading intellectuals in Quebec worried that 
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the agrarian revolt, burgeoning regional sentiment in the West, and the popularity of the 
Progressive party in western Canada could even lead to the breakup of Canada.
106
  
 The war reawakened British Canadian ethnic nationalism in the West. By the early 1920s 
many British Canadians regarded immigration and cultural diversity as a hindrance to the 
province's future.
107
 This belief was well represented by George Exton Lloyd, the Anglican 
Bishop of Saskatchewan who first came to the West in 1885 as a young soldier to defend the 
region from the "disloyal" Métis. In a speech to the Grand Orange Lodge of British North 
America, Lloyd deplored the "mongrel" Canada being created in the West.
108
 Lloyd never passed 
up on an opportunity to denounce diversity and proclaim the true character of the West. 
Immigration, Lloyd argued, was compromising Saskatchewan's British character: "The real 
question at stake is not whether these people can grow potatos, but whether you would like your 
daughter or granddaughter to marry them, that is, will they develop into good loyal citizens of 
Canada and the Empire?."
109
 Like Lloyd, many British Canadians feared that years of mass 
immigration were undermining educational and political institutions and advocated for a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the assumptions undergirding Canadian immigration policy.
110
 
 Attorney General Turgeon, with his extensive political experience in Saskatchewan, 
sensed an incoming storm. He informed Archbishop Mathieu that a new anti-French and anti-
Catholic wave would likely hit provincial politics and ignite new controversies by focusing on 
bilingual teachers, schools located in convents, and members of religious orders such as nuns 
being employed as teachers.
111
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 Where can the source of discontentment against francophones and Catholics be located in 
historiography? Earlier studies of western Canadian political history interpret political 
movements against francophones as marginal or extremist outbursts in an otherwise new and 
multicultural society.
112
 In the case of Alberta, for example, western Canadian historian Howard 
Palmer argued that the place of French Canadians in prairie society "does not appear to have 
been of great concern to Albertans in the first half-century of the province's existence."
113
 More 
recently, however, historians have looked more closely at debates over "Britishness" in early 
western Canada and concluded that multiculturalism was more myth than reality
114
, that 
xenophobia was widespread
115
, and that groups such as the Ku Klux Klan were not marginal, but 
important participants in a major debate over the definition of Britishness and political 
community in western Canadian society.
116
 As political scientist and historian Martin Robin 
argues,  
What livened the public mind in Saskatchewan, in the late 1920s, to 'things as 
they were' was an accumulation of fears and prejudices assiduously cultivated 
during previous decades by assorted guardians of public morality. The Ku Klux 
Klan did not invent prejudice in Saskatchewan. It was already there in abundance, 
rooted in groups and processes -- economic, social, and political -- perceived as 
threatening to the status and power of native, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant 
Saskatchewanians.
117
 
 
Discrimination against minorities was not marginal to western Canadian society during the 
1920s. Rather, it was central to political and social discourse. As historian James Pitsula also 
argued, the racism of the KKK differed little from what many people in Saskatchewan thought 
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about non-British minorities during the 1920s.
118
 The Klan shared overlapping agendas and 
members with a number of different groups, and in Saskatchewan its peak membership of about 
25-30,000 rivalled that of major organizations such as the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' 
Association (35,000).
119
 
 A number of organizations and political groups addressed the foreigner question in 
Saskatchewan. They ranged from moderate (farm and labour organizations), militant (Protestant 
church groups and the Royal Canadian Legion) to extreme (the Orange Order
120
, National 
Association of Canada, Ku Klux Klan) in their views.
121
 All agreed that the status quo was 
unacceptable and that the core value of assimilating minorities, brought to the forefront of 
Saskatchewan politics during the Great War, must not be forgotten. The French Canadians were 
the principal enemy on the front line of this troublesome issue because they had a special status 
that other minority groups did not. They represented what the Saskatchewan political community 
would not accept: official recognition of minorities in the region. Moreover, Saskatchewan 
francophones' political and cultural connections to Quebec stirred Protestant fears of Rome and 
Quebec exerting political control over the destiny of western Canada.
122
  
 Protestant leaders were the among first to speak out against the French language and 
French education.
123
 University of Saskatchewan Professor Edmund H. Oliver argued that 
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immediate action bolstering national schools was necessary in order to prevent the province from 
becoming another "polyglot Austria."
124
 Reverend S.P. Rondeau, a francophone and United 
Church minister, was one of the more colourful Protestant figures and a member of the KKK. He 
argued that anywhere the francophone Catholics formed a considerable part of the population in 
Saskatchewan, the rights of Protestants were ignored.
125
 Rondeau argued that francophones in 
western Canada would stop at nothing to achieve bilingualism and a dual French-English society 
outside of Quebec. He also believed that they had a powerful ally in the federal government, 
where Quebec MPs exerted considerable influence. Others saw the link to Quebec as a sinister 
francophone plan to force bilingualism on the West. When the Anglican Church learned that the 
federal government was using Roman Catholic priests in order to help bring francophone 
immigration from Quebec to Saskatchewan, it denounced the scheme as a plan to turn 
Saskatchewan into a bilingual province. Other troubling signs were that federal forms were being 
made available in both English and French, and individuals were being told that they could use 
French when addressing certain government departments.
126
 
 Agitation against francophone education soon reached a boiling point. Reverend Rondeau 
railed against public schools in francophone Catholic communities such as Gravelbourg and 
Ferland, where teaching was conducted in convents and by nuns, even though there were no 
complaints from ratepayers.
127
 In the Ethier School District, a lone Protestant ratepayer 
complained that the school was little more than a Catholic chapel and that provincial law was 
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being flouted by the francophones who were teaching French "from morning to night."
128
 These 
educational arrangements were completely unacceptable to groups like the Orange Lodge
129
, 
who denounced them as pandering to francophones by unscrupulous politicians who were giving 
Saskatchewan francophones rights that they did not deserve.
130
   
 To Saskatchewan francophones, it was painfully obvious that the old Liberal politics of 
minority accommodation had changed, especially since the end of the war. William Turgeon 
resigned in 1921 to accept a judicial appointment; he was the oldest member of the Liberal 
government and with his departure, Catholics and the francophone community lost their main 
cabinet representative. Premier Martin, whose feelings towards the francophone community 
were ambivalent, assumed responsibility of the Attorney-General portfolio.
131
 Another troubling 
sign was the government's new approach to education. The 1918 School Act still permitted some 
education in French but placed it at the discretion of school boards. The government refused to 
create a French curriculum or provide French language resources.
132
 The Department of 
Education increased its oversight and inspection of schools in francophone communities and 
undertook a number of investigations into British Protestant allegations of abuse.
133
 Moreover, 
the Minister of Education refused to appoint bilingual inspectors for school boards where French 
was being taught. Francophones inspectors were assigned to English schools while 
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predominantly French-speaking communities like Bellevue and Domrémy had to make do with 
hostile unilingual anglophone inspectors.
134
 
 The francophone community changed its activism strategy in 1925. That year, morale 
was low at the ACFC when Raymond Denis took up leadership of the organization. Denis was 
an able and intelligent man, already well known in the francophone community for his 
confidence, leadership, and political astuteness.
135
 He took the ACFC in a new direction, 
preferring action, audacity, and even open confrontation to the behind-the-scenes lobbying still 
favoured by some members of the clergy. The francophones, Denis argued, must meet their 
adversaries in battle rather than fear them. This new approach focused on public visibility and 
open politics, and was well-received by many members of the ACFC since the organization's 
initial strategy of ignoring anti-French groups was ineffective. Even Archbishop Mathieu noted 
his approval in the new ACFC outlook as long as the francophones remained prudent and 
moderate in their response.
136
 Denis was not one to shy away from controversy or political 
debates. Wherever schools and the French language were threatened, he declared, Saskatchewan 
francophones would rise to the occasion: 
Il faut montrer à nos adversaires, qu'ils portent des capuchons la nuit ou qu'ils 
n'en portent pas, qu'ils ont manqué leur effet, parce que nos districts d'école sont 
solidaires les uns des autres. Lorsqu'un district est attaqué, tous le sont par le 
même et tous ont le devoir de concourir à le défendre...lorsqu'ils n'ont fait que 
remplir leur devoir, et qu'ils sont des victimes du fanatisme mesquin et bête de 
nos adversaires, notre devoir est de les aider dans la mesure de nos forces.
137
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On the education portfolio, the results of Denis' new approach were immediate. Rather than 
remain in administrative deadlock with the Department of Education, Denis instructed the ACFC 
to simply appoint its own school inspectors or "distingués visiteurs" who, while lacking official 
department approval for their actions, were nonetheless used by the ACFC to report on the 
quality of French education around the province. After all, anyone could legally "visit" a school 
as long as local trustees approved it.
138
 That same year, the ACFC also mounted its own 
educational program for French schools which included examinations, diplomas, and scholastic 
awards.   
 Denis also strengthened links between francophones in Saskatchewan and Quebec.
139
 
From 1925 to 1928 the ACFC spearheaded a number of trips to Quebec called "voyages de la 
survivance." These trips were "patriotic pilgrimages" to improve relations between francophones 
in the West and la Belle province, and to ensure that French Canadians in Quebec knew the 
precarious situation in western Canada.
140
 The ACFC, in conjunction with francophone 
associations in Alberta and Manitoba, also scored a considerable victory for teacher recruitment 
following a troubling Saskatchewan government announcement that any French teacher recruited 
from Quebec must be proficient in English.
141
 Rather than pressure the Saskatchewan 
government to reconsider the new regulations the ACFC lobbied Quebec to change its normal 
school program for teachers to include courses in English so that they could also teach in western 
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Canada. The plan worked. Quebec directed its schools to provide English courses so that their 
graduates would be qualified. Teachers from Quebec could now work in Saskatchewan's schools, 
helping francophones in the province solve the critical problem of finding bilingual French 
teachers.
142
     
 
The Rise of J.T.M. Anderson and the Revenge of the Conservatives, 1925-1929  
 
 As the ACFC gathered strength under the leadership of Raymond Denis, provincial 
politics continued to move away from the old Liberal-minority consensus. The Klan busied itself 
consolidating its numbers and ramping up attacks on Catholicism and French Canadians. Klan 
organizer J.J. Maloney reported that the Liberals were pandering to the "foreign vote," "catering 
to Rome," and allowing the use of the French language in government.
143
 The fight for bilingual 
teachers led by Denis and the ACFC had not gone unnoticed by the Klan. Lewis Scott, another 
Klan organizer and close ally of Maloney, informed Saskatchewan Premier Jimmy Gardiner that  
We will oppose in every way possible the enforcing of bilingualism in this 
province. We believe in UNITY of the Canadian People and that in this great 
NATION we should have ONE LANGUAGE, and do not wish to see this part of 
Canada divided by language as is found in other parts of the world.
144
    
 
Klan ideology dovetailed well with Protestant fundamentalism and British Canadian 
nationalism.
145
 The Klan sought to convince people in Saskatchewan that francophone Catholics 
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in western Canada sought to establish a second Quebec in the West.
146
 Quebec, and by extension 
French speakers in the West, were portrayed as a principal threat to British Canadian values and 
ascendency in the province.
147
 The anti-Catholicism of the Klan borrowed from American ideas 
of Anglo-Protestant supremacy and applied them to the regional context of politics in western 
Canada. In western Canada, opposing Catholicism and separate schools necessarily meant 
opposing the francophone threat as well. The loyalty of francophone Catholics, so the argument 
went, was to Quebec and Rome, not Canada and Britain. If some parts of the population 
continued to hold such misguided views it would be impossible to properly build a unified nation 
and society.
148
 As S.P. Rondeau bitterly complained, "All our troubles, all the sedition, plotting 
and plans against the national school system are hatched in Quebec."
149
 
 The political battle over separate schools, French language rights, minorities, and British 
ascendency, which stretched back to the earliest political days of western Canada, was reaching a 
critical point. Premier Gardiner attacked the Klan publicly. The KKK, Orange Lodge, and 
members of the Anglican clergy helped orchestrate a number of complaints in 1926 that 
Protestant students, who were a minority in francophone Catholic school districts, were being 
forced to use French textbooks that were "sectarian," "Quebec-based," and full of "Catholic 
ideology. Premier Gardiner fired back, arguing that Canada was a partnership between French- 
and English-speaking peoples, that respecting French rights was what defined Canada as a 
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British nation, and that the French-English partnership established early in Canadian history 
could be an example of diversity and tolerance for Saskatchewan.
150
 Gardiner also painted the 
Klan and its supporters as overly American and un-British, and vowed that his government 
would not kowtow to such a group.
151
  
 Nobody was willing to back down. Protestant church ministers, the Klan, and the Orange 
Lodge continued to organize political attacks on the use of French in schools. In 1928 they raised 
more complaints against a number of school districts, alleging that French was being used as the 
language of instruction past grade one.
152
 The communities of Ferland, Gouverneur, Begin, 
Gravelbourg, Bruno, Poirier, Val Marie, and Moose Pond were all embroiled in controversies.
153
 
All of these communities also had significant francophone Catholic populations and suffered as a 
consequence. In Gravelbourg, Protestants were enraged that the public school was housed in a 
convent, while at Courval the school was defaced by someone claiming "unfair conditions in this 
public school demands [sic] investigation and action."
154
 At Ferland, a group of people broke 
into the school and removed crucifixes from the walls. In Val Marie the school board secretary 
tried to postpone the annual board meeting due to the death of his wife but forgot to remove the 
public meeting notices; anti-Catholic community members held the meeting anyway and an all-
Protestant board was elected.
155
 The ACFC, true to Denis' combative spirit, was instrumental in 
defending community interests. It moved quickly to help trustees in several francophone school 
districts, including Moose Pond and Gravelbourg, by paying for legal fees and offering political 
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support. The work of the ACFC allowed trustees to have the allegations against them 
dismissed.
156
  
 
Denying "French Control": The 1929 General Election in Saskatchewan 
 The 1929 election was viewed as a referendum on the burning questions of the decade, 
particularly separate schools, immigration, and the cultural makeup of Saskatchewan.
157
 The 
electoral campaign was bitter.
158
 The vice-president of the provincial Conservative party, J.F. 
Bryant, warned that if the pace of Catholic immigration from continental Europe to 
Saskatchewan continued, the "French [would] control the political destinies of Quebec, 
Saskatchewan, and all of Canada."
159
 The Conservatives lambasted the Liberal government, 
telling voters that Premier Gardiner wanted to make Saskatchewan a bilingual province and that 
under the Liberals' watch, the francophone population was doing that.
160
 Conservative leader 
J.T.M. Anderson argued that the Liberals had let down the population by not taking into account 
the "danger which knocks at our gates."
161
 Voting Conservative, the party argued in its campaign 
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messaging, meant ending the divisive presence of Catholic schools and neutralizing the influence 
of Quebec and the Catholic church in provincial politics.
162
 
 Premier Gardiner's strategy followed the usual Liberal plan which had kept the party in 
power since 1905: portray the opposition as bigots appealing to racial and religious zealotry, and 
insist on the economic and administrative success of the Liberals. Gardiner attacked Anderson 
for his classic treatise on assimilation in education, The Education of the New-Canadian
163
, 
holding the work up as proof of Anderson's lack of respect towards new Canadians. But the 
Liberal strategy could not quell the desire for change. Gardiner's Liberals won 24 seats and 
Anderson's Conservatives won 24 as well. Anderson formed the Cooperative Government with 
five Progressive members and some independents when Gardiner's government lost power on a 
non-confidence motion.  
 The 1929 election demonstrated that the separate schools and bilingualism questions 
were still important in Saskatchewan, even twenty four years after the province was founded. 
Moreover, while the francophones were a small minority in western Canada, their place in 
provincial politics was not. To a restive anti-bilingualism movement, the francophones were at 
the forefront of the battle because they represented a different idea of the Saskatchewan political 
community. They represented the idea of cultural partnership between anglophones and 
francophones raised by Monk, Bourassa, and Laurier during the autonomy bill debates in 1905. 
These ideas were simply unacceptable to those who saw Saskatchewan as a British political 
community where the best people, institutions, and society of the British Empire would flourish. 
The opposing vision of bilingualism and cultural survival espoused by francophones could not be 
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allowed to sunder the promise of a British West. In the minds of the KKK and the Orange 
Lodge, the hand of Quebec and the Catholic church was guiding the region's francophones, who 
in turn were supported by the provincial Liberal machine. The only way to stop the francophones 
was to unite against them and make the majority realise the seriousness of the task at hand. The 
ACFC sensed the danger in the campaign rhetoric. Knowing that its history of cordial relations 
with the Liberal party put it in an awkward and vulnerable position, the Comité exécutif told its 
members that French Catholics were free to vote for whomever they chose and that the ACFC 
had never officially taken sides with one party or another since its founding.
164
 But, the ACFC 
continued, it was important for francophones to vote for the party that would be most 
sympathetic to francophones.
165
  
  
French-Language Rights and the Anderson Government (1929 to 1934) 
 As Premier J.T.M. Anderson organized his new government, he also assumed 
responsibility for a portfolio in which he had a great deal of expertise -- education. Not content 
with his electoral victory over the Liberals, Anderson immediately announced that the previous 
Liberal government had allowed schools to be used for Catholic proselytizing and propagating 
"anti-British" messages.
166
 From Anderson's point of view, even the ousting of the Liberals 
would not completely rid Saskatchewan of Catholic Quebec's influence. Others agreed. When 
the federal Postmaster General stated that some post offices would offer French language 
services in Saskatchewan, the Conservative Saskatoon Daily Star denounced bilingualism and 
Quebec's interference in Saskatchewan affairs. The printing of the report of the Royal 
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Commission on Radio Broadcasting in both French and English in a single volume also raised 
the ire of the Star, which called the it an attempt "to force French upon the people of the British 
provinces."
167
 "What are we in Canada," the paper thundered, "a colony of Quebec?
168
" At the 
next federal election, the Star warned, Saskatchewanians would let the federal government know 
what they really thought about bilingualism.
169
  
 Anderson's first major decision as Premier was to undo the ACFCs work on bilingual 
teachers and rescind the exchange of teaching certificates with Quebec because their formation 
was "inferior" to that offered in Saskatchewan. He also promised to investigate allegations of 
illegal French teaching in schools.
170
 The Quebec government, acting on the request of the 
ACFC to look into Anderson's accusations, insisted that its graduates were as competent as those 
in Saskatchewan.
171
 Next, Anderson announced that English would be the only language of 
instruction in Saskatchewan's schools. Denis and the ACFC were furious and vowed to oppose 
the legislation. Religious instruction in French was particularly concerning for the francophone 
community.
172
 In January 1930 the ACFC held a private meeting with Anderson who suggested 
that the francophones simply close the school at noon hour or after 3:30PM and offer French 
catechism during those times.
173
 It took Anderson's advice and worked around the law by 
offering religious instruction in French after the closing of schools from 3:30 to 4PM.   
 The francophone community was dealt another crucial blow when Archbishop Olivier 
Elzéar Mathieu died at the end of 1929. Saskatchewan francophones could no longer count on 
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Mathieu's sound judgment, tact, and diplomacy which defined his years as Regina's first 
Archbishop.
174
 As debates over education and the Anderson amendments continued, the clergy 
missed the clear direction that once characterized Mathieu's leadership.
175
 Furthermore, Mathieu 
was succeeded by an Irish Catholic as was Archbishop Emile Légal in 1920. These new 
Archbishops lacked the empathy and political drive that characterized the leadership of Mathieu 
and Légal, and mark the beginning of the decline in French-Catholic political influence in 
western Canada.
176
 
 The decline in francophone clerical influence meant that the ACFC had to redouble its 
efforts. Raymond Denis took up Mathieu's diplomatic work, meeting with Anderson before the 
first session of the Legislature began in February 1930. Anderson assured Denis that he was "not 
bigoted or biased in any way" and that "no minority in this province is going to be persecuted by 
any Government I have the honour to lead, nor is any minority going to be allowed to impose its 
beliefs upon a majority."
177
 The reassurance rung hollow for Denis and the francophones. Their 
mistrust was only confirmed when the session began and Anderson introduced the government's 
first piece of legislation, Bill 2, which banned religious symbols and religious garb in public 
schools during instructional time. British Protestants applauded the new amendment. The Daily 
Star argued that Anderson's amendment carried out the spirit of the School Act as conceived by 
the province's father, Frederick Haultain.
178
  
 The ACFC denounced the new School Act and asked priests across the province to 
mobilize francophone opposition to it. Although the ACFC saw religious instruction and 
language issues as somewhat separate from one another, Denis believed that if the government 
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eliminated religious instruction, language amendments would soon follow.
179
 A flood of 
telegrams were sent to the Premier in a last-ditch attempt to change Anderson's mind but they 
had no effect. He was determined to make good on his promises to further reduce Catholicism in 
Saskatchewan schools.
180
    
 The noisy editorials of the Daily Star and the Orange Lodge Sentinel in Saskatchewan 
elicited a response from Québec. Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau publicly chided Anderson 
for repressing French teaching.
181
 Henri Bourassa offered an even more depressing assessment of 
the situation. The real problem, he argued, was Sir Wilfrid Laurier's failure to fight for better 
protections of French language rights in 1905. The deficiencies of the Saskatchewan Act were 
now in full view.
182
 The unfortunate effect of Quebec's wading into Saskatchewan politics was 
that it reinforced the persecution complex that British Protestants in western Canada had when it 
came to Quebec and central Canada. The Orange Sentinel warned that Saskatchewan's provincial 
rights would be trampled on in order to appease Quebec's French population. Citing the 
statements made by Taschereau and Bourassa, the Sentinel argued that a campaign was 
underway to coerce the province into rescinding its education legislation.
183
  
 In Saskatchewan, there was widespread belief that Anderson ought to reform the entire 
educational system. Abolishment of religious instruction, symbols, and garb was not enough. 
There was still the matter of French-language instruction.
184
 The Conservative press and British 
Protestant groups continued their campaign against French and showed little sign of letting up. 
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Even in areas where French was not the major question at hand it attracted controversy. During a 
provincial Royal Commission hearing, for example, it came to light that French-speaking police 
officers and Justices of the Peace were used in communities such as Gravelbourg where the 
population was predominantly francophone. The Commissioners expressed doubts as to whether 
or not French still enjoyed official status in the province's courts: 
...we were then under the impression that Ch. 22 of the 1891 Dominion Statutes, 
being the last Statute making the English and the French language official in the 
Courts of the North West Territories, had not been repealed by the Parliament of 
Canada, and we were inclined to the opinion that the French language was official 
in the said Courts by virtue of said Ch. 22 of 1891, which had been continued by 
the Saskatchewan Act, and so expressed ourselves. But we have since ascertained 
that said Ch. 22 of 1891 was repealed by the Parliament of Canada...which places 
the question as to whether the French language is official in these Courts in a very 
doubtful position...Under such circumstances, we think it would be unwise to 
express ourselves with greater finality.
185
 
 
The question was by no means clear from a legal or historical point of view, which alarmed 
Anderson and his supporters.
186
 The Premier promised an immediate investigation to ensure that 
Laurier and the provincial Liberals had not secretly colluded to make Saskatchewan officially 
bilingual in 1905.
187
 
 In May 1930 Anderson called on two normal school professors to launch an inquiry into 
bilingual schools. In their report to the Premier dated January 1931, C.E. Brown and J.A. Gagné 
concluded that French students had an inadequate knowledge of English because of French 
instruction, and recommended that the primary course in French be abolished. Anderson took the 
report seriously. Its conclusions dovetailed nicely with the popular belief in Saskatchewan that 
French had no place in a western Canadian province. As Anderson himself noted, the French 
primary course "was materially and psychologically out of order in a Canadian prairie province" 
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and that getting rid of French should foster "a greater measure of unity and harmony in 
Saskatchewan."
188
 In February 1931, Anderson introduced new legislation to repeal the use of 
French in the primary course and as a language of instruction. French could remain a subject of 
study for up to one hour a day at a school board's discretion but it could no longer be used as the 
language of instruction under any circumstances. This amendment led to the somewhat comical 
contradiction that French could be studied for an hour a day in all grades, so long as instruction 
was in English.
189
 
 The debates over Anderson's amendments revealed alternate visions of the West and 
nation. The Liberals, led by Gardiner, argued that Anderson was out of touch with the times. Dr. 
J.M. Uhrich, who served in cabinet as Public Health Minister between 1922 and 1926, panned 
the amendment as "humiliating" and a "gross injustice" to the francophones. Uhrich firmly 
believed that bilingualism in western Canada was not a barrier to regional unity.
190
 The 
Conservative members replied that French was not an official language in the province and that 
teaching in French could happen anywhere as long as it was not during school hours. The Daily 
Star congratulated Anderson's government for liberating francophone students "from the burden 
of a language that is in no sense essential to their daily needs"
191
 since, after all, they were in 
western Canada and not Quebec. Having only one language would be beneficial not only to the 
unity of the province, region, and nation, but also to the education of a minority that should 
accept the realities of living in a British province.
192
  
                                                 
188
 Quoted in Ibid., 190.  
189
 Denis, "Francophone Education in Saskatchewan," 89.  
190
 Huel, "La Survivance in Saskatchewan," 192-93.  
191
 Ibid. 
192
 Ibid.  
  
119 
 
 The ACFC met with Anderson to discuss the amendment but he refused to change his 
position. The government's stance on French, Anderson told the ACFC, was "irrevocable."
193
 
The ACFC opted to defy the government. Denis instructed French teachers to simply ignore the 
new law. But it is difficult to know whether school districts actually followed Denis' advice 
because school inspectors were aggressive in keeping languages other than English out of 
schools.
194
 There is some anecdotal evidence in the francophone community that the law was 
ignored, but it remains to be investigated whether there was a systematic attempt to continue the 
teaching of French in the primary course. As Fransaskois sociologist Wilfrid Denis points out, 
1931 was the "lowest point for language rights in general, and for Francophone rights in 
particular, in Saskatchewan."
195
  
 By the time Anderson finished reforming education in 1931 signs of the Great 
Depression were already present in western Canada. The Depression changed prairie politics, so 
much that many historians have argued that it ended racism, Francophobia, anti-immigration 
attitudes, and the popularity of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.
196
 There is, however, another 
reason why major political movements against French faded out of provincial politics in 
Saskatchewan: they were successful in achieving their political goals. By the time Anderson's 
government was crushed by the Liberals at the polls in 1934, Catholic religious symbols and the 
French language had been all but removed from Saskatchewan's schools. Francophobia and 
xenophobia were now minimal issues in Saskatchewan because of Anderson's steadfastness in 
eliminating Catholicism and French in schools. Once the symbolic political culture of the 
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province had been restored, political leaders could busy themselves with the real business of 
building a province and dealing with the Depression.  
 
Conclusion 
 A number of conclusions may be drawn from the political history of Saskatchewan from 
1905 to 1931. Questions of political culture and symbolic politics raised before 1905 and during 
the autonomy bill debates remained on the political agenda of Saskatchewan up to the Great 
Depression. While there were undoubtedly other political questions occupying the minds of 
leaders and the general population, the burning question of the nature of western Canada -- its 
institutions, culture, and politics -- remained at the forefront of provincial politics during the 
1905-1931 period. The powerful Liberal machine in Saskatchewan was not undone by appeals to 
farmer's rights or better terms with the federal government. The Liberal party had done a great 
deal on these portfolios to satisfy the population. In Saskatchewan it took the language, schools, 
and immigration questions to take down the Liberals -- a fact which demonstrates the importance 
that early western Canadians placed on identity and culture. 
 Secondly, the perception that the federal government and Quebec exerted too much 
control over western Canadian politics was popular. The KKK, the Orange Lodge, and the 
Conservatives capitalized on this sentiment in order to convince people that outside forces were 
conspiring to prevent Saskatchewan from fully exercising its provincial rights and autonomy. 
Thus in a way, the original expansionist idea, which held that the West should be a new society 
unfettered by the problems of older Canada, continued to arouse a great deal of passion amongst 
British Canadian Protestants. In Saskatchewan the strategy of associating the provincial Liberal 
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party with federal government control, foreigners, Catholicism, and bilingualism, which was 
originally used by Haultain, finally paid off. 
 The Anderson amendments and the onset of the Great Depression mark the end of the 
second wave of major political controversies over the French language in Saskatchewan. This 
political pattern is consistent with what other western Canadian historians have observed -- 
namely, that the period between 1870 and the Depression was a formative one for the region's 
culture and politics.
197
 During these years, western Canadians struggled over the character of the 
region's political community. In Saskatchewan, a key part of this battle was the place of French 
in provincial constitutions, institutions, and schools. As the Second World War approached, the 
French language question was settled for the foreseeable future.  
 From a francophone point of view, the outcome of these battles over the status of French 
during western Canada's formative political years was dismal. French was not considered an 
official language in any western province, although this attitude would be challenged later during 
the 1970s and 1980s. French language instruction in schools was all but outlawed in Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Alberta. The aggressive push for British cultural ascendency in provincial 
institutions was, by many accounts, a success. Finally, the Depression saw the outflow of many 
French-speaking professionals -- doctors, lawyers, and teachers -- who sought to escape the 
tough times by taking their education and work elsewhere. Many of these professionals were 
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active in politics and francophone organizations as well; with their departure, the francophones 
lost some secular community leadership.
198
 
 But not all was lost. During the early decades of provincial politics in Saskatchewan, 
francophones managed to form a provincial association, found a provincial newspaper, and 
maintain a level of political organization and presence during major debates. The hard work of 
clergymen, francophone politicians, and community leaders meant that the dream of a bilingual 
West was not dead. Moreover, the fact that some British Canadian leaders recognized a special 
place for francophones in western Canada meant that the francophones had succeeded in 
defending their interpretation of the region's history.  
 While British-Protestant allegations of conspiracy between Quebec, federal/provincial 
Liberals, and western Canadian francophones were grossly exaggerated, it is true that the ACFC 
had informal connections to the provincial Liberal party. It is also true that Quebec espoused a 
pan-Canadian French-Canadian nationalism, best represented by the thought of Henri 
Bourassa
199
, and that francophones in the West viewed Quebec as a political ally. The ACFC 
worked hard in order to maintain social and political connections to Quebec, and continued to 
share some ideological affinities with French-Canadians in that province. But francophones in 
Saskatchewan differed somewhat from Quebec's French speakers because of their national 
origins, their particular geographic dispersal, the challenges of living on the frontier and with 
other minority groups, and their lack of demographic dominance. To many Saskatchewan 
francophones, Quebec-based political associations were helpful in organizing the community but 
could not do the job as well as secular, homegrown organizations.  
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 Why is it important to understand the early historical trajectory of the French language in 
Saskatchewan? In order to understand a political community, it is crucial to study its formative 
years. The years between 1905 and 1931 were formative for Saskatchewan and Alberta in terms 
of political institutions and political cultures. After 1931, the burning question of Saskatchewan's 
political community lost importance, not only because of the hardship brought on by the 
Depression by also because the movement against separate schools and bilingualism were so 
successful. The groups that sprang up to ensure that English would dominate had accomplished 
their goals and were no longer necessary.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
"A Permitted Language, Without any Official Recognition": Bilingualism and Education, 
1968 to 1990 
 
Dépourvus depuis si longtemps du contrôle de ses propres moyens de développement, il n'est pas sûr que la 
communauté fransaskoise pourra survivre. Il n'est pas sûr non plus que l'on veuille lui remettre justement le contrôle 
dont elle a besoin pour profiter de l'apport des media. À la suite de décennies de politiques d'assimilation, les 
Fransaskois se retrouvent sans écoles sans églises, sans territoire à eux. Faut-il se surprendre que plusieurs y aient 
oublié leur identité? Advenant qu'on assurerait aux Fransaskois l'accès aux media, retrouvera-t-on chez-eux les 
énergies nécessaires pour les utiliser à bon escient?
1
  
 
- Gustave Dubois 
 
Notre gouvernement s'est engagé à honorer l'article 23 de la Charte tel que nous l'entendons. La question qui reste à 
résoudre entre le gouvernement, votre association et la Commission des écoles fransaskoises (C.E.F.) est de savoir 
jusqu'à quel point les Fransaskois sont en droit de contrôler et de diriger étroitement l'éducation de leurs enfants.
2
 
 
- Grant Devine 
 
  
Introduction 
 The Fransaskois were at their breaking point. On 14 April 1965, over 30 years after 
J.T.M. Anderson's Conservative government made teaching in any language other than English 
illegal
3
, a group of francophone parents withdrew their children from school in Saskatoon. "This 
action," they declared, "is taken in protest...against the cultural genocide that has been 
perpetrated for the last 60 years in the province and continues to be perpetrated without hope of 
immediate alleviation."
4
 The parents refused to send their children back to school until the 
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government implemented French-language education; the board threatened to expel the 
students.
5
  
 In response to the protests, Liberal Premier Ross Thatcher appointed the Saskatchewan 
Committee on Instruction in Languages other than English (Tait Commission), and invited 
minority groups in the province, including the Fransaskois, to submit briefs and 
recommendations on non-English instruction.
6
 The ACFC was uncompromising in its 
understanding of Saskatchewan history and why the francophone community deserved French-
language education: 
It should be of general knowledge to every Canadian pupil of this Western portion 
of Canada that the French people have been the pioneers of civilization in these 
Western provinces...they were here a long time before anyone from Ontario even 
thought of coming out West...The French opened up these territories for others to 
follow and neither suffering nor hardship could deter their indomitable spirit from 
pushing ahead...it saw the rise of bigotry and hatred blend into the short-sighted 
and fanatical views of a Mr. Haultain and a Mr. Tweed...And so French, the 
maternal tongue of the founding people of Western Canada, one of the two 
languages recognized as the two official languages of Canada by the British North 
America Act of 1867 became, by the grace of a fanatical minority, relegated to a 
second rank, to be taught in schools as a second language even to its own French-
speaking element when the local English-speaking majority deemed it to be so 
taught in its school districts.
7
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The Tait Commission tabled its report in 1966.
8
 The document had little to say about the sad 
history of French language education in the province, except that "The language need [sic] of our 
schools was to teach English as a common denominator of communication."
9
 It recommended 
maintaining the status quo: "Although there are several ethnic groups in Saskatchewan and each 
may desire to preserve its language and its culture, it is a matter of compelling significance that 
the vast majority of people in this province speak English."
10
 Its only recommendation was that 
the province introduce one hour of French-language instruction during school hours if a school 
board allowed it -- a return to the meagre educational rights francophones in the province had 
before 1931.
11
 In 1967 the government amended the School Act accordingly. A 1968 amendment 
empowered cabinet to "designate" French-language schools and the number of hours that could 
be taught in French.
12
 The Fransaskois panned the report, and over twenty years of conflict over 
French-language education ensued.
13
      
 This chapter examines French-language education policies and controversies in 
Saskatchewan between 1968 and 1990. During these years the Fransaskois, provincial 
government, and school boards fought a growing number of battles over the place of French in 
the province's education system. Although the 1967 and 1968 School Act amendments marked a 
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new era in the history of education in Saskatchewan, they did not usher in an era of linguistic 
peace. The Fransaskois seized political opportunities presented by the federal government's 
bilingualism in education policies, while the provincial government and school boards fought a 
defensive battle centring on board autonomy, provincial autonomy, and multiculturalism. Both 
the Saskatoon East School Unit dispute and the constitutional challenge of the Education Act, 
1978 centred on the nature of French-language education in Saskatchewan and the degree of 
control the Fransaskois community could exert over education. The first battle ended in defeat 
for the Fransaskois. The second one was a Fransaskois victory, but even with constitutional 
rights and favourable court decisions it took almost a decade to implement Fransaskois school 
governance.   
 Education is about the values of a society. Studying education in all its complexity -- the 
ideas taught, the language of instruction, policy, institutional history, the contemporary politics 
surrounding funding and infrastructure -- can provide insights into society's political community. 
The educational system represents the continuity and stability of a society. For constitutional 
reasons, education is central to provincial political culture because it falls exclusively under 
provincial jurisdiction, with the exception of section 93 of the British North America Act, 1867 
and official minority language rights outlined in section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.
14
 For minority groups, education is a cornerstone of cultural and linguistic 
survival. Education professor and former plaintiff in the Mahé case Angeline Martel argues that  
Education is a frequent focus of minority demands because of the central role it is 
seen to play in the protection and development of language and of linguistic and 
cultural identity. More than a simple milieu of language transmission, schools are 
important social institutions where culture and group identity are constructed and 
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reproduced. It is also in schools and around school matters that the social 
networks which consolidate minority group are created and reconstructed. The 
school system has traditionally represented the main social institution, where the 
linguistic and cultural future of the next generations were at stake. Furthermore, 
the importance conferred to schooling within minority institutions comes from a 
realization that it is the locus of the homogenizing and domination-fostering 
forces of majority institutions.
15
 
 
 Education is also a reflection of political and cultural undercurrents in society. In this 
vein, the two case studies presented in this chapter illustrate the broader, troubled history of 
French-language rights in Saskatchewan. Although NDP Premier Allan Blakeney and 
Progressive Conservative Premier Grant Devine both made attempts to expand French-language 
education in Saskatchewan, the province's history of assimilation and Anglo-conformity weighed 
heavily on events. As the renowned Fransaskois sociologist Wilfrid Denis writes, it is important 
to account for the weight of history because "even as gains are made in certain dimensions, the 
dross of history weighs heavily on minorities. Existing hegemonic controls from previous eras 
still play a significant role."
16
 The heavy hand of history in Saskatchewan bequeathed a political 
community resistant to official bilingualism. That the Fransaskois achieved their own 
homogenous francophone schools and boards demonstrates their political determination and 
expertise as a community, in addition to the importance of federal politics in influencing the 
outcomes of language politics provincially. 
 
Early attempts: 1968 to 1977 
 The election of Jean Lesage's Liberal government in Quebec and the appointment of the 
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, 
along with Fransaskois activism during the 1950s and 1960s, placed an increasing amount of 
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pressure on Saskatchewan Liberal Premier Ross Thatcher and his government. Thatcher, a 
politician already well known locally for his "aggressive style and single-mindedness"
17
, had 
little time for official bilingualism. He once mentioned during a trip to Ontario in 1967, for 
example, that "we need more French in Saskatchewan like we need a hole in the head."
18
 
Grudgingly, Thatcher expanded French-language education in Saskatchewan in 1968, but his 
government was careful in how it portrayed this new policy. "Let me only say at this time," he 
assured the legislature, "that no compulsion will be involved. No English-speaking person in 
Saskatchewan will be obliged to learn French."
19
 The New Democratic Party welcomed more 
French education but criticized it on multicultural grounds, arguing that more should be done for 
other minority languages as well. This view foreshadowed the stance on official bilingualism the 
NDP would make when it took power in the 1970s.
20
  
 The 1968 amendments to the School Act and subsequent regulations also foreshadowed 
Saskatchewan's educational battles of the 1970s and 1980s. Under the new legislation, it was 
clear that English would continue to reign. School board autonomy and decision-making power 
was preserved and the amount of French-language instruction would diminish each year. A board 
would have to write the minister to request that a school be "designated" for French instruction 
and show that the arrangement was economically feasible.
21
 
 Proficiency in the English language was still a principal concern of the Saskatchewan 
government in 1968. That year, the civil service released its recommended French-language 
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teaching times for all grades. French teaching would be slowly reduced from 100% in 
Kindergarten to 40% in grades ten to twelve. 
 
Table 3.1: Recommended French-Language Teaching Times, Saskatchewan (1968)
22
 
Level Year Recommended Time 
Kindergarten -  Up to 100% 
Division I Year 1 Up to 75% 
 Year 2 Up to 75% 
 Year 3 Up to 60% 
Division II Year 1 Up to 60% 
 Year 2 Up to 50% 
 Year 3 Up to 50% 
Division III  Grades 7-9 Up to 50% 
Division IV  Grades 10-12 Up to 40% 
 
The government adopted even stricter regulations than those recommended by the civil service, 
permitting French instruction up to 50% of the time in Kindergarten, 40% in Grade One, 30% in 
Grade Two, and 20% in Grades Three to Twelve.
23
 Therefore, proficiency in English -- or, as the 
Fransaskois viewed it, assimilation to the English language -- remained the principal goal of 
language education in Saskatchewan and would be assured by increases in the amount of English 
used in teaching. 
 In 1971 newly-elected Premier Allan Blakeney and his NDP government applied a 
slightly different ideal to education: multiculturalism. In 1973 the government amended the 
School Act to allow any language other than English to be used as a language of instruction.
24
 
The primacy of the English language, however, remained a priority. Several months before other 
amendments to the School Act were tabled in 1974, Associate Deputy Minister of Education 
Laurence M. Ready wrote to Frank Bogdasavich, Deputy Minister of Culture and Youth that 
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"Since English will continue to be the language of communication in most, if not all parts of 
Saskatchewan, pursuit of competence in its mastery should be paramount."
25
 Further, Ready 
explained, ."..all other languages should share second priority to English. But because French is 
one of Canada's official languages it deserves some special consideration."
26
 The government 
relaxed restrictions on French teaching times but, after Grade Five, the maximum amount of 
French teaching allowed was 50% of the time.
27
    
    The deficiencies of the 1968 and 1974 School Act amendments became more and more 
apparent in subsequent years. Language education in Saskatchewan was stuck between its 
assimilationist history and new, awkward attempts to make education more accommodating to 
Fransaskois and other minority group needs. Conflicts exploded between francophones and 
school boards in a number of Saskatchewan communities with strong Fransaskois populations, 
such as Debden (1971-1972), Assiniboia (1974), Prud'homme (1977), and Ferland, Delmas, 
Ponteix, Glaslyn, and Saskatoon (all in 1979).
28
  
 At the root of these educational conflicts was the lack of clear legislation and policies for 
French-language education, which created problems for Allan Blakeney's government. On n 
pedagogical, level the legislation created a vacuum in terms of materials and resources, because 
the government did not make provisions for creating French resources. French teachers deplored 
the lack of materials, textbooks, and curriculum guides; the government worried about a lack of 
teachers proficient in French.
29
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 On an administrative level, it was even worse. Boards fought each other over funding and 
transportation of students. They complained that the government asked them to provide French 
education and did not provide the necessary funding to do it. They fought the Fransaskois 
community over attendance, school designation, and transportation of Fransaskois students to 
French schools outside of their own jurisdiction. In the Gravelbourg area, for example, the Wood 
River School Unit refused to pay for a number of Fransaskois students' transportation to Collège 
Mathieu because Wood River did not authorize their attendance there.
30
 Meanwhile the 
Fransaskois community accused the government of misspending federal dollars for francophone-
only education by simply handing money over to school boards without accounting for how it 
was spent.
31
 The provincial government found itself caught between the Fransaskois community 
who appealed directly to it in order to have boards grant them French education, and the school 
boards who insisted that they remain autonomous from ministerial control. 
 In 1977 the Saskatchewan government undertook a major consolidation of its educational 
laws. At the time there were fifteen different laws related to education that needed to be revised. 
Unfortunately for both the government and the Fransaskois community, the new bill simply 
muddied the waters. The White Paper on Consolidation and Revision of School Law in the 
Province of Saskatchewan proposed "Joint Boards" where existing boards could establish and 
delegate authority to parallel boards.
32
 It retained English as the sole language of instruction in 
all schools and allowed boards to designate their own French schools. It also, however, vested 
power in Cabinet to designate schools, setting up a power struggle between the government, 
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school boards, and the Fransaskois.
33
 In other words, the bill proposed to simply perpetuate the 
history of assimilation and the 1968 legislation, albeit with some minor changes. Unsurprisingly, 
the ACFC was not happy with the bill and pressed the government for a clearer, less equivocal 
education policy that "devra énoncer clairement l'intention du gouvernement d'accepter le 
caractère propre du Canada (deux peuples fondateurs, deux langues officielles, etc.)."
34
 It was 
especially concerning to the ACFC that English remained the sole language of instruction in the 
province.
35
 The Fransaskois wanted "pure French schools" where francophones could truly learn 
the language, not schools designed to teach anglophones how to speak French.
36
 As the ACFC 
noted in The Heirs of Lord Durham, its 1977 Plan of Action, "...the A.C.F.C.'s goal is to 
establish a network of schools for francophone pupils with French as the language of instruction 
and communication."
37
 The government lacked a clear vision for language education. Don Faris, 
the Minister of Continuing Education, summed up the fundamental issue: "Does the Government 
of Saskatchewan want to promote unilingualism, bilingualism (French and English), or 
multilingualism in education?"
38
   
 
The Vonda Dispute Begins, 1976-1978 
 Before Faris' question could be answered, the Vonda-Saskatoon East School Unit dispute 
underscored the inconsistencies of Saskatchewan's French-language education policies. As 
francophone parents from Vonda would later remark, the dispute was "a microcosm of French 
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education crises" in Saskatchewan.
39
 École Providence in the small francophone town of Vonda, 
under the jurisdiction of the Saskatoon East School Unit, was designated for French-language 
teaching from grades one to six. The Fransaskois community, however, wished to extend 
designation for grades seven to twelve starting with grades seven to nine in 1976. The 
Fransaskois also wanted Vonda to accept francophone students from Prud'homme and St-Denis, 
forming a regional francophone school that would have the proper environment and enrolment 
numbers to make it sustainable.
40
 The Saskatoon East School Unit resisted immediately. Citing 
declining enrolment and rising staff costs, in addition to insufficient funding to support French 
education, the board said it was simply unfeasible.
41
 Saskatoon East also refused to accept 
Prud'homme francophone students attending high school at Aberdeen because they were part of 
the neighbouring Wakaw School Unit.
42
   
 The Vonda dispute, which flared up in the summer of 1977
43
 after several months of 
controversy, could not have come at a worse time for Allan Blakeney. In August 1977 Blakeney 
was slated to discuss minority language education rights at the 18th Annual Premiers' 
Conference in New Brunswick. Three weeks before the conference, Blakeney wrote to Cabinet 
about the need to clarify the Saskatchewan position on French education. He was optimistic: 
"We have come a long way, since 1971, to providing education in either official language in 
Saskatchewan."
44
 Blakeney suggested that Saskatchewan continue with its original plan of 
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offering French-language education to everyone, regardless of origin.
45
 But the government was 
careful about how it presented the policy to the public. French was not, Minister of Education Ed 
Tchorzewski wrote to senior civil servants, an official language in Saskatchewan, nor should the 
government give any impression that it was.
46
 Any extension of French-language education in 
the province, he continued, should be couched in terms of national unity and multiculturalism, 
which would make it politically acceptable.
47
 When the government finally released its policy 
statement on 28 July 1977, it declared that it supported French education "In keeping with its 
strong commitment to the fact that Canada is a country of two official languages and to the fact 
that Saskatchewan is a multicultural society...."
48
 National unity and multiculturalism were the 
main justifications for French education in the province. Among the four primary objectives 
underlined for French education, the first was national unity. None of the objectives specifically 
mentioned supporting the Fransaskois community or arresting francophone assimilation.
49
 
Moreover, while the principle of French language education seemed acceptable in Saskatchewan, 
its application became problematic.   
  The Fransaskois and Fédération des Francophones hors Quebec (FFHQ) used the St. 
Andrew's conference to challenge Blakeney and the government on its educational policy. With 
the help of the FFHQ, the ACFC sent out a "Scandal Dossier" to national media, asking 
associations representing francophones outside Quebec to send letters to Blakeney and new 
Education Minister Don Faris to "act definitively in the matter of the stated requirements of 
Saskatchewan's Francophone community."
50
 "The parents came to realize," the FFHQ charged, 
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"that education services in french were totally unexistant [sic], and that something had to be done 
about it."
51
 The document alleged that the provincial government was throwing up barriers to 
French-language education and was not serious about its commitments to the Fransaskois 
community. It was visceral in its criticism: "Shame on all the provincial governments who dare 
to declare before all Canadians that the right of Francophones are well protected in their 
provinces. Nothing could be further from the truth."
52
  
 Blakeney was furious. So were top-level civil servants in the Department of Education. 
Laurence Ready, Associate Deputy Minister, wrote to Don Faris that "I resent the inference that 
the Saskatchewan government is involved in any kind of plot to deny educational services to 
Francophones, and that the services provided have been granted begrudgingly 'in driblets'."
53
 In 
New Brunswick, Blakeney had to face a storm of reporters. Later in a confidential memo to 
cabinet he wrote that 
Creating a 'national scandal' of a problem in Saskatchewan will serve to feed the 
fires of separatism. If that is what they want to do, they should continue to 
magnify Saskatchewan problems and inform the Quebec people that 
Saskatchewan is unfair to the francophone minority in this province. If the 
A.C.F.C. is determined to 'feed the fires of separatism', then they must prepare to 
deal with the actual consequences of Quebec separation. In Saskatchewan, for 
instance, it is highly unlikely that there would be much sympathy for French 
language rights if Quebec is no longer in Canada.
54
    
 
With the Premier making comments such as these, perhaps the ACFC could be forgiven for 
believing that the government did not have the Fransaskois' best interests in mind.
55
  
   In mid-August 1977 the ACFC, the provincial government, and the Wakaw and 
Saskatoon East school boards reached an agreement. The children of seven families from the 
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Prud'homme area would be allowed to attend the school at Vonda.
56
 But the board still refused to 
extend French designation of the Vonda school beyond grade six. Further, ACFC political 
activism against the government's educational policy began to poison the organization's 
relationship with the government. Following the New Brunswick incident, Laurence Ready 
recommended that the Department of Education cease working with Donald Cyr, the Executive 
Director of the ACFC. Ready also told the Department to "...re-iterate our desire to co-operate 
with that Association, provided it acts responsibly. Failing to do this, then it seems to me that we 
have no alternative but to by-pass l'A.C.F.C.."
57
  
 The Fransaskois remained unhappy with the current educational arrangement for Vonda. 
In November 1977, the Comité des Parents de la région Prud'homme-St. Denis-Vonda wrote a 
brief to Don Faris demanding further changes. The problem, according to the parent group, was 
that the three Fransaskois communities were divided among different school board units which 
weakened their demographic power within the different boards.
58
 Ad hoc measures, where 
families and students would be allowed to change school district were not acceptable.
59
 The 
Comité proposed that the government establish a "sub-unit" board for the Francophones of the 
region.
60
 This request was important because it marked the beginning of a new, more aggressive 
Fransaskois activist strategy in education. French-language schools were not enough; the 
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community wanted a degree of administrative control in order to exercise what the Fransaskois 
called a fundamental right.
61
 
 Feeling the pressure, the government looked at its options. Executive Council 
commissioned a poll by Gallup research, asking if respondents supported or opposed French-
language education in Saskatchewan. Overall the poll found that 53.6% of Saskatchewanians 
said "Yes".
62
 Responses, though, varied by age and level of education. "No" answers climbed to 
42% and 43% for the 45-54 and 55+ age groups. Respondents with high school education or less 
answered "No" 49.1% and 42.2% respectively, while university degree holders responded 74.5% 
"Yes."
63
 There was a danger that official bilingualism could be portrayed by its opponents as 
something foisted on others by a well-educated elite. As for Fransaskois school board powers, 
Don Faris was careful to keep expectations low. The government would take the middle road. In 
his speech to the ACFC biannual congress in November, Faris did not foresee "the Department 
of Education establishing a large additional bureaucracy for the administering of French 
language education in this province. Indeed, it would be quite unjustifiable; what is justifiable 
are internal modifications in the structure of the Department of Education to reflect the increased 
emphasis on minority language education...."
64
 ACFC President Irène Chabot wrote to Faris to 
express the organization's "profound disappointment" with his speech, which in her mind 
reduced French-language education to "a privilege rather than a right, which can only appear to 
Francophones as a flagrant injustice and a violation of this province's Constitution."
65
 
 The cornerstone of Fransaskois political activism was its strong view of the community's 
history. To the Fransaskois, French education and official bilingualism were not privileges; they 
                                                 
61
 Rupert Baudais, "French education called fundamental right," Star Phoenix, 14 Novembre 1977.  
62
 Russ Eaton to Robert Weese, 4 January 1978. [PAS], D.L. Faris Fonds.  
63
 Ibid.  
64
 Don Faris, "Speech to ACFC Congress," 12 Novembre 1977. [PAS], D.L. Faris Fonds.  
65
 Irène Chabot à Don Faris, 5 décembre 1977. [PAS], D.L. Faris Fonds. My translation.  
  
139 
 
were rights derived from the bilingual character of western Canadian history.
66
 The current 
system of English-speaking government or school board control over education simply did not 
correspond to how the Fransaskois community viewed French-language education. In a February 
1978 press release the ACFC declared that designated schools were not enough:  
Necessary administrative structures are imperative if a minimal effectiveness in 
French language teaching in Saskatchewan schools is to be ensured. The French 
Canadian Cultural Association's recommendations were presented to the 
Saskatoon School Board with the intention of the latter adopting the Association's 
position. This brief presents the historical background to linguistic rights and 
passed school legislation, showing that in 1866 these rights were respected and 
recognized; thereafter, these rights were eroded, and finally, suppressed. Today, 
they have been partially restored and considered to be a privilege rendered rather 
than a right.
67
 
 
French in Saskatchewan, the ACFC charged, had "the status of a permitted language, without 
any official recognition."
68
 The government's lack of seriousness in all things French, the ACFC 
continued, was evident in how it carried out bilingualism in education.  
 As Saskatchewan prepared to enact a major new piece of education legislation (Bill 22) 
in April 1978, Chabot wrote to Faris that  
Bill 22 does not recognize the bilingual character of Canada. French is not 
recognized, along with English, as an official language of instruction, in the very 
spirit of the federal Official Languages Act. To respect Canada's duality, section 
(1) of paragraph 180 should read: "English or French shall be the language of 
instruction in schools," and other sections should be reworded accordingly.
69
   
 
Chabot and the Fransaskois would indeed be sorely disappointed by the legislation. bill 22 made 
what the government called "a minor statutory change." The change in language was subtle, but 
nonetheless important. "Students have the right" to attend designated schools became "students 
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shall be entitled."
70
 It was actually a step backwards; the government did not want to use the 
word "right," and give the impression that a bilingual education was a right in the province. It 
explicitly endorsed the educational status quo: "In summary, this proposal does not make French 
an official language...It does use the existing designated program. This minimizes the impact of 
the changes, and yet emphasizes our desire to do this in a reasonable manner."
71
  
 The Fransaskois were not the only group with major reservations about the new 
legislation. The Saskatchewan School Trustees Association (SSTA) feared that new provisions 
for French education, including those dealing with school boundaries and transportation of 
students, were eroding school board powers.
72
 "The bureaucracy of the civil service is too strong 
now without being granted such boundless power in law," the Association wrote.
73
 The SSTA 
believed that control over education should remain in the hands of boards and communities, not 
the minister, and that no changes to boundaries or school designations should occur without 
board approval.
74
 With the Fransaskois eager to expand French education and boards jealous of 
their statutory power, the stage was set for major conflicts over the establishment and delivery of 
French education. 
 
Designated Schools in Question: The Vonda Dispute Becomes a Political Crisis, 1978 
 In May 1978, the new education provisions became law.
75
 Why did the provincial 
government continue down its established path for French-language education when both the 
Fransaskois community and school boards were displeased with it? The answer lies in the 
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implications of education policy for the political community. Nationally, Saskatchewan wanted 
to make "its best efforts to provide French language instruction, wherever numbers warrant...and 
demonstrate Saskatchewan's readiness to contribute to national unity, despite a small and 
dispersed francophone population."
76
 Provincially, however, the government was concerned with 
"radical francophones" and "extremist members of other ethnic groups who may see this as 
'pandering to the French'."
77
 The government regarded its position as striking a balance between 
these competing provincial and national challenges. As such, the middle road approach seemed 
the wisest, especially with Saskatchewan poised to have a provincial election at either the end of 
1978 or early in 1979. But the middle road caused relations to break down between the 
Fransaskois and Allan Blakeney's government because neither side was willing to compromise 
on its vision for French-language education. The government grew especially impatient and 
exasperated with Fransaskois criticisms of the designated school system, which the community 
argued was exemplary of everything that was wrong with the government's approach to 
education.  
 In May 1978, the Comité des Parents de la région Prud'homme-St. Denis-Vonda met 
again with the Saskatoon East School Unit to discuss extending French-language instruction at 
Vonda past grade six. The board suggested, following an idea pitched by the civil service in 
1977
78
, that rather than extending the program at Vonda the Fransaskois students attend school at 
Aberdeen, just outside of Saskatoon.
79
 In 1978, however, barely a few weeks after the new 
Education Act was enacted, the Saskatchewan civil service recommended something different to 
Don Faris: "that the Department and the Minister support the principle that the Division III 
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program would be more appropriately placed in Vonda."
80
 Not only was the government sending 
out mixed messages to the school board, it was also concerned about the deficiencies of the 1978 
legislation: "On matters such as this does the provincial government have a responsibility for 
making a final decision or is it the sole responsibility of the fiscally responsible school board?"
81
  
 At the end of May, the ACFC submitted a brief to the province, asking for a number of 
measures to end assimilation of francophones. "Francophones in Saskatchewan," the brief 
argued, "have been deprived of an educational system favourable to the development of their 
identity as francophones."
82
 The ACFC reminded the government that "[it] aims at a network of 
schools in which the language of communication and of instruction will be the French language 
except for the English language arts which is to be taught in English."
83
 Unfortunately, the 
ACFC argued, French-language education was still a privilege in Saskatchewan rather than a 
right. The community required direct participation in education policies and if the government 
refused to help, "our politicians will have to bear the weight of a decision whose irreversible 
consequences will be judged by history as genocide."
84
  
 Officials in the Department of Education took a different view of the brief. They were not 
about to let the ACFC dictate Saskatchewan education policy. Laurence Ready, already losing 
patience with the Fransaskois, wrote to Don Faris that "If l'A.C.F.C. is going to use [the FFHQ] 
which is committed to militancy and confrontation to promote its objectives in Saskatchewan, 
then the value of continuing consultation with l'A.C.F.C. may well be questioned."
85
 Ready also 
downplayed the right to French education in Saskatchewan: "The Constitution of Canada does 
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not guarantee the right to education in the French language."
86
 Finally, he recommended that the 
Minister dismiss any ACFC demands to review the new education law since the government had 
just finished consolidating the province's legislation. From this point on the Department of 
Education was generally hostile to the ACFC and had little time for criticisms of its established 
policies. The Fransaskois would take what they were offered, or they would get nothing at all.  
 Don Faris and a cabinet committee did, however, sit down to discuss the brief with the 
Fransaskois. It was a tense meeting. Minister of Culture and Youth Ned Shillington noted that 
"We, the ministers involved, reacted luke-warmly to the discussion...."
87
 The government agreed 
to increase funding to the ACFC but refused to acquiesce to one of their key demands -- the 
establishment of an "Official Minority Office" that would report directly to cabinet and the 
premier on Fransaskois issues. Recognizing French as equal with English in education was out of 
the question. Furthermore, Saskatchewan would not revisit its education policies even though the 
Fransaskois denounced the government's French-language education system. The government 
was firm in defending its vision of French-language education access "to ALL CITIZENS in 
Saskatchewan, anglophones and francophones alike."
88
 The new legislation, Faris argued, 
simultaneously fulfilled the government's obligations to the Fransaskois community and the 
entire province by making French-language education universal, not just for francophones.
89
  
 The ACFC panned the government's position as hypocritical.
90
 Blakeney's declarations 
on bilingualism and national unity, Irène Chabot explained, did not match his track record on 
provincial bilingualism.
91
 The May 1978 editorial of L'Eau Vive argued that on national unity, 
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French-language education, and provincial bilingualism, Blakeney was saying one thing and 
meaning another entirely: 
Tout en reconnaissant la minorité française, du même trait de plume il refuse de 
reconnaître la minorité française dans sa province...une société bilingue doit 
reposer sur une égalité entre les deux groupes fondateurs...Ce refus de laisser 
vivre trouve son expression dans le refus d'un système d'écoles françaises, dans le 
refus de proclamer le français comme langue officielle, dans le refus de contribuer 
moralement et financièrement au développement des communautés françaises, 
dans le refus de mécanismes tels qu'un service d'éducation de langue française 
(SELF) ou d'un bureau de la minorité officielle, etc..
92
  
 
 The same day that the Fransaskois submitted their brief and met with the provincial 
government, Don Faris also met with Glen Penner, Superintendent of the Saskatoon East School 
Unit, to discuss the Vonda situation. The news was bad. "Saskatoon East Board presently 'is 
adamant not to put grades seven to nine back into Vonda'," Faris noted.
93
 He also worried that 
the ACFC would continue to try to bypass the school board by appealing to the Department of 
Education to impose a solution.
94
 Faris was stuck between unclear legislation, board autonomy, 
and the Fransaskois who refused to accept the board's offer to move the students to Aberdeen 
and also accused Faris of siding with the board.
95
 
 Fransaskois activism yielded some results. Faris and the Department of Education agreed 
to sit down with the Saskatoon East board and the Comité des parents in mid-June. French 
teaching needed to be extended at Vonda, the ACFC argued, because "We have everything to 
lose...Designation at Aberdeen would benefit the anglophones. There is a need for a French 
atmosphere which is not possible at Aberdeen."
96
 Any hopes that the Fransaskois community 
once had for improvements in French education were dashed "After ten years' experience we 
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realize the inadequacies of the present system and we are not satisfied."
97
 But the board refused 
to alter its stance, while the department affirmed that it would not overrule the board.
98
 At the 
end of the minutes, a worried Faris wrote that the issue was "larger than Vonda".
99
 But he was 
unsure whether the Department of Education had the statutory power to overrule the board.
100
 
The deficiencies of the 1978 legislation remained apparent.  
 The Department of Education quietly tried putting pressure on the Saskatoon East school 
board. Deputy Minister Ian Wilson wrote to the board: "We share the doubts and reservations of 
the Vonda parent's group about the limited francophone environment for the children attending 
the designated program for Division III at Aberdeen."
101
 Wilson proposed a compromise: that the 
francophone students attend Aberdeen for one year (1978-79) while the board have a new school 
built and program set up at Vonda for the 1979 school year.
102
 Again, the board refused as it was 
determined to expand the French program at Aberdeen rather than in Vonda.
103
 
 Was the Saskatoon East School board against French-language education for the 
Fransaskois? There is little evidence demonstrating an overtly anti-Fransaskois bias in the 
board's actions. The board, however, did not understand why the Fransaskois valued francophone 
education so highly.
104
 Board Superintendent Glen Penner had a strong influence on other board 
members, convincing others "that the Francophone pressure groups have no limits to their future 
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demands, and no appreciation of what the Board is doing for them now."
105
 Discussions between 
the two groups were certainly strained. On 29 June the Comité de parents wrote a long brief to 
the Department of Education, complaining that the board was acting in bad faith and had no real 
justification for refusing to extend designation at Vonda.
106
 As an illustration of the board's 
treatment of the francophone community, the Committee described its attempts to evaluate the 
proposed designation at Aberdeen: 
Mr. Penner asked the principal of Aberdeen to send a letter to the parents of the 
Vonda grade 6 students asking them to bring their children to the school in 
Aberdeen for a visit since grade 7 would be there next year. Le Comité d'Action 
asked for this to be postponed until after the 14th, but this was refused...The 
following day Mr. Penner cancelled the visit, but put the burden on Sister Maria to 
advise the parents. That same day, June 5th, Mr. Kyle spent half a day in the 
Vonda school trying to argue Sister Maria in using her influence to convince the 
parents to send their children to Aberdeen. She told us it was worse than being in 
court. These, gentlemen, describe the situation we the parents of Vonda-St. Denis 
face.
107
  
 
Both sides were at an impasse. The Fransaskois went public with their grievances against the 
government and the board. Gustave Dubois, recently hired by the ACFC to work towards 
developing and furthering French education in Saskatchewan, told the media: "The government 
of Saskatchewan is not putting its money where its mouth is...Premier Blakeney has made widely 
publicized statements about Quebec and national unity, but he is doing next to nothing for 
francophones in Saskatchewan who are dying out as a distinct people."
108
 Designated schools 
and the current arrangement in Saskatchewan, Dubois explained, were failing the francophone 
community.
109
 These comments raised the ire of Laurence Ready, who threatened to cut funding 
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for the position if Dubois continued to create trouble.
110
 Irène Chabot wrote to Don Faris, calling 
Ready's letter "blackmail" and denouncing the Department of Education's approach to dealing 
with the ACFC: 
I regret to have to address you regarding your senior civil servants. Last year, Mr. 
Wilson warned the Executive Director of our association not to criticize the 
policies of the Department of Education if the A.C.F.C. wished to obtain financial 
support for the employment of an Education Development officer. If cooperating 
with the Department means being in agreement with the shortcomings of program 
development for designated schools, with the absence of a global policy for 
French language and culture community development, with the absence of 
structures within the Department of Education, and with the proposed school 
legislation, never, Mr. Minister, will we be able to submit to such injustices 
toward Saskatchewan's official language minority group.
111
 
  
Faris' caustic reply shows the extent to which relations between the ACFC and the government 
were crumbling: 
Quite frankly, I have to conclude that you and the Executive Director of 
l'A.C.F.C. do not fully appreciate the time and effort that senior officials in the 
Department of Education devote to problems and issues relating to the 
improvement of opportunities for French-language education in Saskatchewan. I 
have to conclude also that you and your Executive Director have not differentiated 
between constructive criticism and irresponsible criticism. To offer criticism that 
is constructive is one thing; to make irresponsible public statements such as those 
made by Mr. Dubois in the June 11, 1978 issue of the Prairie Messenger is 
something else. What you and your Executive Director fail to understand is that 
one of the major problems facing officials in the Department of Education is the 
negative attitude of non-francophones toward the goals of your Association. 
Irresponsible, inaccurate and misleading statements such as those made by Mr. 
Dubois only serve to reinforce these negative attitudes.
112
 
 
In order to avoid public embarrassment, the government sent out a press release blaming the 
board and the committee for the impasse and appointed a mediator to get the two sides talking 
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again.
113
 In private meetings with the ACFC, the government again asked the organization to 
stop criticizing the province publicly and in return it would hold regular meetings in order to 
better co-ordinate policy.
114
 
 Mediation worked. It ended the Vonda designated school dispute at the beginning of 
August 1978 with the Fransaskois agreeing to send their children to Aberdeen for the 1978-79 
school year on condition that the government and Saskatoon East board build a new school at 
Vonda, guarantee transportation to Aberdeen, and extend the designated program at Vonda from 
grades seven to nine.
115
 The government reached a deal with the board mid-August to help build 
a new school and extend designation at Vonda immediately for grade seven, while grade nine 
instruction would be ready by 1980.
116
      
  
Vonda Redux: The Dispute Returns, 1979-1980 
 Despite the acrimony and tensions between the government, the Saskatoon East board, 
and the Fransaskois, the Vonda dispute came to a reasonable end. But if the Fransaskois believed 
that the government would grant them some leeway in education because of their compromise on 
the Vonda dispute, they would once again be disappointed. The community had publicly 
criticized the Premier, embarrassed the government, and openly defied the Department of 
Education.
117
 Looking back on the previous weeks, Don Faris wrote to senior civil servant 
Howard Leeson that in the future "it is my judgment that Cabinet will be taking a firm, if low-
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key, position on its Francophone policies, particularly with respect to Francophone 
education...."
118
  
 The Allan Blakeney NDP returned to power in the October 1978 election and soon after 
set to work on new regulations for the Education Act. Some civil servants in the Department of 
Education pointed to the deficiencies in the legislation and the government's vision of universal 
access to French-language education as opposed to Fransaskois education: ."..regulations and 
legislation placed too great an emphasis on accessibility rather than on the local availability of all 
forms of language instruction. I pointed out that we were trying to respond to a perceived need 
for certain sorts of service rather than attempting to create a need."
119
 But the new regulations 
were a major disappointment to the ACFC which wanted to see clearly defined rights rather than 
permissive statutory powers in education. The organization argued that it had been shut out of 
consultations
120
 and that the regulations, like the legislation itself, placed no real obligations on 
the minister or school boards, instead granting permissive powers to both.
121
 The original 
deficiencies that had caused so many problems between 1968 and 1978 remained; moreover, 
French-language education was still not a right in Saskatchewan. 
 Blakeney realized that from a public relations point of view that the ACFC should at least 
be included in consultations on any new regulations.
122
 In February 1979, the ACFC submitted 
yet another brief to Ned Shillington, the new education minister. Recalling the painful history of 
education in Saskatchewan, the brief again demanded that the government draft a clear French-
language education policy and that the Fransaskois be granted control over francophone-only 
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schools.
123
 It also asked that French be recognized as a language of instruction equal to 
English.
124
 Building on the lessons from the Vonda dispute, the brief denounced the 
government's refusal to help the Fransaskois community deal with recalcitrant school boards: 
The principle of local autonomy, it is well known, works against a harmonious 
development of a French-language educational network. On boards of education, 
Francophones are either not represented or very much in a minority situation. As a 
result, Francophones have no control over decisions which affect them directly.
125
 
 
 Officials in the Department of Education, however, were still handcuffed by legislative 
limits placed on the minister. Ned Shillington was so unsure of his power to make changes to 
French-language education that he wrote to Howard Leeson, Deputy Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs, to have his department clear things up with Department of Education 
civil servants about the Education Act.
126
 "The limits imposed by Section 180," Shillington 
wrote, "are moderately clear, however, government policy respecting the direction and emphasis 
which can be or should be placed on regulations is not."
127
 The confusion led Shillington to tell 
the ACFC that no discussions or changes to legislation could be made because government did 
not know what the implications of the law and regulations were.
128
 The government was 
increasingly certain that it could not, and would not, bypass local school boards in implementing 
French-language programs.
129
  
 At the end of 1979 the Vonda situation became more complicated when the local 
Ukrainian community formed its own parents committee to request Ukrainian language 
instruction at Aberdeen. Why was French being favoured over other languages? "Saskatchewan," 
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it declared, "is a truly multi-cultural society, since no racial group forms the majority."
130
 
Saskatoon East school board refused to consider the proposal since it represented a slippery 
multicultural slope. It was already busy expanding French-language education at Aberdeen and 
believed that if Ukrainian was permitted, German would follow.
131
 The Ukrainian Parents 
Committee asked the Minister to intervene and told the board that "It is our view that in a multi-
ethnic area like Aberdeen, it would make good sense to have all three languages: German, 
French and Ukrainian made available to interested students."
132
 But the Ukrainians, like the 
Fransaskois, ran into trouble with the board and asked Attorney General Roy Romanow for 
help.
133
 Romanow was well-connected and popular in the Ukrainian community and often took 
care of political issues involving them. Eventually Romanow was able to convince the Saskatoon 
East Board to implement a Ukrainian language program at Aberdeen to the satisfaction of the 
parents committee.
134
  
 Conflict between the Fransaskois and the Saskatoon East School board over the Vonda 
school boiled over again in August 1980. Saskatoon East cancelled Grade 10 to 12 classes for 
Vonda graduates at Aberdeen school, citing low enrolment and little interest in the French 
program.
135
 Liguori LeBlanc, trustee and chairman of the Vonda school board, argued that the 
government was violating the 1978 agreement between the government, francophone 
community, and Saskatoon East.
136
 A vocal advocate of Fransaskois education, LeBlanc argued 
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that the Aberdeen arrangement was not perfect -- the Fransaskois wanted a kindergarten to grade 
12 francophone school at Vonda -- but it was better than nothing.
137
 The Saskatoon East board, 
for its part, blamed the problem on the Vonda francophone parents' committee for making 
unreasonable demands; it also cited the introduction of a new Ukrainian language program which 
increased staffing costs.
138
 
 It was the last straw for the ACFC, who demanded that the new education Minister Doug 
McArthur set up a francophone school board to run all the French-language designated schools 
in the province because English speakers simply did not understand the Fransaskois' needs.
139
 
McArthur dismissed the idea on the grounds that it would further fragment the province's 
education system.
140
 The Regina Leader Post aptly described the challenge the government 
faced, including the possibility of an "anglophone backlash": 
Even with provincial money budgeted for multicultural programming, it's not hard 
to imagine anglophone jealousy at increasing amounts of money directed at 
francophones - a community numbering fewer than 30,000. On the other hand, the 
government can't afford to ignore Saskatchewan francophones' special educational 
needs either. They're vocal, well-organized, and in a country that's officially 
considered bicultural - they have political significance beyond their small 
numbers. Whatever steps the department takes in the area of French education, it's 
likely to risk offending somebody.
141
 
 
As in 1978, it was a question of who would compromise first. The Saskatoon East board offered 
to send the grades 10 to 12 Vonda students to Holy Cross High School in Saskatoon by bus, or 
pay for the costs to send the francophones to Collège Mathieu in Gravelbourg; the Fransaskois 
refused, calling this idea "a non-offer" and "trinkets and whiskey."
142
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 Negotiations broke down and the Fransaskois turned to the courts in order to compel the 
board to offer grades 10 to 12 in French at Vonda.
143
 It was the first time the judiciary would be 
asked to weigh in on Saskatchewan's new Education Act. Liguori LeBlanc requested an order 
from the court forcing the Saskatoon East School Unit to implement a French program for grades 
K to 12, to reinstate the French program at Aberdeen, and to hire an additional teacher for 
Vonda.
144
 In order to help finance the legal challenge, the ACFC launched "Opération solidarité" 
which took donations from the community and sought to create Fransaskois interest in "la 
question scolaire de façon qu'ils puissent se sensibiliser davantage...et en se solidarisant par delà 
les distances qu'ils parviendront à se donner les outils indispensables à leur survivance."
145
 The 
ACFC also used the media to criticize Allan Blakeney and the provincial government, saying 
that French-language rights were used as a "bargaining tool" by Saskatchewan in constitutional 
negotiations when nothing was being done for the Fransaskois at home.
146
 Again, Irène Chabot 
underlined the need for French school boards and francophone control over education:  
The lack of a French school board means Saskatchewan parents who supposedly 
have the right to choose the language of instruction for their child are in fact 
subjected to the total prerogative of anglophone school boards, which are more 
or less incited, without being compelled, to respond to the demands of the 
parents.
147
 
 
 The Court of Queen's Bench handed down its ruling in October 1980. In his decision, 
Judge Ken Halvorson sided with Saskatoon East and the government. Halvorson explained that 
the Vonda parents had not formalized their request to the board for grades 10 to 12 instruction: 
the board, therefore, was not obligated to do anything.
148
 Halvorson also interpreted the 
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Education Act regulations as permissive. The Act did not oblige the Minister to designate any 
schools for French-language teaching: 
Upon a review of regulation 32.2 in its entirety, it is abundantly clear firstly, that 
the Minister owes a duty thereunder to the Crown and not to the applicant, and 
secondly, that his function is discretionary. 32.2(1) refers to 'recommendation of 
the minister', 32.2(2) reads 'the minister may make a recommendation...where a 
request...has been submitted...by a board....'; regulation 32.3(5) states that 'a 
school shall be designated....if the minister is satisfied'. The use of the words 
'recommendation', 'may', and 'satisfied' all suggest discretion rather than a 
mandatory duty.
149
 
 
On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal also sided with the board and the government. 
Justice R.N. Hall explained that, according to the Education Act regulations, even if Saskatoon 
East wanted to designate grades 10 to 12 as French in Vonda, the board was powerless to do so. 
It could only ask the government to designate the school, and the minister would decide which 
specific grades would have French-language instruction.
150
 Furthermore, Hall argued, under the 
Education Act, the last word remained with the minister and the Crown, not with Mr. LeBlanc. 
The government had no obligation to provide any French-language education anywhere.
151
 
 A stubborn Department of Education, inadequate legislation that kept French-language 
education firmly in the hands of school boards and the minister, and a government refusing to 
change its course were enough proof to the Fransaskois that nothing had changed for French-
language education in Saskatchewan. Since the founding of the ACFC it had to fight to have 
French education. 1980 was no different.
152
 Dismayed by their loss in Court, the Vonda school 
trustees sent out a press release denouncing the government's legislation:  
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...the judgment handed down by Judge R.N. Hall of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal clearly shows that the provisions for French education in the present 
Saskatchewan Education act are meaningless. This judgment as well as that 
handed down by Judge Halvorson...prove definitively that any right or even 
privilege to French education in Saskatchewan does not exist. The irony of the 
situation is that successive Ministers of Education as well as Premier Blakeney 
have insisted that the new education act would take proper care of the educational 
needs of the Fransaskois. These people have in the past accused us of being 
ungrateful for not appreciating the great efforts they have been making on our 
behalf. Furthermore, Premier Blakeney has attempted to portray himself as a 
leading father of the renewed Confederation, all the while denying Francophones 
in his own front yard the most basic rights to education.
153
 
 
As much as Allan Blakeney and the provincial government tried to convince the public and the 
Fransaskois that they were making progress on French-language education, the Vonda issue 
confirmed that it was simply not the case. As Liguori LeBlanc put it, "any right or even privilege 
to French education in Saskatchewan does not exist."
154
  
 Premier Allan Blakeney made little mention of his beliefs on French-language education 
or official bilingualism in his political memoirs. His only statements are ambivalent: 
But I did favour putting into the Constitution English and French language rights. 
This might help to prevent Canada from descending into two very distinct 
language solitudes and so making the country even more difficult to govern. I did 
not like the idea of embedding language rights in a charter of rights and freedoms, 
but I understood the pure political argument for doing so.
155
 
  
His comment about negotiating minority language education during constitutional discussions 
demonstrated his fear of political fallout for going too far to help out the francophones: 
Saskatchewan and several other provinces were prepared to have the federal 
government, with as much agreement as they would get from Quebec, sort out the 
intricacies of minority language education rights. I remember having a private 
conversation with Premier Davis and Mr. Trudeau on this point. My closing 
comment was, 'All right, but be it on your head'.
156
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Blakeney was known by those closest to him to be a man of deep values -- a "principled 
pragmatist" who understood the Saskatchewan political community. Blakeney enjoyed the fine 
details of policy but was also well-versed in political philosophy and British institutions. He was 
not, however, overly interested in abstract notions of language rights. A month after the appeal 
court decision on Vonda, for example, Blakeney and the provincial cabinet met with the ACFC. 
Upset with the outcome of the Vonda dispute, the ACFC pressed Blakeney to give a firm 
commitment to when and where Fransaskois children were entitled by right to an education in 
French. Blakeney replied that  
to an Anglo-Saxon mind such as his, it was not a matter of what someone said his 
rights are, he is interested only in how they affect his life. He pointed out that 
charters exist all over the world with glowing rights written for people which don't 
mean a thing in practical terms. Mr. Blakeney noted that linguistic rights are not 
human rights. He said that the phrase 'where numbers warrant' is necessary 
because in practical terms he believes that's the way it will be and he does not 
want to promise more than he can deliver.
157
  
 
Given Blakeney's own memoires, in addition to his statements and arguments with the ACFC, it 
is reasonable to conclude that he was not keenly interested in constitutionally protecting French-
language education rights in Saskatchewan with a written constitution or statement of principle. 
He preferred to keep things practical and allow the legislature and cabinet to decide, ultimately 
allowing for greater flexibility. But the Fransaskois, especially Liguori LeBlanc, had another 
interpretation. Following the meeting, LeBlanc bluntly told Blakeney "It is obvious that the 
Fransaskois have no right to a French education in Saskatchewan."
158
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 LeBlanc and the Vonda trustees sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
as a last-ditch challenge to the government and the Saskatoon East board.
159
 On 17 February 
1981, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the request.
160
 It was the final defeat in the Vonda 
dispute, the last chance for the Fransaskois to have French education according to their own 
vision.  
 In many ways the Vonda dispute was a microcosm of French-language education 
problems in Saskatchewan. The provincial government, unwilling to come out clearly in favour 
of French-language education in Saskatchewan, retained control over French education.
161
 The 
government refused to help the Fransaskois by taking leadership when the community asked for 
help in dealing with difficult school boards. As the Vonda-Saskatoon East Central dispute 
demonstrated, the long history of "education as assimilation" -- originally articulated best by 
Clifford Sifton -- was difficult to overcome. Even though the 1968 and 1978 amendments to 
educational legislation seemed part of a new openness to French, in reality the government had 
little interest in the Fransaskois vision for education.  
 
Wither French School Governance? The Aftermath of the Vonda Dispute (1981 to 1982) 
 The 1968 to 1981 period proved to the Fransaskois that even with seemingly positive 
changes to language education in Saskatchewan, the government wished to maintain control over 
French-language education based on a vision of universal access rather than francophone cultural 
survival. During a speech in Saskatoon in March 1981, Irène Chabot noted that the bitterness of 
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the past decade, especially the outcome of the Vonda dispute, only further underscored the 
"nécessité d'une commission scolaire française."
162
 The ACFC was not ready to give up, and 
Chabot argued that one of the next major political projects for the ACFC was francophone 
control over its own French-language schools.
163
 The Fransaskois believed that it was possible 
and could be realized with a number of different strategies: refusing to pay school taxes, 
establishing a francophone board without government permission, or pushing the minister to 
establish one legally.
164
 
 They first focused its efforts on the minister. According to the ACFC, the Education Act 
was a double-edged sword; although it centralized French-language education within the hands 
of the minister, it contained the possibility of the minister unilaterally establishing a French 
board. It might be possible for the community to compel the minister, through negotiations and 
high-level political pressure, to establish a francophone board. Since the Vonda dispute the 
provincial government had agreed to meet occasionally with the ACFC in order to resolve any 
conflicts or questions about French-language education. The government also wanted to avoid 
further public battles with the Fransaskois, which might weaken Saskatchewan's position during 
constitutional discussions. The ACFC would use these meetings to see how far the new Minister 
of Education Doug McArthur was willing to go. McArthur, a young, intelligent, and energetic 
minister, was keen on developing positive relations with the Fransaskois. Convincing the 
minister was a long shot, but one that the Fransaskois were willing to try. In June 1981 the 
Association des commissaires des écoles franco-canadiens de la Saskatchewan (ACEFC) met 
with McArthur to discuss the possibility of establishing a francophone board. According to the 
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ACEFC, the Education Act allowed the minister to establish a board wherever it was in the best 
educational interests of citizens; since it would be in the best interests of the Fransaskois, 
McArthur ought to do it.
165
  
 But McArthur and the Department of Education continued to hesitate. With a 1982 
election on the horizon, the NDP was worried about losing political support. Creating a French 
school board would undoubtedly cause problems. Western alienation was at a high. Western 
Canadians were getting fed up with constitutional wrangling and hearing about Quebec; they 
were even more enraged about the National Energy Program, introduced by Pierre Trudeau's 
Liberal government in October 1980. For western Canadians upset with Ottawa, 1980 to 1981 
was known as the "winter of discontent".
166
 The NDP worried constantly about how far it should 
go in supporting French, since it could easily be equated with supporting Trudeau and the federal 
government. Indeed, the political costs of French school boards were the foremost concern for 
the Department of Education: "With the prospect of a 1982 election, it would be advisable to 
delay any serious consideration until after the election, thus avoiding this as a campaign 
issue."
167
 The department recommended that McArthur not make any promises.
168
 During a 
subsequent August 26 meeting with the ACFC and ACEFC, McArthur explained that any type of 
Fransaskois school governance could not be granted without significant amendments to the 
Education Act.
169
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 As with the Vonda dispute, Fransaskois pressure on the government revealed the 
deficiencies of Saskatchewan's legislation and vision for French-language education. Senior civil 
servants were unsure as to whether federal government funding should be used for Fransaskois 
education or for expanding French immersion programs. Should all programs be available to all, 
or should restrictions be placed on admissions based on mother tongue?
170
 Or should a portion of 
federal grant money for French-language education be funnelled into supporting and studying the 
idea of a Francophone school board?
171
  
 Further pressure on McArthur by the ACFC and ACEFC was unsuccessful. The 
government was as eager to reject Fransaskois school governance as the community was to 
achieve it. Irène Chabot argued that control over Fransaskois schools was "la clef de 
l'épanouissement des Fransaskois" and a question of fundamental justice.
172
 
 In a December 1981 meeting, McArthur rejected a number of ACFC proposals for a 
francophone-run school in Prince Albert.
173
 As Allan Blakeney wrote to Raoul Granger, a 
Fransaskois parent who later played an instrumental role in the fight for school governance: 
"While I appreciate the desire for education reflecting Fransaskois culture, I do not believe it 
would be wise to further fragment the Saskatchewan school system."
174
 Irène Chabot, responding 
to the government's decision on behalf of the Fransaskois community, indicated to McArthur 
how frustrated they were with the government: 
Il est bien clair que vous mécomprenez complètement la situation de la minorité 
fransaskoise lorsque vous qualifiez ses difficultés essentiellement sans 
importance, comparable à d'autres difficultés résolues quotidiennement dans le 
système scolaire...Quand une minorité, que l'on dit officielle au pays, ne peut pas 
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contrôler ses propres écoles, dites-nous, Monsieur le Ministre, en quoi cela est 
différent d'un système totalitaire où seul les autorités ont droit de décision sur la 
façon de vivre du menu peuple.
175
 
 
 But the provincial government did not completely misunderstand the Fransaskois 
community. Rather, Premier Blakeney and the NDP were worried about holding onto power as 
the political right gained momentum across western Canada and the country. In the 1980 federal 
election, only two seats in western Canada went to Trudeau's Liberal party; any provincial 
government seen to be too close to his policies was bound to suffer the consequences at the 
polls.
176
 Westerners were angry, and change was in the air. As the 1982 Saskatchewan election 
campaign heated up in March, the Western Canada Concept Party stormed onto the scene and 
made a number of headlines for its attacks on French-language education. Western Canada 
Concept stood for, among other things, "One Nation" and "One Official Language."
177
 Ray 
Bailey, the Saskatchewan leader of Western Canada Concept, lambasted Blakeney and the NDP 
for going too far on French education. Bailey argued that francophone schools were wrong 
because "if you do it for them, you have to do it for the Ukrainians, the Polacks, the Germans 
and so on. I don't think any province could afford it. This is an English-speaking country."
178
 
Bailey promised to eliminate funding for French-language education and took his crusade against 
Blakeney, Trudeau, and bilingualism across the province, drawing large crowds even in 
traditionally strong NDP ridings.
179
  
 Change was indeed in the air. Although the Western Canadian Concept Party did not win 
a seat in Saskatchewan, the province voted overwhelmingly for a new government. On 26 April 
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1982, Allan Blakeney and the NDP lost to the Progressive Conservative Party of Saskatchewan, 
led by an upstart agronomist Grant Devine. In a way, the Fransaskois predicted Blakeney's loss, 
believing that his middle road approach to bilingualism pleased no one. A month before the 
election the ACEFC discussed provincial government education policy at its congress in March: 
Le gouvernement aimerait avoir des solutions uniformes. Le gouvernement 
provincial, dans les coins anglophones, fait campagne dans le sens que 'vous 
voyez comment on tient tête aux demandes des francophones', alors que dans les 
coins francophones, le gouvernement fait campagne dans le sens que 'voyez 
comme c'est facile d'obtenir des services en français'. Alors dans un sens le 
gouvernement alimente lui-même le ressac des anglophones.
180
 
 
The Fransaskois community believed that it had made few fundamental gains in francophone 
education during the Blakeney years. Perhaps with a new government in power, the Fransaskois 
could make more progress on the school governance question.  
      
Another Government's Promise: The Governance Question in the Early Devine Years 
(1982 to 1984) 
 
 Two weeks before Devine won the election, the ACFC published its strategic plan for the 
1982-1984 period in the Fransaskois community newspaper, l'Eau Vive. Its primary objective 
was to build a Fransaskois education system and obtain amendments to the Education Act to 
allow for Fransaskois governance.
181
 Despite the challenges and defeats of the previous decade, 
there was a spirit of optimism in the Fransaskois community. A new governing party presented 
opportunities for improved community-government relations. In May 1982 both Liguori LeBlanc 
and Irène Chabot wrote to Devine, requesting meetings on the schools question and official 
bilingualism in Saskatchewan more generally.
182
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 Just over a week before the official patriation day for the new Constitution, Grant Devine 
and the Conservative caucus met with Irène Chabot and several Fransaskois leaders in Regina. 
The civil service, as well as new Minister of Education Gordon Currie, warned Devine that on 
the French education portfolio "..a strong and continuing lobby can be expected" from the 
ACFC.
183
 L'Eau Vive, somewhat exaggerating the importance of the meeting, called it "Une 
première dans l'histoire politique de la Saskatchewan."
184
 While the tone was informal Chabot 
used the opportunity to recall the importance of history to the Fransaskois community, and that 
this history confirmed the ACFC vision for a bilingual Saskatchewan: 
The pride we have in being French-Canadian, in being Fransaskois, is not a 
remnant of Folklore: we have inherited it from our parents and our leaders who 
never ceased to believe that to be French-Canadian meant that your ancestors had 
been partners in building the nation as we know it today and that the constitution 
of 1867 had simply confirmed in law the existing reality, that you could choose to 
be an English speaking Canadian or a French speaking Canadian anywhere within 
the boundaries of the new Nation. Our fore-fathers were very aware that they were 
moving within their country when they came to the North West Territories and 
therefore always believed, as we do, in the right to be equal partners in the North 
West Territories and later on in the province of Saskatchewan.
185
 
 
As they had during the 1970s, the Fransaskois used memory and history as one of their main 
political tools. For Chabot, the history of francophones in western Canada and the equal French-
English partnership meant that "the legal status of French in Saskatchewan [must] be recognized 
by the government."
186
 Devine was non-committal. He promised no more than a study on the 
financial elements of official bilingualism at the provincial level. Ever the populist, he added, as 
he would several more times during his premiership, that he considered himself close to the 
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Fransaskois people since his wife Chantal was a French Canadian and their children studied in 
French at school.
187
  
 Meanwhile, the Fransaskois kept pushing the government and school boards to expand 
French-language education. Now with section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guaranteeing minority language education, francophone communities across the 
country advanced their cause.
188
 The Secretary of State offered help to the Saskatchewan 
government in the event that "the establishment of separate French-language school boards 
would most likely entail additional expenditures on the part of your government."
189
 
 The times called for optimism. In Saskatchewan, the Department of Education approved 
the opening of l'École canadienne-française (ECF) in Saskatoon in August 1982.
190
 ECF was the 
result of almost a year's worth of negotiations between the community and the Saskatoon 
Separate School board, and it inspired parents across the province to seek similar legal 
agreements for French-language schools.
191
 The arrangement, however, was still far from what 
the Fransaskois wanted -- a province-wide board which would provide French-language 
education for the Fransaskois.
192
 The community remembered the bitter battles and defeats of the 
Blakeney years and was not about to give up the goal of full control over its own schools.
193
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Indeed, relations between the ECF and Saskatoon Catholic Board of Education were not always 
easy. On one occasion in 1983, for example, the ECF school council recruited a francophone 
teacher for its staff, only to have the board place her in a different school.
194
 These sorts of minor 
quibbles only reinforced the belief in the community that full administrative control over French 
education was the only way.
195
 
 One of the most important results of the constant problems between the Fransaskois, 
school boards, and the provincial government during the 1970s was the increasing 
professionalization of the Fransaskois school governance movement. Over the course of 1982-
1983 years, both the ACFC and the ACEFC went to great lengths to clarify the mandates of their 
respective associations, and ensure that the government could not undermine the Fransaskois 
community's position on school governance by giving mixed messages and communicating 
different ideas to different people.
196
 In February, 1983 the ACEFC undertook a major revision 
of its mandate and vision for francophone school governance. It became la Commission des 
écoles fransaskoises (CEF), the term "commission" chosen over "conseil" because members 
believed it was more authoritative and indicated a stronger organization: "Le nom crée une 
perception psychologique à l'échelle provinciale, et au niveau des groupes avec lesquels ont 
transigé."
197
 The main goal of the CEF was to achieve Fransaskois school governance. At a joint 
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meeting between the CEF and the ACFC, the two organizations explained why Fransaskois 
control was necessary: 
On n'est pas capable de contrôler l'embauche d'un professeur. On n'a rien à dire 
sur l'orientation, la direction que le professeur peut prendre. On n'a rien à dire sur 
la programmation. On ne peut pas contrôler qui vient à notre école. Il faut 
développer une stratégie politique de revendication...Il faut fournir de 
l'information. Il faut être en mesure de démontrer le vouloir de la population.
198
 
  
Here it is important to recall the fundamental distinction that the Fransaskois made in terms of 
francophone and immersion education. Immersion was certainly popular, with the Official 
Languages Commissioner noting in 1984 that it was taking the country by storm.
199
 Francophone 
education was linguistic and cultural; immersion only offered language, and not even at a level 
that the Fransaskois considered appropriate for francophone students.
200
 The Association 
canadienne d'éducation en langue française (ACELF), a national organization dedicated to 
bringing francophone schools and governance to fruition across the country, summed up the 
importance of these schools: 
The expression 'French school' usually designates an institution which provides 
instruction in French to pupils whose first language is French. However, this 
meaning does not apply to all institutions labelled as such...Provincial definitions 
of French schools vary considerably...The French school is an institution which 
makes a considerable contribution to the maintenance and development of the 
French fact in Canada. It is associated with the family, the Church, associations, 
and other cultural, social, and community institutions of the French-speaking 
group.
201
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On governance, the ACELF was unequivocal: 
How can such a deep-seated determination to be Francophone, so strongly 
expressed by parents, teachers, and members of the community, be displayed if 
they do not have charge of the school administration? Can we believe that the 
administration of a French school and a school project centered around the 
conveyance of the French culture can be entrusted to people of another language 
and culture? This situation has prevailed in many areas for too long a time to 
allow it to continue. A school board, composed of members of the Francophone 
community, will ensure that teachers, courses, and programs meet the cultural 
requirements of the community in which the French school is established.
202
 
    
The CEF, for its part, along with Canadian Parents for French and the ACFC, published a small 
pamphlet intended for anglophone parents interested in French immersion in order to explain the 
differences between francophone and immersion education. "CPF, ACFC and CEF hope that this 
publication will be useful in promoting mutual understanding between our two linguistic 
communities"
203
, the document noted. It compared the two systems and showed why Fransaskois 
education differed from immersion, emphasizing "the need for French Language students to have 
a school milieu in which their cultural and linguistic identity is reinforced."
204
  
 The national push for control over francophone schools, already underway in 
Saskatchewan and other provinces such as Alberta, Ontario, and Manitoba,
205
 acted as a source 
of political renewal for the Fransaskois community. L'Eau Vive called on all Fransaskois to 
participate in the activities of the ACEFC, "given that the Devine government seems willing to 
move forward in the domain of francophone education."
206
 The newspaper also called on the 
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CEF to present plans for a Fransaskois school system to the provincial government in order to 
move the school cause forward.
207
  
 The CEF and Fransaskois parents immediately set to work on a major governance 
proposal to submit to the province. The CEF began by meeting with school principals and parent 
groups in Fransaskois communities across the province. Principals outlined difficulties in dealing 
with anglophone boards on staffing and resources, while parents wanted better communication 
between different Fransaskois communities.
208
 The meeting also defined Fransaskois education: 
"Elle est un processus qui permet aux Fransaskois de croître et de développer leurs talents et 
leurs habilités en demeurant eux-mêmes."
209
 The meeting minutes noted that "Tout le monde 
s'entendait pour accorder la priorité aux aspects suivants: contrôle (administration), financement, 
édifice, transport...."
210
    
 But without a model for what a Fransaskois board would look like, the government could 
simply delay even discussing its implementation -- which was the main strategy used by Premier 
Devine and the Department of Education in 1983. Minister of Education Gordon Currie, in a 
letter to CEF President Raoul Granger, wrote that the government would not move ahead with 
anything until the community presented a detailed proposal.
211
 Granger answered that he knew a 
proposal was necessary, but difficult given that the CEF had limited resources. He added: "Nous 
remarquons de la part de votre ministère une absence totale d'intérêt vis-à-vis ce projet...On 
préfère, semble-t-il, dépenser ses énergies à maintenir le statu quo."
212
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 Aside from government or public acceptance of a Fransaskois board, there were also 
practical questions. What, for example, would the tax base be for a Fransaskois board? The CEF 
released a study in August 1983 suggesting that francophones pay their taxes to the new board, 
regardless of their residence in the province; this arrangement, if supplemented by money from 
the provincial government, would allow for proper financing of the board.
213
 A month after the 
CEF study, the ACFC published a document outlining the community's needs and priorities in 
Fransaskois education. "Partout les francophones désirent qu'on distingue entre classes françaises 
et classes d'immersion en langue française," the document noted.
214
 This distinction was crucial 
to proper administration of francophone education, and logically supposed the creation of a 
francophone board.
215
 Even if the government agreed, the document continued, a francophone 
board faced major challenges in terms of logistics (transportation, administration, etc.) across a 
large province. Finances would have to be negotiated with the province, and an organizational 
structure would have to be worked out within the government in order to accommodate the new 
board.
216
  
 
First Steps? Towards a Model of Fransaskois School Governance (1984-1985) 
 The main barrier to expanding francophone education during the Devine years, as it had 
been under the Thatcher and Blakeney governments, was the reality of politics. There were limits 
to what the public would accept, and throughout Saskatchewan history the Fransaskois learned 
that political activism had its limits. If the community hoped to make significant progress in 
education with Grant Devine's government, it soon became clear that they were in for a difficult 
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time. By 1984 relations between the Fransaskois community and the government began to break 
down as the battle over control of French-language school governance became more and more 
heated. On 9 February 1984, after almost a year of meetings, research, and planning, the CEF 
submitted its major proposal for a francophone school board to the provincial government.
217
 As 
a political and policy document, it confirmed the major role that memory played in driving the 
Fransaskois vision of French in society. The first part of the proposal documented the French 
historical presence in western Canada, including the use of French in the North-West Territories' 
early education system.
218
 It was a story of the government's betrayal of dualism in the West: 
À leur arrivée dans l'Ouest, les francophones ont établi des écoles françaises et qui 
répondaient à leurs besoins. Les législateurs n'ont pas tardé à leur imposer 
l'anglais afin de pouvoir les assimiler le plus vite possible. Malgré ces efforts, il 
reste encore des francophones en Saskatchewan et nous croyons qu'il est temps de 
corriger les injustices qui sévissent depuis 90 ans et de leur redonner le contrôle 
de leurs écoles, ainsi que les moyens nécessaires à l'exercice efficace de ce 
contrôle.
219
 
    
The francophones, the brief continued, "se reconnaissent toujours comme les premiers qui, suite 
au peuplement du pays par les autochtones, sont arrivés à ce pays et qui y sont restés...Ils se 
considèrent donc comme peuple partenaire à part entière avec tout ce que cela comporte de 
respect par rapport à leur individualité et leur collectivité."
220
 Furthermore, the brief argued, the 
Education Act was inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms insofar as it 
did not allow for Fransaskois control over francophone schools.
221
   
 The provincial government promised to study the proposal in detail, while the 
Fransaskois and federal government kept up the political pressure. Publicly, Saskatchewan went 
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into damage-control mode. In April, Official Languages Commissioner Maxwell Yalden accused 
Saskatchewan of doing little to help francophones within its own provincial borders.
222
 
Education Minister Patricia Smith wrote to Raoul Granger that "I am quite concerned that Mr. 
Yalden appears to be unaware of the many positive things that we have been able to do in the 
province of Saskatchewan for the francophone community."
223
 Devine's reply to Yalden was that 
Saskatchewan was being generous given the demographic size of the Fransaskois community. 
These exchanges prompted a public denunciation of Devine by new ACFC president Liguori 
LeBlanc. LeBlanc, already known in the Fransaskois community for his efforts in expanding 
French-language education in the province, reminded Devine that the few French schools and 
non-existent French services available in Saskatchewan meant there was plenty of room for 
improvement.
224
 
 Although they first tried negotiations and pressure, the Fransaskois certainly did not rule 
out the possibility of taking the government to court. The community, for example, closely 
followed other francophone cases winding their way through the courts in Alberta and Ontario. 
When the Ontario Supreme Court ruled in June 1984 that section 23 of the Charter also included 
the right to francophone control over schools, the ACFC expressed its hope that  
ce jugement facilitera une réponse positive de la ministre de l'éducation, 
l'honorable Pat Smith, dans ce dossier. Sinon, les éléments qui semblent être 
contenus dans ce jugement...permettront aux Fransaskois d'étoffer davantage les 
arguments nécessaires à l'atteinte de leur objectif de contrôle de leurs écoles.
225
  
 
 In September and October, with still no word from the government on the CEF proposal, 
the Fransaskois community denounced Devine and Smith for procrastinating on the schools 
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portfolio.
226
 Granger also wanted changes to the Education Act which would make a clear 
distinction between francophone and immersion schools, in addition to recognizing French as 
equal to English in the education system.
227
 In January 1985, the ACFC wrote Devine that 
further delays on the Fransaskois education proposals were unacceptable, especially since "La 
communauté fransaskoise fait face à une étape décisive dans son évolution historique."
228
 In 
particular, LeBlanc charged, Patricia Smith "refuse de se compromettre par rapport au principe 
même de donner aux Fransaskois le pouvoir de gérance et d'administration sur leurs écoles...En 
ceci, elle semble refléter la position officielle du gouvernement."
229
 
 The government did not have an official position, except that it believed the status quo 
was constitutionally sound. Its main strategy was to delay the Fransaskois community as long as 
possible on the question, especially with an election coming up in the near future. Smith and 
Devine did not even discuss the CEF proposal with Cabinet until January 1985. Smith asked 
cabinet to approve her strategy of rejecting the CEF model, but proposing a number of pilot 
projects wherein Fransaskois parents would negotiate greater educational decision powers with 
chosen school boards.
230
 This strategy, Smith told cabinet, would show a "commitment to move 
toward providing more local autonomy of French minority education. It may enable this gradual 
evolution of responsibility within existing administrative structures, avoiding court litigation, the 
potential for public unrest and substantial increased costs."
231
 In reality, the plan differed little 
from the strategy used by the Blakeney government during the 1970s: refuse to enact any 
fundamental changes to education, ensure that government control over legislation was 
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protected, and reinforce local board autonomy. Given the difficulties the Fransaskois 
encountered with various school boards in the 1970s, especially in Vonda, Smith's "new" 
strategy to have the community negotiate devolved powers with boards was not met with much 
enthusiasm.  
 If Smith, Devine, and the government were unwilling to court controversy, the CEF had 
opposite plans. At its February 1985 congress the organization adopted "une double stratégie 
pour atteindre son but ultime, soit la voie du lobbying politique et la voie juridique."
232
 L'Eau 
Vive predicted that given the way things were going, the community would end up suing the 
government.
233
 On 26 February Smith informed the CEF that it would not accept granting school 
governance to the francophone community.
234
 Two months later, Premier Devine communicated 
to ACFC President Liguori LeBlanc the same message: 
Comme vous le comprenez bien, l'impact que votre proposition aurait sur le 
système éducatif nous imposait d'évaluer soigneusement ses implications 
éventuelles. En plus d'une évaluation de votre proposition les ministères de 
l'Éducation et de la Justice, le Cabinet a étudié cette proposition, ainsi que les 
autres options, à deux occasions. Suite à notre discussion la plus récente, 
l'Honorable Patricia Smith a indiqué le 26 février dernier au Président de la 
C.E.F., Monsieur Raoul Granger, et au Comité consultatif sur le minorité de 
langue officielle auprès de la ministre, que l'administration actuelle n'était pas 
prête à envisage la proposition de la C.E.F. ni aucune des options proposées qui 
entraîneraient des transformation à la structure administrative scolaire en place 
[sic].
235
   
 
The CEF had its answer. Any fundamental changes to school governance in favour of 
francophone  control would not be implemented by the Devine government.  
   
Saskatchewan's French-Language Education Before the Courts (1985-1988) 
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 Fed up with political impasse, the Fransaskois decided to take the school governance 
cause to the courts. They were inspired by the Franco-Albertan community, who in July 1985 
won a partial victory before the Court of Alberta Queen's Bench. In Mahé v. Alberta, the Court 
ruled that section 23 of the Charter included governance rights for Franco-Albertans. More 
specifically, the court wrote that the government could satisfy its obligations for francophone 
governance by simply allowing francophone parents on existing school boards.
236
  
 Going to court was risky, but when political negotiations and lobbying yielded little there 
were no other options for the community. In any case, the Fransaskois had nothing to lose. They 
knew that the Charter offered them the right to francophone education and it was now a matter 
of deciding the extent of that right. By August 1985, the provincial government also recognized 
that political negotiations and discussions with the Fransaskois were going nowhere, and perhaps 
only the courts could resolve the continual debate between the two sides.
237
 In mid-August, the 
CEF met with ACFC executives and francophone parent committee members from across the 
province to discuss the community's legal options. Gustave Dubois, one of the major leaders in 
the early Fransaskois schools movement, went over developments in other provinces, noting that 
in Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario there were possibilities of winning.
238
 The CEF left little 
question as to its resolve to see the case through. In November 1985 it noted in L'Eau Vive that 
"Il faut s'attendre à ce que cette démarche aboutisse en Cour suprême du Canada."
239
  
 The CEF chose as its legal counsel Fransaskois lawyer Roger Lepage, who was also busy 
representing Father André Mercure before the Supreme Court in his ongoing case to have French 
recognized as an official language in Saskatchewan. Lepage believed that the key to the 
                                                 
236
 Mahé v. Alberta, [1985] ABQB 143; "Les tribunaux donnent raison aux Franco-Albertains," L'Eau Vive 7 août 
1985.   
237
 Pierre Brault, "L'A.C.F.C. invitée par le gouvernement à défendre son point," L'Eau Vive, 28 août 1985. 
238
 CEF, "Réunion du comité exécutif et de Me Lepage avec les codemandeurs," 17 août 1985. [PAS], ACFC Fonds.  
239
 CEF, "Reconnaissance de nos droits: rien de moins," bulletin in L'Eau Vive, novembre 1985.  
  
175 
 
Fransaskois' argument was the distinction between immersion and francophone education, with 
the major goal of having the Education Act struck down by the courts in favour of Fransaskois 
governance.
240
 To do so, Lepage explained, the community would have to maintain its position 
that anything less than complete control over French-language schools was unacceptable to the 
community, and a violation of the Charter.
241
  
  The CEF filed its statement of claim in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench on 10 
October 1985. According to the CEF, section 180 of the Education Act, which gave discretion to 
school boards and the Minister of Education as to when and where French-language education 
could be offered, was inconsistent with section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.
242
 More importantly, the CEF affirmed, 
The Education Act does not provide citizens of the French linguistic minority in 
the province of Saskatchewan the right to manage and control their French 
minority language instruction of French minority language educational 
facilities.
243
 
 
 The ACFC and Fransaskois community leaders saw the CEF legal challenge as a chance 
to right legal and historical wrongs, but also to unite the community. Wilfrid Denis, a 
Fransaskois sociology professor, reminded delegates at the 1985 ACFC convention in November 
that Saskatchewan's francophones always had to fight for their rights, and that without their 
political struggles francophone culture would not continue to exist in Saskatchewan.
244
 Both the 
ACFC and the CEF played a key role in fostering and articulating a rights-based community 
discourse surrounding the French language. The CEF, for example, published a series of "Rappel 
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des droits linguistiques" in L'Eau Vive which insisted that governance was part of the Charter 
section 23 rights, even if it was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
245
  
 The trial was delayed until 19 May 1987 and lasted ten days. The CEF, as it had before, 
used the case as an opportunity to "mieux informer la population sur différents aspects de 
l'éducation francophone en milieu minoritaire" through a series of conferences in francophone 
communities across the province.
246
 The trial was difficult. It revealed the major differences in 
how the Fransaskois community and the provincial government viewed the education question. 
Fransaskois lawyer Roger Lepage began the CEF case by presenting a history of education in the 
province.
247
 Lepage noted that the community had asked for community-controlled school 
boards even before 1982, and that the pre-Charter legislation remained essentially intact.
248
 In a 
similar vein, Wilfrid Denis, who acted as an expert witness for the CEF, presented historical and 
sociological data on linguistic assimilation of the provincial francophone community. The 
government, for its part, argued that while some wrongs may have been committed in the past, 
history could not be re-written. Assimilation was also a matter of individual choice rather than 
something the government was responsible for bringing about.
249
 The province defended its 
legislation, explaining that it provided for francophone education as required by the Charter. 
Governance, the province explained, was not necessary to fulfil Saskatchewan's obligations 
towards the francophone community.    
    
Winning Governance? The Wimmer Decision and its aftermath, 1988-1991 
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 On 18 February 1988 -- a week before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in the 
Mercure case -- the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench delivered its ruling on the province's 
Education Act. Judge Wimmer based much of his decision on the 1985 Alberta Court of Queen's 
Bench judgment and, like that one, left the question of school governance in an ambivalent state. 
Wimmer upheld school board powers and the overall administrative structure of the provincial 
education system, but explained that the Education Act could be unconstitutional if board powers 
were used to deny French language education to the Fransaskois. According to Wimmer, the 
demographic weight of different Fransaskois communities was a key factor in deciding whether 
or not section 23 rights existed. The province's education legislation, he ruled, was 
unconstitutional when it did not allow governance in areas where there were enough Fransaskois 
students to warrant it. It was also unconstitutional wherever school division boundaries might 
impede implementation of s. 23 rights, and insofar as it required ministerial permission to 
establish a French language school.
250
  
 As with the Mercure decision
251
, the problem with Wimmer's ruling was its ambivalence. 
It allowed both the Fransaskois community and the government to claim victory. Further, by 
declaring that it was up to the Legislature rather than the courts to settle the francophone 
governance question, Wimmer left an important right in the hands of the English-speaking 
majority. His ruling certainly did not change the government's mind on the question. The 
Saskatchewan Department of Justice called it "not particularly persuasive" and maintained its 
position that section 23 rights did not include school governance.
252
 The Fransaskois, however, 
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called Wimmer's decision a victory and promised to press the government for further action.
253
 
On February 25, ACFC President Rupert Baudais wrote to Grant Devine that "Nous nous 
attendons à ce que votre gouvernement se penche dans les plus brefs délais sur la mise en 
application du jugement."
254
    
 Although Education Minister Lorne Hepworth promised to give a more elaborate 
government reaction to the Wimmer decision in February, cabinet did not meet to discuss the 
ruling until 10 March and considered returning to negotiations with the Fransaskois.
255
 Cabinet 
wanted to work out something comprehensive with the Fransaskois on both the schools and the 
Mercure questions in order to avoid political controversy. Mercure in particular could serve as a 
bargaining chip for discussions on education governance: 
The government could link Mercure to education. Education could initiate 
discussions with Francophone groups on the issue of "management and control" 
of French language education...Francophone leaders are at this stage taking a 
relatively hard public stand, and may not readily accept a genuine compromise. 
However, they wish to enter negotiations and discuss the issues with 
government...Offering "management and control" as part of the response to 
Mercure might make the overall package more attractive to Francophone 
groups.
256
  
 
On March 15, however, cabinet changed its mind. Rather than negotiate, the government would 
take its chance with the courts.
257
 It decided to appeal the decision, arguing that section 23 of the 
Charter did not include the right to governance; even if it did, Saskatchewan's limits were 
reasonably justified.
258
 The CEF also appealed Judge Wimmer's decision, arguing that he had 
erred in not interpreting section 23 of the Charter broadly enough, in implying that minority 
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language instruction could be integrated within the existing English language system, and in 
placing limits on section 23 solely based on economic considerations.
259
 
 But as Wimmer pointed out in his ruling, legal action could not be the sole basis of 
francophone education in Saskatchewan. Even if the CEF was right to claim governance as part 
of s. 23 rights under the Charter, "it is not for the judiciary...to pass upon the means by which 
such rights might be lawfully recognized."
260
 Section 23 provisions could not be implemented 
solely by the courts. It took the political and administrative machinery of government to create 
and maintain francophone school governance. Thus, despite the difficulties of politics and 
negotiations leading up to the Wimmer ruling, both the Fransaskois community and the 
government realized that they would have to work out a solution to the governance problem.  
 In May 1988 the government sat down with the Fransaskois to discuss the next steps for 
francophone education in the province. It did not, however, just speak with the community; 
Devine and Education Minister Lorne Hepworth also invited major players in Saskatchewan 
education, including the Saskatchewan School Trustees Association (SSTA), the Saskatchewan 
Teachers' Federation (STF) and the League of Education Administrators, Directors, and 
Superintendants (LEADS). While the CEF understood the implications that francophone 
governance would have for the provincial education system, it was offended that "Le 
gouvernement a convoqué tout ce monde à discuter de l'avenir de l'éducation des francophones 
en Saskatchewan."
261
 During the meeting Wilfrid Denis described a number of disputes and 
governance problems that École canadienne-française had in Saskatoon, which "a surpris 
plusieurs des représentants anglophone qui croyaient que 'l'entente Saskatoon' fonctionnait à 
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merveille."
262
 Hepworth and the anglophone groups noted that they would respect the Wimmer 
decision and section 23 rights, but that they were concerned about how francophone governance 
would be applied.
263
    
 In June, the province signed a multi-million dollar deal with the federal government, 
following Saskatchewan's decision to repeal official bilingualism legislation after the Mercure 
decision.
264
 Over a third of the $63 million deal was to be used to help Saskatchewan establish 
francophone governance.
265
 However, it took almost a full year of foot-dragging on the issue for 
the Saskatchewan government to establish, in February 1989, the Coordinating Committee for 
the Governance of Francophone Schools by Francophones, chaired by Edgar Gallant. The 
committee featured representatives from the Fransaskois community, government, SSTA, STF, 
and LEADS. Gallant's final report, released in June 1989 recommended "a system under which 
no one has to lose and everyone, in one sense or another, stands to gain."
266
 Gallant 
recommended that "The management facilities involved must be equivalent to those of the 
majority school system, and the system must be under the effective control and management of 
the fransaskois."
267
  
 Following the report's conclusions, Saskatchewan created a task force in September 1989 
which would propose amendments to the Education Act, transfer resources and staff to 
francophone schools, and inform the public about francophone education.
268
 Work progressed 
well and the administrative machinery was almost in place. Then, federal and constitutional 
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politics intervened. In March 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its ruling in 
Mahé v. Alberta.
269
 A landmark ruling, Mahé affirmed that 
Where the numbers warrant, s. 23 confers upon minority language parents a right to 
management and control over the educational facilities in which their children are 
taught. Such management and control is vital to ensure that their language and 
culture flourish. The English and the French versions of s. 23(3)(b), read together, 
support such an interpretation. The measure of management and control required by 
s. 23 may, in some circumstances and depending on the numbers of students to be 
served, warrant an independent school board.
270
  
  
Mahé was a game-changer for the Saskatchewan government and the Fransaskois. It not only 
confirmed Wimmer's decision and governance rights as part of section 23, it also soured relations 
between the government and the community. A month after Mahé, Saskatchewan announced that 
"the province needs more time...some complex legal and constitutional issues must be resolved 
prior to enacting legislation."
271
 The government's decision raised the ire of Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney and Official Languages Commissioner D'Iberville Fortier, both of whom wrote public 
letters to Grant Devine denouncing the government's about-face on francophone schools.
272
 The 
Regina Leader Post called it a "Sad day for the Fransaskois," arguing that "This delay is more 
than just a serious breach of the Saskatchewan government's promises. It puts Saskatchewan in 
direct conflict with the Supreme Court of Canada and the Canadian Constitution."
273
 
 As criticism poured in to Saskatchewan government offices from across Saskatchewan 
and Canada, government-community relations further deteriorated. The province's postponing of 
Fransaskois governance left the question in political limbo. In November 1990 a francophone 
parent group in Gravelbourg filed yet another legal suit against the province, arguing that 
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Saskatchewan was violating the constitution by not providing a francophone elementary school 
in the area.
274
 Devine argued that it simply cost too much.
275
 "In the present financial situation," 
Education Minister Ray Meiklejohn wrote to D'Iberville Fortier, "the province cannot easily 
allow any further strain on the economy."
276
  
 Devine's Progressive Conservative party lost the Saskatchewan general election on 21 
October 1991 to the NDP. During Devine's tenure as premier, the Fransaskois went from 
optimism and hope to frustration and disillusionment. Even with court decisions and major 
studies favouring francophone school governance, the francophone community was unable to 
fully achieve its goals.     
     
Conclusion 
 Between 1968 and 1991, the place of French in Saskatchewan schools was a 
controversial question. Although the provincial education system slowly moved from small 
amounts of French-language instruction towards full francophone control over francophone 
schools, it would be a mistake to view this progression as a smooth or easy historical process. On 
the contrary, the expansion of French-language education between 1968 and 1990 revealed the 
heavy weight of history. A school system originally designed to assimilate a population with 
diverse national, cultural, and linguistic origins did not yield easily to the efforts of an 
aggressive, well-organized minority group. School boards designed for local, democratic control 
were not necessarily well-suited or sympathetic to the Fransaskois' linguistic and cultural needs. 
 To say that the Fransaskois had difficulties in achieving francophone education and 
school governance is not to place all blame at the feet of the government, school boards, or even 
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the general public. A complex educational bureaucracy and financial pressures on the province at 
the end of the 1970s made establishing French-language schools difficult. Similar provincial 
financial pressures at the end of the 1980s, resulting from national and international economic 
forces, in addition to the fiscal challenges faced by the Saskatchewan Progressive Conservative 
government, made establishing a francophone school board politically and financially difficult.  
 Additional factors influencing the debate on French-language education in Saskatchewan 
do not, however, discount that there was a widely-held belief that what the Fransaskois wanted 
was simply unacceptable. It was special treatment for only one minority. It was fragmenting an 
already complex education system. It was conceding too much to French speakers. These views 
influenced policy and forced both the NDP and Progressive Conservative provincial 
governments to resist francophone pressures for more control over education, no matter how 
well-intentioned both governments may have been.   
 This chapter, therefore, demonstrates that while it may be possible for a minority group to 
influence and even modify a language regime using activism, negotiations, and legal tactics, 
changes are difficult to enact without favourable legislation. In the case of the Vonda dispute, the 
Fransaskois found themselves caught between a recalcitrant school board and a hesitant 
provincial government. Without the demographic means to influence the anglophone-controlled 
school board in Vonda, the Fransaskois turned to politics and then to the judicial system. But as 
their defeat in the Vonda case illustrated, they could not expect to win on any front without 
constitutional law on their side.  
 The new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reopened the possibility of using the 
courts. Still, with a new government in power the Fransaskois first tried using political 
negotiations. When relations between the Fransaskois and the province broke down, the 
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Fransaskois used the constitution to their advantage but would be disappointed with an 
ambivalent Court of Queen's Bench decision that kept power in the hands of the government. 
The Devine government was able to delay implementing Fransaskois school governance and left 
the question to the NDP under Roy Romanow.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"Conscious of our Multicultural Heritage": Bilingualism and Provincial Cultural Policy, 
1971-1982 
 
En Saskatchewan, où les groupes d'origine ethnique autre que française et anglaise sont nombreux et importants, 
cela a pour conséquence générale que les Canadiens-français sont considérés comme un de ces groupes ethniques. 
Les Fransaskois sont placés devant un problème bien concret lorsqu'on leur demande de participer à des activités 
multiculturelles dans leur communauté: faut-il participer en anglais et accepter d'être traité comme un "groupe 
ethnique"; ou faut-il refuser et se placer ainsi en marge de sa communauté?
1
 
 
- Association culturelle franco-canadienne de la Saskatchewan 
 
Very few residents of Saskatchewan have experienced francophone culture at first hand. The French fact in 
Saskatchewan continues to be a matter of bilingual labels and a small community of francophones, smaller by far 
than the communities of German or Ukrainian speakers. The important cultural fact about Saskatchewan is the 
development of a distinctively Prairie culture from  multicultural roots. We are a province of many cultures, or of 
one culture, depending on how the word is defined. Ours is not an English culture, though our principal language is 
English. Saskatchewan is the only Canadian province in which people of British descent and people of French 
descent together do not form a majority. We belong to neither of the two nations so often referred to in the current 
debate.
2
 
 
- Allan Blakeney 
 
 
Introduction  
 Saskatchewan was different from the rest of Canada. In the 1970s, while federal and 
provincial leaders drew battle lines over bilingualism, language rights, and the definition of 
Canada, Saskatchewan Premier Allan Blakeney reacted with growing concern. Where, and how, 
did Saskatchewan fit in to the bilingual and bicultural idea of Canada proposed by the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism? Nowhere, Blakeney answered.
3
 At meetings on 
national unity and the constitution Blakeney enjoyed reminding listeners that "Saskatchewan is 
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the only province in which those of British and French origin, combined, form less than half the 
population. That makes us particularly conscious of our multicultural heritage."
4
  
 This chapter discusses the creation of multicultural policy in Saskatchewan between 1971 
and 1982. During these years Saskatchewan went on the offensive, using multiculturalism to 
contest the redefinition of Canada as a bilingual and bicultural nation.
5
 Bilingualism did not fit 
with how Saskatchewan's political leaders or the majority of the population viewed the province 
and its history. Allan Blakeney and his newly-elected NDP government believed that the history 
of Saskatchewan and western Canada strongly undermined the bicultural thesis of the nation. In 
a 1980 speech to the National Press Club, for example, Saskatchewan Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs Roy Romanow noted that  
My parents came to Saskatchewan from the Ukraine. They spoke not one word of 
French. They spoke not one word of English -- except for two short and imperfect 
sentences my father was taught on the ship coming over: 'Me Mike Romanow. Me 
Liberal'. When my father passed away, he still found it easier to speak Ukrainian 
than English. My mother, like thousands in the West, to this day, enjoys a full life 
in the west end of Saskatoon -- shopping, going to church, visiting friends -- using 
only the Ukrainian language. There's nothing unique in this kind of story in 
Saskatchewan. Instead of Ukrainian, the language might be German, 
Scandinavian, Dutch, Hungarian, Cree or Chipewyan, or Polish. Saskatchewan is 
the only province in Canada in which the people of British and French origins, 
taken together, make up less than half the population. The first language of many 
people, like myself, is neither of the two official languages - English nor French. 
The uniqueness of Saskatchewan -- its multicultural character -- is a product of 
the era in which it was settled and of the way the land shaped the people.
6
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Romanow's own background represented both the past and present of Saskatchewan according to 
the government: multicultural origins and hard work in the search for a better life. Biculturalism, 
on the other hand, characterized central Canada, an older and more distant region. It simply did 
not correspond to the Saskatchewan identity. Of course, there were francophones in the province, 
but where they fit into the province's history and what rights they had was an open question.  
 
Region and Nation: The Political Community and Early Multicultural Ideas 
 Federal government expansion into cultural policy, especially official bilingualism, 
precipitated a crisis of political identity in Saskatchewan.
7
 As political scientist David E. Smith 
argues,  
Federal language policy enhanced the West's real or imagined disabilities in the 
federation. In its origin and operation it was a potent reminder of the region's 
peripheral location, while it presented practical difficulties for implementation 
even for those sympathetic to its purpose. Essentially, bilingualism was a simpler 
tune than westerners wanted to hear. The plural ethnic base of the West, which 
had survived the Anglo-Saxon's enthusiastic Canadianization policies of the 
1920s, could not easily be fitted into a bicultural interpretation of Canadian 
society...since the passage of the Official Languages Act, the prairie provinces 
have moved with determination into the same field. Whether or not intended, the 
result has been to identify the provincial governments even more than the federal 
government with multiculturalism policies but, coincidentally, to defuse the 
opposition to federal bilingualism policies.
8
  
 
Smith called for further study of "the reasons why provincial governments and the populace they 
serve have come to accept multiculturalism."
9
 In this vein, this chapter argues that 
Saskatchewan's multiculturalism policies cannot be understood without taking into account the 
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influence of bilingualism and language politics.
10
 Bilingualism and federal government language 
policies forced Saskatchewan to change the way it understood its own history and politics.
11
 If 
Saskatchewan was different from central Canada -- multicultural, not bilingual -- the province 
would have to challenge the historical and social principles of official bilingualism with a 
homegrown cultural policy.
12
 But finding a historical principle was not easy, since the ideals of 
Britishness that dominated Saskatchewan's early history could not be the basis for the province's 
new identity. Across the country English Canadians were working towards abandoning their 
strongly British and imperial ideas of the nation by the 1960s and 1970s.
13
 As historian José 
Igartua argues, this abandonment was subtle but worthy of study because it reveals how English 
Canadians viewed themselves: "we can gain a better understanding of the last fifty years of 
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Canadian history by viewing transformations in representations of national identity in English-
speaking Canada as a historical process."
14
  
 Multiculturalism would be the new principle for Saskatchewan, its answer to Ottawa. By 
promoting multiculturalism the Saskatchewan government could legitimize its criticisms of 
bilingualism, participate in constitutional debates, and have its own perspective heard without 
appearing anti-francophone or anti-diversity. This interpretation is consistent with studies of 
early multiculturalism policy in other western Canadian provinces. In Alberta, for example, it 
was introduced  
...as a strategic manoeuvre to bolster and defend Alberta's compact perspective on 
federalism and to forestall the adoption of any constitutional change that would 
perpetuate an idea of the Canadian federation in which Alberta would have 
difficulty recognizing itself as an equal and autonomous partner. [Premier Harry] 
Strom equated the alienation felt by non-English and non-French Canadians as 
second-class citizens to Alberta's own "status anxiety," and to Western alienation 
more generally.
15
 
  
Multiculturalism policy gave western Canadian provincial governments their own new political 
identity which allowed them to resist the federal government's re-casting of Canada as bilingual. 
It also responded to the void left by English Canada's abandonment of Anglo-centric values and 
interpretation of history. Much more than modest policies for funding heritage projects, 
museums, cultural associations, and teaching in languages other than French or English, 
multiculturalism in Saskatchewan opened a space for the province to redefine its political culture 
as diverse, pioneering, and open. It allowed Saskatchewan to go on the offensive and articulate 
its culture in a positive light.  
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 At the same time, multiculturalism allowed the provincial government to place all non-
English speaking minorities, including the Fransaskois, on the same level, thereby preserving its 
language regime. Indeed, rather than recognize the founding values and their continuity in 
Saskatchewan, the provincial government used multiculturalism in order to re-interpret its own 
history, using its history of immigration and contemporary cultural diversity to assert that its 
history was multicultural and therefore different from the bicultural history of central Canada.
16
 
More importantly, a multicultural Saskatchewan would not have to recognize official 
bilingualism and other political aspirations of the Fransaskois community. Herein lies 
francophone reluctance to support multiculturalism, especially given that it emerged as a policy 
explicitly critical of bilingualism.
17
 This reluctance was widespread amongst French-speaking 
communities in Canada.
18
  
 The Fransaskois community and the Association culturelle franco-canadienne de la 
Saskatchewan (ACFC) viewed multiculturalism with suspicion and concern, since the defining 
of Canada as multicultural rather than bicultural had considerable implications for language 
policy and French-language rights in Saskatchewan. The historical interpretation of 
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Saskatchewan as multicultural rather than founded by both English and French speakers was 
simply unacceptable to the Fransaskois community. As such, the potential for conflict between 
the Fransaskois, the government, and other minority groups was great. The Fransaskois would 
not accept being defined as one ethnic group among many, while the Saskatchewan government, 
and many Saskatchewanians, viewed francophones as demographically insignificant and 
historically not more important than any other group. The Fransaskois community also had much 
to say about the multicultural rendition of Saskatchewan history. The community's political 
campaign for bilingualism seriously challenged the redefinition of Saskatchewan as multicultural 
because it put into question the government's new historical narrative. If the government was 
serious about cultural diversity, then, how did it react to the activism and demands of a well-
organized minority group?  
 That the Fransaskois at first perceived multiculturalism with suspicion did not mean that 
they eschewed it entirely. Nor did francophones in Saskatchewan oppose cultural diversity. On 
the contrary, they had an ambivalent relationship to multiculturalism. They knew all too well the 
bitter defeats of the past and what life as a minority group meant. They were sympathetic to the 
plight of other minorities in the province and attempted to influence the establishment of 
multiculturalism policy, not only to help other groups in principle but also to take advantage of 
programs for their own purposes. In 1971, for example, the ACFC argued that while French and 
English were Canada's official languages, any new constitution of the country should recognise 
all "collectivités culturelles," including  
les groupes d'expression indienne et métisse, esquimaude, italienne, ukrainienne, 
etc. Si ces réalités culturelles canadiennes ne sont pas encouragées d'une façon 
positive dans la constitution, nous craignons qu'elles continuent de subir une 
suppression inconsciente néfaste, sous prétexte qu'elles sont hors-la-loi.
19
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It was a difficult position for the Fransaskois. It was an equally difficult political scenario for 
Allan Blakeney, who had to balance a burgeoning regional political consciousness in western 
Canada with the needs of national unity and constitutional reform.  
 Saskatchewan did not invent multiculturalism policy but it was the first jurisdiction in 
North America to enact multiculturalism legislation in 1974. Somewhat curiously, however, 
scholars have paid little attention to Saskatchewan's cultural programming and how it fits into 
the broader provincial political community. Most analyses of multiculturalism in Canada focus 
on its federal and national implications.
20
 These studies are interested in the results produced by 
the cultural mixture of Canada. Their deficiency, Canadian philosopher Ian Angus explains, is 
that  
What is left out of this formulation is the role of empire and its succeeding form 
of state power in establishing the field within which mixing will take place and 
the relationship between the mixture that is English Canada with First Nations and 
Quebec. The dominant philosophy in English Canada has been established 
precisely through ignoring the central role of empire.
21
 
 
It is worth again quoting Angus' summation of the curious intellectual paradox caused by 
English Canada's shift away from a British identity in the 1960s: 
It is widely recognized that English Canadian political culture has focused on 
community and plurality, but this conception contains the risk of becoming simply 
apologetic and ideological if it ignores the critique of empire that has been equally 
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constitutive of its distinctive character. English Canadian culture is thus caught 
between its origin in empire and its attempt to adequately critique that origin. 
English Canadian intellectual culture acquits itself well when it consciously 
articulates the project of throwing off empire and judges critically failures to do 
so.
22
   
 
 One of the few works that attempts to make sense of the political meaning of empire and 
the multiculturalism-bilingualism nexus is Eve Haque's Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual 
Framework, which offers a deconstructive analysis of the two political ideals. Haque, however, 
has little to say about francophone minorities save for their participation in "a new, unisonant 
formulation of nation-building; one that could preserve white-settler hegemony at the same time 
as it disavowed its racial exclusions."
23
 While the retooling of Canada towards a bicultural nation 
undoubtedly exerted new pressures and challenges on indigenous peoples, it should also be 
remembered that Canada's early nation-building ideology was strongly anti-French, especially in 
western Canada. In many respects, the Fransaskois believed that they too were a colonized 
people, whose early presence was disregarded by English Canadians. Furthermore, the federal 
government was not the only player in the multicultural game. Provincial governments also 
participated actively in their own forms of nation-building ("province-building"
24
) and cultural 
construction. These processes had similarities and differences across provinces and excluded any 
number of different peoples. In the Saskatchewan case, one of the peoples excluded by the 
Saskatchewan multiculturalism province-building process were the Fransaskois.  
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 Studies that examine provincial multiculturalism tend to focus on broader content and 
policy implications rather than the historical processes surrounding their creation.
25
 No serious 
consideration has yet been given to why Saskatchewan, a province founded on British political 
and cultural values, would set out to fundamentally change its own political identity.
26
 The role 
that bilingualism and biculturalism played in influencing the reconstruction of Saskatchewan's 
identity remains to be explained. This omission in the literature is somewhat surprising given 
that the 1970s were a period of fundamental economic and societal transformations in 
Saskatchewan.
27
 The increasing importance of natural resource exploitation, especially potash, 
brought considerable economic change to Saskatchewan, while the rise in separatism in Quebec 
and the dominance of the national unity question in federal politics led to major socio-cultural 
changes in Saskatchewan as well.
28
 
 
Multicultural, Not Bilingual: Saskatchewan Makes its Move 
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 Shortly after the provinces and federal government sat down to discuss amending the 
Canadian constitution in June 1971
29
, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced a new federal 
policy for "toutes les cultures au Canada" that fall. This multiculturalism policy held that while 
Canada had two official languages, the country had "no official culture."
30
 Allan Blakeney 
immediately asked Roy Romanow, his right-hand man and minister responsible for Cultural 
Affairs, to look closely at Trudeau's new policy and Book IV of the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism. With the federal government's expansion into cultural matters 
and the defining of the nation, Blakeney's priority was maintaining as much provincial control 
over cultural matters as possible, especially official languages in the courts and legislature.
31
 
 In January 1972, Romanow reported back to Blakeney and proposed guiding principles 
for multiculturalism and bilingualism in Saskatchewan:   
The Province of Saskatchewan has always been a multicultural society and all of 
us share in its heritage...It is recommended that the Government of Saskatchewan 
explicitly reject biculturalism as an historical and contemporary reality for Canada 
and affirm that this is a multicultural country with many languages, two of which, 
English and French, are official. The broad objective of our government should be 
to assure that the diverse cultural life of the people of Saskatchewan is maintained 
as a dynamic source of creativity, both for this province and for the wider 
Canadian society...Any other policy will have serious adverse social, cultural and 
political consequences for Canada in its second century.
32
 
 
It is important to understand the significance of Romanow's briefing because it set the tone for 
Saskatchewan's language and cultural policy for over a decade. Romanow made a clear 
distinction between French and English as official, national languages on the one hand and 
Saskatchewan's cultural reality on the other. Multiculturalism would act as the limiting factor on 
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Trudeau's official bilingualism initiatives. In federal institutions, Saskatchewan would accept 
English and French as national official languages, but the application of official French-English 
bilingualism to provincial government institutions would be discouraged on cultural, political, 
and economic grounds. Saskatchewan could accept two languages nationally, but there were 
limits to how far bilingualism would apply in multicultural Saskatchewan.      
  Saskatchewan took its first steps towards promoting this vision in May 1972 with the 
establishment of the Department of Culture and Youth.
33
 Premier Blakeney, speaking in favour 
of the bill to create the new department, explained that a large part of its activities would be re-
interpreting and promoting Saskatchewan's history by drawing on the "wealth of material" in the 
province's archives.
34
 Romanow expanded on this rationale in his remarks to the new 
department:  
The defence of the multilingual-multicultural resources of the Province of 
Saskatchewan is the duty of all of us and the focal point of such defence will 
reside in this new Department of Culture and Youth and in this Government. I 
hope that the Department of Culture and Youth will be the focal point for the 
advancement and promotion of those great cultures...The significance of this 
legislation is that from now on there will be in this Government an identifiable 
cultural presence for all ethnic groups who appreciate and all people who 
appreciate the development of culture in our province.
35
 
 
The department's mandate was therefore "defensive" against the cultural assimilation of minority 
groups, but also "positive" in that it would advance a certain ideal of Saskatchewan. More 
importantly, Culture and Youth would defend Saskatchewan against the bicultural idea of 
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Canada promoted by Ottawa.
36
 It would work towards a well-defined cultural policy which 
would "present a coherent picture to other governments."
37
  
 The second major part of the new department's mandate, Romanow continued, was to 
create "a sense of one community here in Saskatchewan without at the same time causing undue 
sacrifices and asking undue compromises of any individual group of any linguistic or cultural 
society in our province."
38
 In other words, as stipulated in new legislation, the Department of 
Culture and Youth would promote diversity but also foster cultural and political unity at a time 
when regional political consciousness was on the rise. Multiculturalism would be promoted by 
"programs and activities that provide for the orderly cultural, physical and social development of 
the province or of any class or classes of persons within the province."
39
  
 The Fransaskois community viewed the federal government's new policy and 
Saskatchewan's move towards multiculturalism with concern. In late January 1972 the ACFC 
Board of Directors met to discuss its own position regarding Prime Minister Trudeau's October 
1971 multiculturalism announcement. An internal report issued after the meeting described 
multiculturalism as raising "un longue et pénible débat" among the ACFC executive.
40
 
Multiculturalism, the ACFC noted, threatened to "placer le groupe francophone sur un même 
pied que les autres groupes ethniques ce qui aurait comme effet de réduire la culture française à 
un folklore."
41
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 The Fransaskois were well aware that they were, demographically speaking, one minority 
group among many in Saskatchewan and western Canada. Their political identity rested 
primarily on history. Because they saw themselves as one of Saskatchewan's founding peoples -- 
indeed, as the first Europeans in western Canada -- the Fransaskois objected strongly to being 
compared with other minority groups. They also insisted that their historic link to Quebec gave 
them a different status in the West. The French Canadians, the ACFC believed, were exceptional 
because when they arrived they were simply moving from one part of Canada to another. This 
history distinguished them from other minority groups who left their home countries to settle in 
the West. As one ACFC policy document on multiculturalism argued:  
Une autre des grandes lacunes du multiculturalisme tel qu'il est conçu 
actuellement au Canada, c'est qu'il s'appuie sur une conception fausse de l'histoire 
de ce pays. Il ignore les origines réelles du Canada et veut faire des Canadiens-
français un groupe d'immigrants comme les autres. Or les Canadiens-français sont 
arrivés au pays dans des circonstances bien différentes, qui expliquent leur 
développement particulier, et encore aujourd'hui, leur situation particulière. Les 
français qui sont venue au pays n'étaient pas des immigrants qui changeaient de 
pays; ils venaient fonder un pays. Ils n'ont pas échangé leur culture en venant ici, 
comme le font des immigrants; ils ont développé une culture originale et 
francophone sur ce continent.
42
  
 
 The Fransaskois' historic link to Quebec also provided a contemporary political 
advantage over other minorities. The political weight of Quebec in Canada, as well as 
demographic preponderance over other minority groups at the national level, nourished 
Fransaskois activism and feelings of exceptionalism. In this vein, the ACFC believed that any 
Fransaskois political approach to multiculturalism ought to "garantir et soutenir la situation 
majoritaire du groupe francophone par rapport aux autres groupes ethniques."
43
 Some members 
of the ACFC, however, disagreed with placing the Fransaskois above other ethnic groups and 
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instead argued in favour of offering help, thereby slowing their assimilation and creating new 
political alliances. Indeed, the political relationship between francophone minorities in western 
Canada and other linguistic/cultural minorities groups was neither clear nor straightforward. 
While they were sometimes in competition with francophones, non-francophone groups such as 
the Ukrainians recognized the importance of French-Canadian nationalism in generating ethnic 
consciousness in Canada and viewed francophone minority political activism with a mixture of 
admiration and jealousy.
44
  
 After a number of meetings in January 1972 the ACFC established its official position on 
multiculturalism. The Fransaskois would conditionally support the policy provided that "les 
activités culturelles en langue française soient favorisées par les autorités officielles, tout aussi 
bien que celles en langue anglaise, d'un océan à l'autre" and that Saskatchewan recognize French 
as an official language in the province.
45
 This new ACFC policy did nothing to clarify the often 
blurry and tense relationship between the Fransaskois and ethnic groups seeking similar 
protections for their own cultures and languages. 
 Allan Blakeney's new government, elected in June 1971, was unaware of Fransaskois 
objections to multiculturalism.
46
 Nonetheless, the government moved to create ties with the 
Fransaskois community. In March 1972, Frank Bogdasavich, Special Advisor to the Attorney 
General and later Deputy Minister of Culture and Youth, reported to Jack Kinzel, Clerk of the 
Executive Council and one of Blakeney's closest advisors, that the government's "contact with 
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this cultural group is not yet extensive."
47
 The government likely viewed the francophone 
community as one among many ethnic groups. In the same letter, Bogdasavich remarked: 
"Balancing the various demands of increasingly sensitive cultural groups in the province is going 
to assure us of an interesting challenge in the Department of Culture."
48
 Indeed, the government 
seemed unaware of the political tenacity of the Fransaskois community and the pressure that the 
ACFC and French speakers would soon bring to bear in favour of official bilingualism and 
French-language education in Saskatchewan. 
  By 1973, Saskatchewan's Department of Culture and Youth was ready to take further 
steps towards adopting multiculturalism legislation and formalizing policy. On 13 September, 
Culture and Youth Minister Ed Tchorzewski, a former schoolteacher and rising star in 
Blakeney's government, shared the first proposals for a provincial multicultural policy with 
cabinet.
49
 "Saskatchewan should lead the way in this area due to the fact that it is the only 
province in Canada whose inhabitants, in the majority, are of the non-British and non-French 
origins," the document noted.
50
 This demographic reality resulted from "a peculiar historical 
development in comparison to other regions of the country...Saskatchewan has always been a 
multicultural society and all of us share that heritage."
51
 This history of the province and region 
set it apart from other parts of Canada, and therefore necessitated a different language policy 
from those other regions: 
It is true that in the history and development of Canada [the British and French 
Canadians] have made a special contribution (although in the prairie provinces 
this is less so in comparison to other regions of the country). However, within the 
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terms of reference of multiculturalism in Saskatchewan, they are in the same level 
as the other ethno-cultural groups.
52
      
 
The department's 1973-1974 annual report adopted a similar stance in describing its multicultural 
programming: 
The objective of the Multicultural Program is to develop a sense and an 
appreciation of Saskatchewan's diverse ethno-cultural nature among the people of 
the province. The program is attempting to foster the retention of Saskatchewan's 
multicultural and plurilingual society. Although the Government of Saskatchewan 
recognizes English and French as the official languages of Canada, it recognizes 
Saskatchewan is rich in the variety of languages spoken in the province. In order 
to use this asset for the benefit of all, a multicultural policy must, therefore see 
diversity to be a broadening, rather than fragmenting, influence to enrich the 
people of Saskatchewan.
53
 
 
Similar to Romanow's recommendations to Blakeney just over a year earlier, Tchorzewski 
proposed that the provincial government "reject biculturalism as an historical and contemporary 
reality for Canada" and "define the word 'bilingualism' as a capacity in any two languages and 
assert that the languages of our other ethno-cultural groups, should be regarded as 'national' or 
'Canadian' languages."
54
 This distinction is crucial to understanding how Blakeney's government 
understood language rights in Saskatchewan. The government believed that French language 
rights had to be considered and implemented in the context of multiculturalism, based on the 
belief that Saskatchewan was a multicultural society. Bilingualism could therefore mean English 
and French, or English and Ukrainian, or any other minority languages -- not English and French 
along the lines of what Ottawa was thinking. Tchorzewski noted that this principle carried some 
political risks for federal-provincial relations as "there is a certain element in the nation that sees 
Western Canada as being 'narrow' and basically 'anti-French' because many Western Canadians 
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have been and continue to be, for the most part, opposed to bilingualism."
55
 Westerners were not 
against French, Tchorzewski's brief argued, but rather against "the misuse of the word 'bilingual' 
to explain this concept."
56
  
 
A Popular Vision: Seminar '73 and Saskatchewan Multiculturalism 
 The second pillar of Saskatchewan's early multiculturalism policy was a public forum 
organised by the Department of Culture and Youth. The event, dubbed "Seminar '73," was held 
the same month the province drafted its own policy proposals. The government hoped that it 
would help determine priorities for multiculturalism by consulting individual citizens and a 
number of different organizations such as the Saskatchewan Teachers Federation, the 
Saskatchewan School Trustees Association, the Regina and Saskatoon Folk Art Councils, the 
University of Saskatchewan, and various ethnocultural representative organizations.
57
 Seminar 
'73 resembled Manitoba's first "Mosaic Congress" in October 1970, a public policy seminar that 
would "assist in retaining and developing the many cultures" of Manitoba.
58
 According to 
Tchorzewski, Seminar '73 was "a turning point toward the development of a cultural policy for 
the Province of Saskatchewan."
59
 Multiculturalism would be created in collaboration with the 
public, allowing the government to discuss its vision of Saskatchewan history and culture with 
various individuals and organizations representing ethnic minorities of the province.   
 The Fransaskois participated in Seminar '73 despite their doubts about multiculturalism. 
When the government established the event's steering committee in July, it appointed prominent 
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community leader Roland Pinsonneault, then Assistant Director of the ACFC.
60
 The Fransaskois 
were also represented on the committee by Louis Julé in his capacity as Executive Director of 
Cultural Activities in the Department of Culture and Youth.
61
 Dr. Zenon Pohorecky, Professor of 
Anthropology at the University of Saskatchewan, represented the Ukrainian community, while 
the German and Greek communities were also represented by prominent members.
62
 The 
committee began its work by asking any interested individuals and ethnic organizations to fill out 
a questionnaire to establish discussion themes for the Seminar in September. Fifteen different 
groups responded. The top discussion priority for 14 out of 15 organizations was "Cultural 
Activities," followed by support for "Language."
63
  
 The Fransaskois, although active in multicultural politics, were less involved in setting 
the early tone for multiculturalism policy than other minority groups such the Ukrainians. 
Members of Saskatchewan's Ukrainian community were enthusiastic participants in Seminar '73 
and the establishment of Saskatchewan multicultural policy from its earliest days. As a number 
of scholars have noted, Ukrainians in western Canada led the way not only in driving 
multiculturalism policy, but also in opposing biculturalism.
64
 Well-organized, educated, and 
politically connected
65
, Ukrainians had reservations about biculturalism which dated back to the 
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Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
66
 While they were undoubtedly 
sympathetic towards the Fransaskois and identified with some of their struggles against 
discrimination and linguistic assimilation, they did not view the Fransaskois as exceptional 
among Saskatchewan's minority groups. Rather, they understood themselves to be one of 
western Canada's founding peoples.
67
 Ukrainians also believed that "within the linguistic 
provisions of the BNA Act, English should be the lingua franca of all Canadians, but the 
teaching of, and in, ancestral languages, and their social use, should be encouraged and 
supported from public funds wherever there is effective demand for them."
68
 This view was 
unacceptable to the Fransaskois and francophones everywhere in Canada, who firmly believed 
that French ought to be the country's lingua franca as much as English. The Ukrainian stance on 
language is important for understanding how, by the 1970s, Ukrainians exerted influence on 
western Canadian provincial governments in developing their own cultural policies. Non-
francophone minority group opposition to bilingualism helped provincial governments looking to 
contest the federal government's definition of the nation and limit the extension of bilingualism 
into provincial spheres of power.
69
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 One way of measuring the influence of various minority groups in influencing 
multiculturalism policy in western Canada is to examine their role in the founding debates on 
these policies. Manitoba's Mosaic Congress in 1970, for example, featured 143 Ukrainian 
delegates who outnumbered the French/French Canadians (41), Anglo-Celts (28), Germans (17), 
Jews (16), Poles (14), Italians (9), and Scandinavians (9) combined.
70
 In Saskatchewan's Seminar 
'73, Ukrainians were also influential, with 32.8% of participants claiming Ukrainian background. 
Delegates listed as "French" or "French Canadian" were a mere 5.5%.    
 
Table 4.1: Selected Participants in Seminar '73
71
 
 
Nationality/Ethnic Group Number of Participants % Of Participants 
Ukrainian 132 32.8 
Not given 60 14.9 
Irish 24 6 
French/French Canadian 22 5.5 
German 21 5.2 
British/Anglo-Saxon/English 
Canadian 
18 4.5 
Polish 16 4 
Spanish/Hispanic 12 3 
East Indian 10 2.5 
Romanian 8 2 
Doukhobor 7 1.7 
Russian 7 1.7 
Scandinavian 6 1.5 
UNESCO Representatives 6 1.5 
Hungarian 5 1.2 
 
Ottawa's bilingualism policies were roundly criticized during Seminar '73 by the Ukrainians. 
During the plenary session, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians of Saskatchewan 
argued that a cultural policy based on the idea of a bilingual Canada would be inappropriate 
because it excluded other minority groups in Saskatchewan. Any government support for 
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multiculturalism, the group insisted, "will have to be based on a policy that is firmly non-
exclusionist and non-discriminatory with respect to the diverse organizations within 'the other 
ethnic groups'."
72
   
 The government also articulated its own vision of Saskatchewan and multiculturalism at 
the conference, based on its strategy of contesting biculturalism. During the keynote address, 
Premier Blakeney reiterated his government's view that biculturalism did not accurately describe 
Saskatchewan because people of French and English origin did not constitute a majority in the 
province.
73
 Minister of Education Gordon MacMurchy, an NDP organizer and former school 
trustee who acted as Blakeney's point man on rural Saskatchewan on difficult political issues, 
was even more critical of biculturalism in his own speech:  
...Canada is not a bicultural nation, not a bilingual nation, but one with several 
languages and many cultural traditions. This recognition is vital in Saskatchewan 
when we probably have more diversity and more operational cultural traditions 
than any other province. It has only recently been recognized by the opinion 
leaders and the media that Canada is not a melting pot but a mosaic. For many 
years we held the common American view that ethnic immigrants would 
eventually mix into our country and disappear as groups. Fortunately this illusion 
is no longer accepted or expected. It would be a tragedy if this province lost its 
ethnic colour and diversity, by accident or by design.
74
       
 
In other words, according to the government, multiculturalism set Saskatchewan apart from the 
rest of Canada. To impose two languages or cultures on the province was akin to exclusion -- 
worse, an exclusion that was un-Canadian and akin to the American melting pot.
75
 It would be a 
bilingual melting pot, but a plan for assimilation all the same. Manitoba's Mosaic Congress 
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featured similar criticisms of bilingualism as delegates worked towards a cultural policy more 
suited to how they understood western Canada. When a Ukrainian-sponsored resolution calling 
for Manitoba to "study ways and means of preserving the multi-lingual and multi-cultural reality 
of the Manitoba Mosaic" was adopted, over 25 Franco-Manitoban delegates left the hearings in 
protest. Recalling the event in his memoirs, Ukrainian Professor of Education and prominent 
community leader Manoly Lupul called it ."..the first sign that French-Canadian linguistic 
aspirations in the west would either have to be trimmed or take the aspirations of other 
ethnocultural groups into account."
76
 Saskatchewan's Seminar '73 did not feature any similar 
outbursts, although tensions ran high between the francophones and other minority groups.   
 MacMurchy declared in his speech that Saskatchewan would do the right thing and move 
beyond Ottawa's bilingualism by being more generous towards the province's minorities, 
widening language education beyond French and English. He went as far as to question the 
appropriateness of French language education in Saskatchewan when considering other minority 
groups such as the Germans and Ukrainians:   
An amendment passed in 1968 allows the department to designate schools in 
which French may be the language of instruction. However, no provision exists 
for other languages to be used, despite the fact that we have German and 
Ukrainian groups in Saskatchewan larger than the French. To remedy this, we are 
proposing to amend the School Act at the next session to allow teaching in other 
languages.
77
 
 
The comments struck a positive chord for participants. In the final minutes of the seminar, 
support for languages other than French or English in education and public media were listed 
among the most popular recommendations. The seminar also suggested "that the provincial 
government make a written declaration that Saskatchewan is a multicultural province" and that 
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federal government "should define and constitutionally guarantee the maintenance of languages 
and cultures representative of all Canadian ethnic groups."
78
  
 The government viewed Seminar '73 as a success and used it to counter the federal 
government's seemingly top-down, bureaucratic imposition of bilingualism. As Ed Tchorzewski 
explained, multiculturalism policy in Saskatchewan was founded by "the concerned man on the 
street...as an equal to the planning arm of a Government Department."
79
 In the Legislature, he 
noted that "Multiculturalism in Saskatchewan is a concept that embraces the entire population. 
Indian and Métis, English and French, along with many other cultural groups, are well parts of 
the Saskatchewan Mosaic."
80
 The common thread running through government discussions and 
policy papers, however, was that Saskatchewan had to find a way to define itself that was not 
bicultural. 
 
Multiculturalism in Practice: Applying Policy, 1974-1976  
 If Seminar '73 was a success as the government believed, it did not lead to a 
philosophically coherent policy. Saskatchewan's multicultural policy, in its early years, tended to 
be contradictory and was the result of difficulties in articulating a new history and identity for the 
province. What was clear, however, was Saskatchewan's intention to leave behind its troubled 
history of conflict over language and culture. When Ed Tchorzewski introduced the Act 
Establishing the Saskatchewan Multicultural Act
81
 in the Legislature for second reading, he 
made no mention of Saskatchewan's troubled history with minority groups, especially the 
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francophones. Objections to multiculturalism in the province, he argued, were likely the result of 
"racial and cultural prejudice...based on ignorance."
82
 The new multicultural act, Tchorzewski 
continued, affirmed that "linguistic and cultural diversity is not only an inescapable reality in our 
province and this country, but that it is a desirable situation which must be maintained and 
nurtured."
83
 In making multiculturalism law Saskatchewan would build on its "multicultural" 
past while at the same time creating a new societal future:  
...we are talking of a concept of building a new land, a new culture, and a new 
loyalty -- not by displacing the old, but on the firm foundations of older cultural 
roots -- tended, nourished and adapted over a space of generations...a matter of 
strengthening and building the very foundations of a new society and hopefully a 
better society here in Canada...Ours must be a province where people of every 
cultural background have full access to their own ethnocultural heritage...Such a 
society will not only guarantee that all our residents, wherever they came from, 
have a sense of full participation in the affairs of this province, but may also 
provide an attractive climate for new Canadians who we hope will join us in the 
decades ahead.
84
  
 
In a way, Tchorzewski recognized that Saskatchewan was engaged in reconstructing its political 
community -- that it was embarking on a new cultural project based on an ideal of 
multiculturalism rather than bilingualism or British-Canadian nationalism. At the same time, his 
speech confirmed the government position that the province's history was multicultural rather 
than weighted down by different, and perhaps less palatable, political ideas. Remnants of the 
earlier, assimilationist ideal can be observed, however, in caveats that the government placed on 
diversity. Tchorzewski gave few details as to how linguistic diversity would be developed, nor 
did he explain how Saskatchewan would work with the federal government to promote 
francophone culture. Indeed, as he maintained in his speech, diversity had limits. It would have 
to be balanced with the overall socio-political unity of the province: 
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...the welfare of the individual and the ethno-cultural group is not the paramount 
issue, but rather it is the unity and wellbeing of the whole society that is of major 
importance where there is cultural diversity. Cultural communities are necessary 
because they are rewarding to individuals in such groups, but they must not 
become cultural prisons which cut off individuals and groups aspirations in other 
spheres...We want diversity. We want unity, Mr. Speaker.
85
  
 
 The Act itself reflected the government's understanding of Saskatchewan history. 
"Multiculturalism"  
means the preservation and development of the multicultural composition of the 
province and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes the 
recognition of the right of every community, whose common history spans many 
generations, to retain its distinctive group identity, and to develop its relevant 
language and its traditional arts and sciences, without political or social 
impediment and for the mutual benefit of all citizens.
86
  
 
Francophones viewed this vision for cultural policy as problematic since it did not suppose any 
real reforms in the way power relations were structured in society between French and English 
speakers. Before the bill was enacted by the legislature, ACFC Vice President Paul Arès wrote to 
Deputy Minister of Culture and Youth, Frank Bogdasavich, that although the principles of 
government support for culture were valid, the legislation neglected to "underline the great 
contribution of the two founding nations since the very beginning of colonisation of this area in 
the 18th century."
87
 Arès believed that while multiculturalism was a laudable goal for any 
government, it should not gloss over the "bilingual character of the pioneers from the very 
beginnings of our history."
88
 Therefore, the ACFC suggested, recognition of French and English 
as official languages in Saskatchewan, as well as "the greater Indian and Métis contribution," 
should accompany any official multiculturalism policy.
89
 ACFC President Albert O. Dubé also 
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wrote to Bogdasavich complaining about the historical perspective taken by the government in 
multiculturalism. The government, Dubé wrote, "seems to forget that the recognition of 
multiculturalism in Canada should be within the context of a bilingual country."
90
 For the 
Fransaskois, protecting and fostering the culture of various minority groups was certainly 
beneficial but it would not overturn the predominantly English-speaking reality of Saskatchewan 
culture. More fundamental changes in government-minority relations were required.  
 Now that multiculturalism enjoyed legislative status, the Department of Culture and 
Youth set out to apply various policies and establish government support for provincial cultural 
activities. The government provided for language maintenance and support for minority groups 
through two programs: the "Summer Language Camp Program" and the "Language 
Opportunities Program." Language camps would "help Saskatchewan citizens better understand 
their own cultural backgrounds through the medium of language" in an intensive immersion 
setting over several days or weeks, while Language Opportunities would "assist cultural groups 
to provide language instruction otherwise unobtainable through regular educational channels."
91
 
Funding for both programs was provided to any existing "ethno-cultural organization" that filled 
out a short application and followed the department's guidelines.   
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Table 4.2: Summer Language Camps Funding, 1975-1976
92
 
 
Year Language Amount ($) % of total funding 
1975 Ukrainian 10,400 70 
1975 French 700 5 
1975 Roumanian 750 5 
1975 Polish 3,000 20 
1976 Ukrainian 8,750 68 
1976 French 2,676 21 
1976 Polish 600 5 
1976 Roumanian 800 6 
 
Ukrainians, Francophones, Roumanians, and Poles were the principal recipients of Summer 
Language Camps funding. That they were able to immediately capitalize on new government 
programming in the sphere of culture is consistent with their high levels of organization and 
political motivation. All four already had representative community organizations that could 
quickly take advantage of funding. The predominance of these groups is consistent with Ed 
Tchorzewski's observation that most grants went to organizations that were prominent and, more 
often than not, located in the province's two largest cities.
93
 That the Ukrainians benefited most 
was consistent with their demographic strength and their favourable views of provincial 
government policy supporting multiculturalism.   
 The Language Opportunities Program followed a similar pattern of Ukrainian 
preponderance in funding allocations, taking in over one-third of the department's overall 
funding for language opportunities during the 1974-1975 fiscal year.   
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Table 4.3: Language Opportunities Program Funding, 1974-1975
94
 
 
Language Number of Classes Amount ($) % of total funding 
Ukrainian 12 2,250 39 
Polish 3 500 9 
Hindi 2 250 4 
Polish 2 500 9 
Greek 2 500 9 
Italian 1 250 4 
Roumanian 2 500 9 
German 1 250 4 
Spanish 1 500 9 
Hungarian 1 250 4 
 
The Fransaskois did not receive any funding until the following year when they were given 7% 
of the overall provincial funding (with 52% going to the Ukrainian community).
95
   
 The francophone community was not treated as special or more important than any other 
minority group. On the contrary, the Fransaskois found themselves near the bottom in terms of 
overall funding for multicultural language programs. It is significant, however, that the 
Fransaskois took time to apply for funding and take advantage of such programming, especially 
given that they could find other avenues to fund French-language initiatives. The Fransaskois did 
not boycott multiculturalism policies or programs despite their reservations, opting instead to 
take advantage of them wherever they could. It is possible that the community hesitated to 
exploit multicultural programming to its fullest extent for political reasons, which is why they 
received less funding than other groups. In any case, Fransaskois use of multicultural policy 
shows that, to the community, it was possible that multiculturalism could coexist with 
biculturalism.  
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 Although the government had an idea of what it meant when it referred to Saskatchewan 
as a "multicultural society," multiculturalism policy was not always coherently applied. Until the 
Report of the Cultural Policy Secretariat (Vichert Report) was published in 1980, for example, 
Saskatchewan did not have a well-defined policy for who should receive funding from the 
government or why -- even if the province was determined to define itself as multicultural, not 
bicultural. "Cultural Activities" funding from 1974 to 1976, for example, was given not only to 
Greek, Chinese, First Nations, and francophone organizations, but also to youth hostels, 
recreation and parks associations, debate clubs, church restoration groups, and filmmaking 
clubs.
96
  
 
Multiculturalism Meets National Unity, 1976-1977 
 "If Saskatchewan had a hundred problems," Premier Ross Thatcher declared in 1967, "the 
constitution would be the hundred and first."
97
 Almost ten years later when René Lévesque's 
Parti Quebecois was elected in November 1976, the West's attitude towards the constitution had 
changed considerably. The West wanted reforms on resource revenue sharing and control; 
Quebec wanted constitutional reform. It was the latter question, particularly the tone adopted by 
Lévesque's sovereignty-oriented government, that reignited national debate over all matters 
constitutional.
98
  
 Allan Blakeney welcomed discussions on the constitution, but was not enthusiastic about 
the French-language side of the growing constitutional debate. Pierre Trudeau's almost singular 
preoccupation with Quebec and language rights in constitutional debates posed major difficulties 
                                                 
96
 Saskatchewan, Department of Culture and Youth, Annual Report, 1974-1975; Annual Report, 1975-1976; Annual 
Report, 1976-1977.  
97
 Quoted in Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 95.  
98
 Ibid., 92.  
  
215 
 
for the western Canadian provinces who saw themselves as multicultural. It threatened to upset 
the balance that Blakeney had found between multiculturalism and bilingualism -- political 
acceptability at the provincial/regional level on the one hand, and suitability to the national unity 
debate on the other. In Saskatchewan, multiculturalism was a popular policy and any sort of 
special treatment of the Fransaskois could have political costs for Blakeney and his party.
99
 
Multiculturalism, therefore, gave Saskatchewan the opportunity to unambiguously assert its 
identity during national unity and constitutional discussions between 1976 and 1982.
100
  
 Why is it important to understand Allan Blakeney and the Saskatchewan NDPs position 
on national unity? How does it pertain to the political community of Saskatchewan and the 
French-language question in the province? Blakeney was well-respected on national unity, not 
only in Saskatchewan but across Canada. During national unity debates, he emerged as one of 
the leading voices of English Canada. Secondly, constitutional politics are major battlegrounds 
for political communities and cultural meanings of nations. Both amending a constitution and 
fostering national unity require consensus. Amending a constitution also places different regional 
identities in conflict with one another.
101
 By examining the various statements and political 
processes surrounding national unity and the constitution, a better understanding of 
Saskatchewan political identity can be gained.   
  As patriation of the Canadian constitution took centre stage in national politics, 
Blakeney's government continually reinforced the multicultural definition of Saskatchewan to 
the provincial and national public in addition to using multiculturalism as the major limiting 
                                                 
99
 In 1977, for example, knowledge of federal multiculturalism policies was highest in Canada among prairie 
residents; westerners were also the least likely to see multiculturalism as an attempt to assimilate cultural minorities. 
Canada, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada (Ottawa, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, 1977), 
149.     
100
 As Roy Romanow, John Whyte, and Howard Leeson note, the national unity/constitutional issue was prominent 
during the later 1970s as little substantial discussion was held between the rejection of the Victoria Charter in 1971 
and the Edmonton Conference (which revitalized constitutional talks) in 1976. Canada...Notwithstanding, 1-2.  
101
 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 75.  
  
216 
 
factor on provincial bilingualism. According to Blakeney, any discussion on protecting French 
language rights and culture had to account for the province's multicultural identity. Before the 
17th Annual Premiers' Conference in Banff in August 1976 (the "Edmonton Conference"), for 
example, the Department of the Attorney General wrote that  
In discussion with federal officials last August, Premier Blakeney indicated that it 
must be appreciated that in Saskatchewan matters related to recognition of official 
cultures (as distinguished from official languages) were ones of great sensitivity 
in the context of bi-culturalism as opposed to multi-culturalism. We indicated that 
it would be necessary to give very careful consideration to the form of any 
proposed constitutional guarantees relating to cultural matters...
102
 
 
At the conference Blakeney hinted at the difficulties Saskatchewan faced in applying Ottawa's 
official language policies, especially in education. Other provinces joined in and expressed their 
own wishes for more provincial powers in cultural policy.
103
 There was a "high degree of 
consensus" that provincial governments had "important responsibilities" with regards to cultural 
policy, communications, and immigration, and "a number of them indicated that such a provision 
would enable them to encourage the multicultural aspect of their population."
104
 
 The stakes were high as western Canadians grew increasingly restive over the economy 
and constitution. The Saskatchewan NDP stood to lose support from voters fed up with Ottawa's 
language policies if Blakeney was too closely aligned to Trudeau on bilingualism.
105
 At the same 
time, Blakeney had to cooperate on the constitution and national unity. But by early 1977 
regional discontent with Ottawa was serious and could no longer be ignored. Part of western 
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dissatisfaction with the federal government was directly related to cultural matters.
106
 While 
Blakeney usually could not pass up an opportunity to criticize Prime Minister Trudeau and 
defend Saskatchewan's interests -- especially in matters of resource ownership and cultural 
autonomy
107
 -- it was Saskatchewan Progressive Conservative leader Dick Collver who picked 
up the western alienation cause in Saskatchewan. Collver, an energetic businessman who almost 
single-handedly rebuilt the provincial Progressive Conservative party during the 1970s, regularly 
lambasted Trudeau and Ottawa on economic and cultural issues in the legislature. In April 1977 
he proposed a resolution in the Legislature that "condemns the Liberal Government in Ottawa for 
its centralist policies which are encroaching on provincial jurisdictions, against the spirit of 
Confederation; which fail to recognize in a meaningful way, the regional, cultural, and economic 
differences in Canada...."
108
 Blakeney and the NDP worried that Collver's attacks on Trudeau 
and official bilingualism would bleed support away from the party in favour of the surging 
Conservatives.
109
   
 Despite these challenges and the rising threat of western regional discontent, Blakeney 
continued to try and strike a balance between provincial identity and national necessity. In July 
1977, the Saskatchewan civil service drafted a number of proposals to improve provincial 
French-language rights in Saskatchewan which would in turn increase Saskatchewan's 
contributions to national unity. Wes Bolstad, a senior civil servant in the Blakeney's government 
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who had also worked with Tommy Douglas and Woodrow Lloyd, proposed general directions 
for policy.
110
 Bolstad wrote to Blakeney that  
The question of cultural rights for French Canadians can be approached in two 
ways. One approach starts with the condition of the French Canadian as citizen of 
a province (say, Saskatchewan) and notices that the current situation in the 
country as a whole may represent his last opportunity to obtain a full statement of 
cultural rights. Assimilation is so weakening the sense of cultural community that 
if rights can't be obtained even under the threat of Quebec separation, then they 
never will be. From a Saskatchewan perspective alone, there are sufficient reasons 
in justice and decency that there should be no hesitation to act. If that is not 
enough, however...there is the national implication of provincial cultural 
policy...corrective action in the Provinces will be noticed and will have some 
effect. Apart from providing long-sought justice, cultural rights for French 
Canadians would provide a necessary ingredient for that broader 'sense of country' 
that is a sine qua non of Confederation.
111
   
 
Bolstad counselled Blakeney to consider expanding French-language rights in Saskatchewan not 
only to further the national unity cause, but also because a more expansive provincial 
bilingualism policy would open the door to cultural rights for other minority groups in 
Saskatchewan.
112
 It could involve French-English court and government services, francophone 
schools, cultural supports, and a special advisory unit to the Premier. Sooner or later, Bolstad 
warned, the French-language rights issue would come to a head in Saskatchewan and the 
province ought to take a proactive position rather than wait for the federal government to impose 
policies.
113
 Given that the provincial government was in the midst of creating a new cultural and 
political identity for itself, however, it is difficult to see how an expansive French-language 
rights stance within the province would have been politically possible, even from a national unity 
standpoint. The problem with Bolstad's brief was that it did not consider how the multicultural 
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interpretation of Saskatchewan history could be reconciled with the federal government's push 
for bilingualism -- especially since the former was developed explicitly in opposition to the 
latter. Saskatchewan felt so strongly that its multiculturalism policy was the right thing to do that 
Ed Tchorzewski put out a press release arguing that "The development of the multicultural 
mosaic in the provinces of Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan is a model that should be used 
by Ottawa in making it possible for all the provinces to meet their cultural needs."
114
 National 
unity could only go so far in convincing western Canadians that the francophone minorities in 
the region deserved special rights that other minority groups were not entitled to. 
 
The Fransaskois Fight Back: Contesting Multiculturalism with National Unity, 1977-1979 
 The limiting effects of multiculturalism on provincial bilingualism policy is also evident 
in how the Saskatchewan government dealt with the ACFC between 1976 and 1982. 
Multiculturalism gave the government a firm fallback position on any particular Fransaskois 
demands for language rights and recognition. When Les Héritiers de Lord Durham was 
published by the Fédération des Francophones hors Quebec in 1977, Ed Tchorzewski informed 
the ACFC that the government would consider taking action to help the Fransaskois community. 
Tchorzewski added, however, while Saskatchewan understood its obligations towards the 
Fransaskois in the context of national unity, the government also had a responsibility "to the 
many other linguistic groups in the Saskatchewan multicultural context."
115
 As long as French-
language rights in Saskatchewan were viewed solely through the prism of national unity, there 
were few possibilities for provincial bilingualism since Saskatchewan had already embarked on a 
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cultural policy that ran counter to the pan-Canadian bilingual ideal espoused by the federal 
government and the Fransaskois.   
 Yet, paradoxically, the national unity question had the effect of raising the Fransaskois 
community's profile in Saskatchewan politics. The spectre of Quebec separatism gave the 
Fransaskois and the ACFC the chance to advance their own view of Saskatchewan history and 
cultural policy. In 1977, for example, the ACFC published its organizational history to celebrate 
its 65th anniversary. Somewhat ironically the project was funded by grants for cultural history 
paid out by the Department of Culture and Youth.
116
 ACFC President Irène Chabot sent a copy 
of the aptly titled Sixty-Five Years of Struggle to Allan Blakeney, explaining to him that it was 
the true rendition of "les fondements historiques et politiques des droits du français en 
Saskatchewan."
117
 Chabot argued the Fransaskois deserved special attention above other ethnic 
groups because of the urgency of national unity and survival: "si le groupe, et la culture 
francophones devaient disparaître d'une seule province canadienne, tout comme le groups 
anglophone du Quebec, c'en serait fait de l'Unité nationale du Canada, et tout le monde s'en rend 
parfaitement compte, actuellement, au pays."
118
 
 The national unity question also forced Saskatchewan to re-evaluate its position on 
French-language education in the province. In July 1977 Premier Lévesque proposed "reciprocal 
education agreements" which would allow citizens from outside of Quebec to access English-
language education if the other premiers guaranteed French-language education to any 
Quebecer.
119
 Blakeney immediately called a meeting with cabinet to discuss the province's 
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position on minority language education. His main goal was to have a unified public message 
and reassure cabinet that Saskatchewan was doing all it could for French language rights, given 
that it was historically and culturally different from Quebec and central Canada. Blakeney noted 
that "we have come a long way, since 1971, to providing education in either official language in 
Saskatchewan."
120
 Furthermore, Saskatchewan would not base French-language educational 
rights on ethnicity or cultural origin: "we support the principle that Canadians, regardless of 
background and ethnic origin, should be able to choose their education in either of the official 
languages, wherever practical."
121
 As chapter three of this dissertation demonstrates, this 
principle ran counter to the Fransaskois desire for homogenous, francophone-only schools.     
 The distinction between francophone-only versus universal access to French language 
education is fundamental to understanding how the Saskatchewan provincial government viewed 
French-language rights in the province and in the context of national unity. Fransaskois demands 
for schools could be diffused by the government's argument that Saskatchewan had so many 
ethnic minority groups it could not possibly restrict official language education to one small 
group. Secondly, Blakeney could argue that Saskatchewan was going further than it needed to on 
French-language rights and national unity since everyone in the province could have access to 
French education, not just the Fransaskois.
122
 This approach reflected Saskatchewan's approach 
to cultural policy and rights more generally -- everyone was equal, and no one group could claim 
special rights over any others. If the Fransaskois could have access to French-language 
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education, then everyone else would as well. Conversely, if French-language education existed, 
education in other minority languages should be offered.  
 The government's philosophy and approach to bilingualism, national unity and the 
Saskatchewan multicultural identity was aptly summed up by Minister of Education Ed 
Tchorzewski, who wrote to Deputy Minister Ian Wilson after the cabinet meeting that  
we should refrain from talking about bilingualism as there is a negative 
connotation connected with that word. I think it would be better to say, for 
example in the first sentence, something to the effect of 'in keeping with its strong 
commitment to the fact that Canada is a country of two official languages and to 
multiculturalism in the Saskatchewan context, etc. etc.'...I think we should not be 
saying that French is an official language in Saskatchewan. I do not believe it is 
wise for us to concede that it is an official language in Saskatchewan but rather to 
continue talking of it as being an official language of Canada. To speak of it as an 
official language of Saskatchewan I believe may lead to some difficult, if not 
impossible, demands such as having it made possible to be able to be tried in our 
Courts in either of the two languages, etc.
123
    
 
In Saskatchewan, national unity and official bilingualism clearly met their limits in 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism was recognized explicitly as the limiting force on official 
bilingualism, which applied to the country as a whole but not to Saskatchewan in particular.  
 In spite of the government's stance on bilingualism, the Fransaskois continued to gain 
confidence that they could achieve their political goals. It helped that national politics was 
trending towards French-language rights issues. In the late 1970s the Fédération des 
francophones hors Quebec (FFHQ) and francophone minorities across Canada stormed onto the 
political scene.
124
 As French speakers, the Fransaskois came to be viewed as major players in the 
national unity debate. Suddenly, with the threat of separatism looming ever larger, they had the 
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ear of the provincial government and major news media in Saskatchewan.
125
 Blakeney's advisors 
also began to pay closer attention to the ACFC and Fransaskois media in order to avoid being 
caught off-guard by Fransaskois activism and French language-related issues.
126
  
 The ACFC took advantage of its increased prominence by launching a number of high-
profile campaigns and pressuring the government to provide more French-language services and 
education to the community. During the 18th Annual Premiers' Conference in August 1977, for 
example, the Fransaskois and FFHQ attacked Blakeney publicly by sending a "Scandal Dossier" 
on French-language schooling problems in Saskatchewan to national media on the eve of the 
conference.
127
 Although Blakeney was outraged at the move, in private he admitted that the main 
reason any French language rights discussions were even occurring in Saskatchewan had little to 
do with multiculturalism or open-mindedness towards the francophones, but rather because 
national unity and politics of the moment required it.
128
   
 In October 1977 Allan Blakeney noted in his brief to the Task Force on Canadian Unity 
that Saskatchewanians were tired of "the assumption by Ontario and Quebec that they constitute 
Canada" and of Ottawa "defending Canada entirely from a perspective of Central Canada."
129
 
Furthermore, Blakeney added,   
many brave words have been spoken about the advantages of living in a country 
with two cultural traditions. Once again, that is a point of view which makes sense 
in Central Canada, but has much less meaning for Saskatchewan. The distance 
between Regina and Montreal is greater than the distance between Paris and 
Moscow. Very few residents of Saskatchewan have experienced francophone 
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culture at first hand. The French fact in Saskatchewan continues to be a matter of 
bilingual labels and a small community of francophones, smaller by far than the 
communities of German or Ukrainian speakers.
130
 
 
Blakeney underlined the widespread feeling among western Canadians that the cultural demands 
of Quebec and Ottawa's attempt to recast Canada as a bicultural nation were preventing people in 
the West from redressing "deeply-felt economic grievances." Resentment towards bilingualism 
in Saskatchewan was therefore not only cultural because it went against the way western 
Canadians saw themselves, but it was also economic because it consumed almost all of the 
federal government's efforts on constitutional reforms.
131
 
 To its credit, the Saskatchewan government was willing to consider extending limited 
French-language rights within the province in order to satisfy the federal government push for 
official languages. In return, Saskatchewan wanted more control over resource revenues and 
taxation.
132
 On the other hand, Blakeney was uneasy about constitutionalizing cultural rights. 
Such a move contradicted his general beliefs surrounding the Canadian political system. 
Blakeney believed that rights should be protected by Parliament and the legislatures, not by the 
courts.
133
 He was hesitant about Pierre Trudeau's proposed charter of rights and was generally 
not in favour of entrenched rights even if he was willing to entertain the idea so that 
Saskatchewan could have more powers over its natural resources.
134
 It made sense, then, that 
Blakeney favoured a broad provincial multiculturalism policy because in his view it would give 
the majority the flexibility it needed to negotiate and determine rights.  
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 As the new legislative session opened up in November 1977, the speech from the Throne 
noted defiantly that "We are a multicultural society, yet we see Canada increasingly defined as a 
land of only two cultural traditions. Nevertheless, no one can question the loyalty of 
Saskatchewan people to the idea of Confederation. We are proud to be Canadians, and we want a 
Canada which commands the loyalty of all its citizens."
135
 The opposition used the 
multiculturalism-bilingualism question to portray Blakeney as too close to Trudeau on cultural 
policy. As hesitant as Blakeney was towards official bilingualism in Saskatchewan, it was not 
enough for Dick Collver, who denounced the NDP for not resisting Ottawa's imposition of 
bilingualism on Saskatchewan. Collver, never one to hold back in the legislature, slammed 
Blakeney for not protecting Saskatchewan from Ottawa's policies which were preventing people 
from learning "the language of the province": 
Mr. Speaker, in a multicultural society in Saskatchewan, in which the 
implementation of bilingualism has been rejected throughout the province of 
Saskatchewan it's being done by the present government in Ottawa. In our 
multilingual and multicultural province...we believe where people in other parts of 
the province of Saskatchewan, many of them first generation Canadians, who 
have difficulty acquiring the language of our province - and for them to be told 
that somehow the present implementation of the bilingual policy by Ottawa is 
going to be continued, this is unacceptable to them and unacceptable to the people 
of Saskatchewan.
136
  
 
Collver's speech is notable because it excluded linguistic diversity from the definition of 
multiculturalism. The view harkens back to the more Anglo-conformist vision of western Canada 
-- defended by men such as Clifford Sifton -- who held that while peoples from all over the 
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world could settle the region, it was imperative that diversity be managed and that English be the 
common language.
137
  
 Ned Shillington stepped up to defend the government's approach to culture in 
Saskatchewan. He argued that Collver was wrong because the inclusion of some French-
language rights and education in the province was consistent with Saskatchewan's overall 
approach to multiculturalism: 
In this province, Mr. Speaker, we have attempted to encourage not a bilingualism, 
but a multiculturalism. We have tried to encourage not only the French, but 
including the French. We have also tried to include people of all backgrounds, 
Ukrainians, Germans, and the list is nearly endless, to take a pride in their culture 
and their language, and it succeeded. Multiculturalism is flourishing in this 
province as it never has before and we think this is a far more positive way to 
approach the problem than the pen of the narrow way, in many ways that the 
federal government has approached it.
138
 
 
Thus while cultural policy emanating from Ottawa was cast as a "threat" to Saskatchewan by 
both the Conservatives and the NDP, the parties took different approaches to what 
multiculturalism actually meant in terms of concrete language policies. By casting French-
language rights as part of multiculturalism, the NDP could cooperate with Ottawa while trying to 
mitigate potential political fallout. 
 The line between fostering a provincial political identity and supporting Ottawa on 
national unity and language was a fine one, however, and one not easily walked because of a 
well-organized and aggressive Fransaskois community. In 1978 the ACFC increased its own 
pressure on the Saskatchewan government based on the Fransaskois' strong sense of community 
history, which dovetailed with the imperatives of national unity and the bicultural vision of 
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Canada put forth by the federal government. The first ACFC press release of the year, entitled 
"French, Official Language in Saskatchewan," declared that "In 1905, the Saskatchewan and 
Alberta Constitutions emanating from that of the North-West Territories, in fact retained French 
as an official language with the same constitutional rights as the English language."
139
 The 
ACFC warned the public that it could "demand a French translation of all debates in legislation 
since 1905."
140
 In February the ACFC organized a letter-writing campaign to coincide with the 
First Ministers Conference in Montreal. Fransaskois community members and FFHQ members 
sent form letters to Blakeney which demanded that he establish a Bureau de la Minorité 
Officielle which would identify and solve problems for the Fransaskois. Given that Blakeney 
was about to discuss national unity, the letter argued, "nous estimons nécessaire que ces 
déclarations tiennent compte en premier lieu de votre communauté française en 
Saskatchewan."
141
 Also in February, the death of Saskatchewan Lieutenant governor George 
Porteous prompted ACFC President Irène Chabot to ask Blakeney for the appointment of a 
Fransaskois Lieutenant governor.
142
 Recalling that Amédée Forget was the province's only 
French-speaking Lieutenant governor (1905-1910), Chabot argued that "Le temps est mûr...de 
sensibiliser davantage la population multiculturelle de la Saskatchewan à l'importance du 
bilinguisme officiel dans notre pays."
143
 It was not to be, however, as Cameron Irwin McIntosh 
was appointed to succeed Porteous.
144
 Forget remains the only francophone Lieutenant governor 
in the history of Saskatchewan.  
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 In addition to public statements, the ACFC used behind-the-scenes pressure on the 
province. Irène Chabot asked to meet Allan Blakeney and the provincial cabinet "so that we may 
know your personal position and that of your party, with respect to those sections of the A.C.F.C. 
brochure which deal with the official status of French in our province."
145
 Blakeney, who liked to 
consider many different facets of policy before acting, was concerned about how to respond to 
ACFC activism. Although the general direction of cultural policy in Saskatchewan was well 
elaborated by 1978, it was still a work in progress and the government did not yet have a clear, 
focused approach to the ACFC and the question of provincial bilingualism. Multiculturalism 
provided a useful tool for deflecting requests from Ottawa that Saskatchewan expand 
bilingualism; provincial pressure from the ACFC required a more careful and concrete strategy. 
Unsure of what to do next, Executive Council commissioned a poll of Saskatchewan residents to 
get their attitude about French-language education in the province. 37.4% of provincial residents 
answered "no" to allowing education in French, while 53.6% said "yes."
146
 Rural areas were split 
almost 50-50 on the question, with 47.7% in favour of French education and 46.6% against.
147
 
For the NDP, already struggling in rural Saskatchewan over a number of contentious agricultural 
issues
148
, French-language education was another hot-button issue that could be troublesome for 
the government.     
 In April, Premier Blakeney wrote a terse memo to cabinet asking that they "clear up our 
position re ACFC" in time for next month's meeting.
149
 Executive Council research officer 
Howard Leeson briefed cabinet for the meeting. Leeson recommended that the government reject 
a number of ACFC proposals, notably equal status of French and English because "this is not 
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practical in Saskatchewan."
150
 The ACFC also wanted the government to fund an "Official 
Minority Office" which would be attached to cabinet or the premier; Leeson recommended 
rejecting that proposal as well. Generally, Leeson wrote, the government approach "should be to 
avoid a confrontation, and yet avoid the appearance of 'giving in' to the ACFC."
151
 It would be 
the middle road, a frustrating one for the Fransaskois community. The government would not 
overtly oppose the ACFC lest it be seen as undermining national unity initiatives; at the same 
time, it would resist the ACFC since it would not be popular or politically wise to be viewed by 
people in Saskatchewan as "giving in" to the Fransaskois. 
 Meanwhile the opposition Liberals used the multiculturalism-bilingualism issue to 
criticize Blakeney and the Department of Culture and Youth for "going up and down this country 
talking about national unity"
152
, yet not providing enough funding towards French language and 
culture outside of the educational system. Liberal MLA Ted Malone, a Regina lawyer, 
questioned the government's commitment to national unity: 
For you to say, or for the Premier to say (and I see he has slithered out), for him to 
say that he is doing everything he can to foster better understanding in this 
province, is absolute nonsense, when that is the budget you have available to 
you...if that measly little amount of money you have is not just for French culture, 
it's for all of them and believe me, the Ukrainian people, the German people have 
just as legitimate claim toward funding as the French people so obviously that is 
not enough to go around.
153
  
 
Here again, the inclusive vision of multiculturalism came to the fore. Saskatchewan Liberals 
thought that the Fransaskois were equal with other minorities, but criticized the NDP for not 
doing enough for all minority groups under multiculturalism. The NDP was clearly in a 
                                                 
150
 Howard Leeson to Don Faris, 30 May 1978. [PAS], Allan Blakeney Fonds.  
151
 Ibid.  
152
 Saskatchewan, Debates and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 5th Session, 18th 
Legislature, vol. 20, 2722 (11 May 1978). 
153
 Ibid., 2723. 
  
230 
 
dangerous position, getting criticism from both opposition parties for either doing too much or 
too little.   
 In 1978 there were few signs that Saskatchewan would change its direction on 
multiculturalism. The values and philosophy of multicultural policy were now well-enough 
established in the province that after 1979, annual reports of the Department of Culture and 
Youth ceased explaining why multicultural policy existed in Saskatchewan.
154
 Allan Blakeney's 
public statements on national unity and the Saskatchewan identity also gave little evidence of a 
change in philosophical direction. In October 1978, for example, during discussions on 
constitutional reform, Blakeney continued to preach cautiousness on official bilingualism, 
especially in the context of western Canada's regional, multicultural identity.
155
  
 Yet the myriad of economic and political issues facing Saskatchewan and Canada 
eventually prompted a more conciliatory tone from Blakeney's government after the NDP was 
re-elected in October 1978. Pressure from the federal government on language rights remained 
strong as the prime minister and premiers returned to constitutional discussions.
156
 When the 
First Session of the new Legislature opened in February 1979, for example, the Speech from the 
Throne noted that constitutional discussions  
...will require compromise on the part of all Canadians if we are to meet the 
aspirations of many different groups -- groups such as those who wish to ensure a 
fair return to their province from natural resources, those who wish to see the 
language rights of English and French-speaking Canadians protected in all parts 
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of Canada within the context of a multicultural country, and those who wish to see 
a strong unified Canadian economy.
157
 
   
Accompanying this message was a general reconsideration of provincial cultural policy to be 
undertaken by the Cultural Policy Secretariat, established in June 1979.
158
 The secretariat's 
mandate was to "produce a draft cultural policy for the government...which recognizes changing 
cultural influences and attempts to preserve and encourage all that is unique about our 
province."
159
 Saskatchewan was approaching its seventy-fifth year in confederation and the 
government wanted to use the opportunity to evaluate how it represented itself within and 
without.
160
 
 In June 1979 the ACFC also undertook a re-examination of its stance on 
multiculturalism. The organization published a key policy document that remained in force until 
1986. Its juxtaposition with the Saskatchewan government vision of multiculturalism is striking 
and underlines the key role that the politics of memory played in the language question in 
Saskatchewan. Canada, the ACFC argued, is a country composed of two linguistic majorities as 
recognized in the British North America Act and the Official Languages Act; the recognition of 
French and English as official languages is also the recognition of those two official cultures.
161
 
Its views on the worthiness of multiculturalism and other minority groups were blunt. The "third 
force," the ACFC argued, "est en fait un regroupement tout-à-fait hétérogène, et sans unité et 
sans valeurs culturelles spécifiques."
162
 Other minorities in Canada, the ACFC believed, did not 
have the same claim to rights as francophone minorities. Moreover, other minorities did not 
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understand how multicultural policy was affecting the Fransaskois and how the English-speaking 
majority used multiculturalism to pare back francophone demands for linguistic and cultural 
equality. Other minority groups should support the French Canadians, the ACFC wrote, because 
multiculturalism was nothing more than assimilation policy masquerading as cultural diversity: 
Profitant des générosités tardives, peut-être forcées, d'une majorité bien installée, 
ces groupes s'unissant pour former une troisième force, voulurent se prévaloir de 
cette attitude pour obtenir pleine reconnaissance. Du même souffle ils fournissent 
à la majorité l'argument qui lui permet d'entretenir et d'accélérer le processus 
d'assimilation des Francophones. Ce processus avalera, comme ça se fait depuis 
toujours, malgré les espoirs éphémères, ces différents groupes quels qu'ils 
soient.
163
   
       
As a result, "L'A.C.F.C. s'oppose donc à une mosaïque canadienne ou saskatchewanienne qui 
conduit à un 'melting pot' déguisé et qui mène à un folklore coloré mais sans racines."
164
  
 
Les Fransaskois, Saskatchewan, and the Referendum, 1979-1982 
 At the end of 1979, two events complicated the multiculturalism and French-language 
rights debates in Saskatchewan. In December the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its 
decision in Attorney General of Manitoba v. Forest, a case dealing with the constitutional status 
of Manitoba's language legislation.
165
 The court ruled that the 1890 Official Language Act was 
unconstitutional, creating the possibility that Manitoba would have to translate all of its laws to 
French. Saskatchewan, concerned about the implications of Forest for its own provincial 
language regime, started examining whether or not it had similar constitutional obligations.
166
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 Quebec separatism also increased the stakes for language politics in Saskatchewan and 
Canada in 1979. In November René Lévesque announced that a referendum on sovereignty-
association was scheduled for May 1980. What happened next, however, shocked a number of 
provincial governments. The Association canadienne-française de l'Alberta (ACFA), the Société 
franco-manitobaine (SFM), and the Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick (SANB) all 
announced support for the "Oui" vote. This support was limited -- most francophones outside of 
Quebec did not want to see la Belle province leave Canada -- but francophones in many 
provinces, including Saskatchewan, expressed sympathy for francophone Quebecers frustration 
and desire to have more power over cultural and linguistic protections for French.
167
   
 On 14 February, the ACFC announced its own position of "non-interference" in the 
referendum: "L'A.C.F.C. reconnaît et respecte le droit des Québécois à décider pour eux-memes, 
sans contrainte, de leur avenir et de leurs relations avec leurs partenaires de la Confédération."
168
 
The ACFC urged the FFHQ, however, to support the "Oui" vote because "Un NON sera 
interprété par le Canada anglais comme l'expression de la satisfaction des Québécois face à la 
situation actuelle, c'est-à-dire au statut quo."
169
 The ACFC believed that by supporting the Yes 
vote, the Saskatchewan government would understand that it was serious about its political 
demands and recognition of the two founding nations thesis.  
 The strategy worked. It certainly shocked the Saskatchewan government into taking 
action. In March, the ACFC met with Howard Leeson, now Deputy Minister of 
Intergovernmental Affairs, who admitted that the government was "surprised" at the ACFC 
position and that perhaps the government had not done enough to understand the Fransaskois 
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position on separatism.
170
 The government agreed to meet regularly with the ACFC before the 
vote in May, and "discuter des applications particulières à la Saskatchewan de la dualité 
canadienne et des éventuels principes constitutionnels qui la consacreront."
171
  
 Blakeney was upset with the ACFC position on the referendum. He told them that they 
were playing with fire by endorsing the "Oui" vote.
172
 Irène Chabot replied that the Fransaskois 
were presented with no other choice when the government continued to make positive statements 
on bilingualism and national unity while simultaneously mistreating the Fransaskois. 
Saskatchewan's cultural policy, Chabot argued, forced the ACFC's hand because it explicitly 
contested the historical recognition of French Canada: 
...nous devons malheureusement constater qu'au niveau des déclarations publiques 
comme à ceux des discussions privées et des gestes concrets, il n'y a pas 
d'expression d'une volonté réelle de changement pour assurer enfin un statut égal 
aux deux peuples fondateurs de ce pays (sans oublier, bien sûr, la position 
primordiale des autochtones) et pour mettre en place des mécanismes qui 
permettront de corriger l'assimilation croissante du groupe canadien-
français...Poussé par la pression des événements, vous semblez prêt à certaines 
ouvertures face au caractère particulier du groupe canadien-français au Quebec et 
à la nécessité de lui reconnaître certains droits, mais les éléments francophones de 
votre province n'ont droit pour leur part qu'à l'indifférence la plus totale frisant 
parfois le mépris...Votre volonté de faire un compromis en faveur d'une 'dualité 
canadienne' théorique tout en évitant d'en reconnaître honnêtement la base en 
Saskatchewan est bien claire!
173
  
 
Chabot identified poor funding, the lack of bilingual services from the province, and universal 
French-language education access as problems that the community faced. The meagre offerings 
of French education in Saskatchewan, for example, were in "programmes destinés à 
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l'enseignement d'une langue seconde aux anglophones. Inutile de souligner que les moyens sont 
totalement mésadaptés par rapport aux besoins des Fransaskois."
174
  
 The referendum ended in defeat for Lévesque and les souverainistes. It was, as Canadian 
political scientist Peter H. Russell explains, a turning point in the national unity debate and 
Canadian federalism.
175
 The same cannot be said, however, about Saskatchewan cultural policy 
and government-Fransaskois relations. After the referendum, both sides maintained their general 
stance on multiculturalism and bilingualism. Even with the close call of the referendum and 
Trudeau's pledge for change, in addition to Saskatchewan's openness, the government continued 
to project its multicultural identity on the national stage and use multiculturalism to draw the line 
on official bilingualism. In September, for example, Saskatchewan published a short booklet 
outlining its vision for the future of Canada. It reminded readers that Saskatchewan was the only 
Canadian province where people of British and French origin taken together formed less than 
half of the population. It also reiterated Saskatchewan's cooperation with Ottawa on official 
bilingualism, with reservations: 
The federal government is urging us to reaffirm English and French as the official 
languages of Canada, and to guarantee in the constitution certain linguistic rights 
for French and English...Like other governments, and all political parties, we 
support the principle of official bilingualism at the national level. We agree that 
the federal government and its agencies should provide services in both French 
and English. And we believe, too, that those provinces which wish to be officially 
bilingual should -- where there are substantial numbers of the English or French 
minority -- have that opportunity. But Saskatchewan will insist that language 
provisions be practical and realistic. That they be tailored to recognize the diverse 
nature of Canada, from province to province. And that they respect the rights of 
Canada's ethnic groups as well as the original peoples.
176
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The defeat of the separatists also prompted Blakeney and his government to clarify that French-
English dualism was not the only priority for western Canadians. The language used by 
Blakeney in his official statement was revealing: 
[The] constitution must ensure that French Canadians, and particularly French 
Quebeckers, are free to be themselves in what is their country as it is ours. But the 
new constitution must also satisfy the real desire for change in other parts of 
Canada, including western Canada. I have said many times in the past that while 
the recognition of 'dualism' -- between French and English, or between Quebec 
and the rest of Canada -- is perhaps our most visible constitutional problem, it is 
not the only problem to be solved. We in the West have our own serious 
grievances which are well known by now, but still unresolved.   
 
 The Fransaskois community, for its part, worried about "post-referendum blues" and a 
decline in political influence now that the "Oui" vote had lost.
177
 With more constitutional 
discussions slated for the near future, the organization presented yet another brief to the 
government, outlining its vision for bilingualism in Saskatchewan. The juxtaposition with the 
province's vision of Canada and Saskatchewan was striking: 
It is clear to us that the Act of Confederation was, amongst other things, an 
alliance between two peoples or two societies and that the intent of the B.N.A. Act 
was to guarantee the rights and assure the equal development of the anglophone 
and francophone groups. It is fundamental that the new text of the constitution 
clearly and unequivocally recognize that there are two founding peoples, without 
prejudice whatsoever to the natives who were here before or to other groups who 
came after and who have contributed to the development of this country. We feel 
that our provincial government has the responsibility to make known this point of 
view and to defend it in the constitutional debate.
178
 
 
The meeting between the government and the community to discuss the briefing was tense. 
Romanow and Blakeney both insisted that full official bilingualism in Saskatchewan was not 
feasible because the Fransaskois community was too small. Moreover, "Mr. Blakeney noted that 
linguistic rights are not human rights. He said that the phrase 'where numbers warrant' is 
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necessary because in practical terms he believes that's the way it will be and he does not want to 
promise more than he can deliver."
179
  
 Indeed, Blakeney had other ideas about the cultural character of Saskatchewan and how it 
fit into the discussion on patriation. In his own brief to Parliament's Special Joint Committee on 
the Constitution, Blakeney remarked that he did not oppose the entrenchment of French and 
English language rights. This recognition, however, had to be reconciled with the Saskatchewan 
reality of multiculturalism: 
Saskatchewan is the only province in which those of British and French origin, 
combined, form less than half the population. That makes us particularly 
conscious of our multicultural heritage. And it gives us a strong commitment to 
policies and programs that will ensure the continued vitality of languages and 
cultures other than French and English. We ought to be examining some 
constitutional recognition of multiculturalism, perhaps in a preamble as discussed 
last summer, or in some other section. But, in any case, it should be the subject of 
early discussion in the next round of negotiations.
180
 
 
But the idea of multiculturalism did not fit with how the Fransaskois viewed their own history, or 
the history of Saskatchewan and Canada: "Le multiculturalisme dans un cadre bilingue signifie 
dans les faits que chacun peut exprimer sa culture d'origine dans une des deux langues 
officielles, au choix. Donc, la grande mosaïque culturelle ne s'exprime qu'en anglais!."
181
 
Furthermore, the ACFC argued, Blakeney and the Saskatchewan government based their ideas of 
multiculturalism on a "false conception" of western Canadian history: 
Une autre des grandes lacunes du multiculturalisme tel qu'il est conçu 
actuellement au Canada, c'est qu'il s'appuie sur une conception fausse de l'histoire 
de ce pays. Il ignore les origines réelles du Canada et veut faire des Canadiens-
français un groupe d'immigrants comme les autres. Or les Canadiens-français sont 
arrivés au pays dans des circonstances bien différentes, qui expliquent leur 
                                                 
179
 Saskatchewan, "Notes taken at a Meeting Between a Committee of Cabinet and the French Canadian Cultural 
Association of Saskatchewan," 17 December 1980. [PAS], Allan Blakeney Fonds. 
180
 Saskatchewan, The Patriation and Amendment of the Constitution of Canada: Brief Presented to the Special 
Joint Committee on the Consitution by Honourable Allan Blakeney, Premier. December 19, 1980. 
181
 ACFC. "La position de l'A.C.F.C. devant guider les Fransaskois dans leurs relations avec les groupes ethniques," 
10 avril 1981. [PAS], CCF Fonds.   
  
238 
 
développement particulier, et encore aujourd'hui, leur situation particulière. Les 
français qui sont venue au pays n'étaient pas des immigrants qui changeaient de 
pays; ils venaient fonder un pays. Ils n'ont pas échangé leur culture en venant ici, 
comme le font des immigrants; ils ont développé une culture originale et 
francophone sur ce continent.
182
 
 
 In the end, Blakeney, Romanow, and the Saskatchewan government agreed to entrench 
French and English language rights in the Constitution. The tensions between the government 
and the Fransaskois community, however, did not disappear. On the contrary, they were 
irreconcilable. The dualistic, bilingual national vision advanced by the federal government, and 
supported by the Fransaskois community, met its match in the provincial identity and cultural 
policy propounded by the Blakeney government.    
 Fransaskois and Saskatchewan government beliefs on multiculturalism, the Constitution, 
and national unity are aptly summed up in one of the last disputes between the ACFC and 
Blakeney's government before the 1982 provincial election. On 15 April, Irène Chabot wrote to 
Roy Romanow refusing an invitation to a multicultural gala and dinner marking the patriation of 
the Constitution. Why would the Fransaskois, who had so much to gain from the new Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, refuse to celebrate it with the province? According to Chabot,  
il nous est difficile de se réjouir et de célébrer ce repatriement, lorsque ce projet 
constitutionnel n'a jamais reçu l'accord de la seule province francophone du pays, 
le Quebec, qui, tout de même, représente un quart de la population canadienne. 
Pour l'A.C.F.C., ce fait nous est inacceptable, et nous porte à questionner la 
sincérité des leaders qui déclarent que ce projet reflète la dualité canadienne. Cette 
nouvelle constitution n'enchâsse pas les quelques concepts et droits que nous, à 
l'A.C.F.C., défendons depuis près de trois (3) ans maintenant, e.g.: 
i) la pleine reconnaissance des deux peuples officiels (le concepte de dualité qui 
devrait être inscrit dans le préambule. 
ii) l'application de l'article 133 à tous les provinces et les territoires canadiens. 
iii) le droit aux groupes de langue minoritaire officielle de gérer et d'administrer 
leur propre système scolaire.  
iv) la reconnaissance de droits collectifs aux groupes de langue minoritaire 
officielle.
183
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Indeed, between 1971 and 1982, Saskatchewan redefined itself as multicultural in order to give 
itself an identity more suited to what was happening in Canada and western Canada at the time. 
The redefinition of the province and its history was fundamentally unacceptable to the 
Fransaskois community. For the provincial government, however, multiculturalism was an 
important historical narrative because it reflected the composition of the population. It also 
appealed to a population seeking an identity. Although financial support of multicultural 
programs was quite small, the overall ideas and narrative surrounding multiculturalism gave 
Saskatchewan a political, historical, and cultural identity at a time that regional consciousness 
was again on the rise.  
 
Conclusion 
 Multiculturalism as a historical narrative and policy was elaborated explicitly in 
opposition to Ottawa's bilingualism narrative and policies. The narrative of multiculturalism 
spoke to the province's need for a reinvented memory. But, while history and memory can play 
key roles in constructing identity, they also constitute major sources of conflict. As the debate 
between the Saskatchewan government and the ACFC shows, fundamental differences in 
historical interpretations of western Canada led to different political goals and visions for the 
province between 1971 and 1982. The multicultural definition of Saskatchewan, while not anti-
French, ran against the pan-Canadian nationalism espoused by Pierre Trudeau and the pan-
Canadian French-English bilingualism so crucial to Trudeau's strategy of constitutional reform.  
 It should be noted that Saskatchewan's use of multiculturalism to blunt the effects of 
bilingualism and national unity is not synonymous with the racism and anti-French politics of the 
J.T.M. Anderson government and the earlier era of Saskatchewan politics. During the early era, 
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more extremist groups held a great deal of power of the political system, which was not the case 
for the 1968-1990 era. Moreover, policymakers and political leaders in the Blakeney government 
sincerely believed that multiculturalism policy was a true representation of the Saskatchewan 
identity. Thus, the purpose of multiculturalism policy went beyond its role in limiting official 
bilingualism in the province.        
 Understanding the founding ideas of multiculturalism in Saskatchewan is critical in 
recognizing how the province viewed official bilingualism and French-language rights within its 
own borders. Multiculturalism was not anti-French or anti-bilingualism in a bigoted or intolerant 
sense, but it did appeal to a population upset with Quebec's demands for cultural and political 
equality. Multiculturalism established an interpretation of western Canadian history that was 
antagonistic to the one espoused by Ottawa and the Fransaskois. For the Fransaskois, the 
recasting of Saskatchewan as multicultural denied their understanding of western Canadian 
history -- namely, the role played by French speakers in opening and establishing the West 
before the provinces were founded. On the other hand, the Fransaskois interpretation of history 
was unacceptable to many people in Saskatchewan because it did not correspond to how they 
viewed the province's history; it also dovetailed with pan-Canadian bilingualism and an Ottawa-
centric vision of Canada which westerners found did not correspond with their understanding of 
their political community. Under the umbrella of multiculturalism, the Fransaskois were no 
different than any other minority group who had helped found Saskatchewan. No amount of 
demographic and political power imposed from Ottawa would make French an official language 
in the province.  
 On a policy level, these antagonistic interpretations of Saskatchewan history had 
considerable implications. The establishment of a multicultural narrative for Saskatchewan 
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history allowed the province to re-cast itself as open and diverse despite its troubled history on 
cultural diversity and the French language. The result was that although different cultures and 
diversity were explicitly endorsed as political values in Saskatchewan, the long-established value 
of unilingualism remained unchallenged. Secondly, it allowed Saskatchewan and western 
Canadian governments to counter the narrative and definition of Canada being advanced by the 
federal government. This function of multiculturalism policy was especially useful during 
national unity debates, when Saskatchewan needed to have firm reasons for resisting the 
expansion of official bilingualism in provincial institutions. Multiculturalism allowed the 
province to place limits on the extent to which French would be an official language in 
Saskatchewan which was especially useful at a time that regional economic and cultural 
discontent were on the rise. Finally, when the province could no longer resist expanding 
provincial bilingualism, especially in education, it used multiculturalism in order to justify 
bilingualism, arguing that French-language education and policy programmes were simply 
reinforcing the Saskatchewan identity.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The "Moderate In-Between Position": The Mercure Case and Provincial Bilingualism, 
1980-1988 
 
Today I would rather recall some historical facts which our history books may have overlooked in the past...Too 
often, we forget that some of the first explorers and pioneers of our province, then known as the West, and later the 
North West Territories, were French-Canadians...the French-Canadians have been part of this province since the 
beginning and we are proud of what they did, of what they have willed to us and this is why we believe that we, 
their descendents, are equal partners in the province they helped build.
1
 
 
- Irène Chabot 
 
And up until today, Mr. Speaker, or soon, this legislature has not spoken to the issues of how we as legislators will 
govern ourselves in this Assembly as it relates to the languages of English and French. And I ask, Mr. Speaker, why 
that is -- why that is. And I say, Mr. Speaker, and I think a fair reflection of history, is that when we became a 
province it was assumed by the members that sat in our places some 80-some years ago today, it was assumed that 
English was the language of Saskatchewan. That's not necessarily a reflection on them, I think history would record 
no other way than but that was the fact...The issue never came up here, Mr. Speaker, because it was assumed that the 
language of this province was English. And that assumption was passed on through subsequent members of this 
Assembly and became the tradition, the practice, of this province.
2
  
 
- Bob Andrew, Minister of Justice 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The speeding ticket was an opportunity. When Father André Mercure was pulled over by 
the RCMP near Cochin, Saskatchewan in November 1980, he believed that it could be the 
Fransaskois community's chance to realize a bilingual Saskatchewan. Born in Quebec, Mercure 
moved to western Canada in 1942 and was ordained in Lebret, Saskatchewan in 1948. 
Throughout his career he understood how important official bilingualism was to the 
Fransaskois.
3
 With his speeding ticket, Mercure believed that it was time to launch a legal case to 
settle the question of bilingualism in Saskatchewan. He refused to pay the ticket and demanded 
that the province provide him with a French trial and translations of the relevant statutes. For 
Mercure and the Fransaskois, the time seemed ripe to raise the issue in the West: only a year 
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earlier, Manitoba's francophones won a crucial victory when the Supreme Court of Canada 
declared that Manitoba's 1890 Official Language Act was unconstitutional.
4
 Could Saskatchewan 
and Alberta legislation have the same fate?
5
  
 Between 1980 and 1988, Father Mercure and the western Canadian francophone 
communities rallied in order to bring Mercure's challenge to the Supreme Court in order to have 
French recognized as an official language along with English in Saskatchewan and Alberta.
6
 This 
chapter argues that the Mercure case provided a judicial and political platform for a number of 
competing narratives on western Canadian history and society. For the francophones, Mercure 
provided a platform to assert the community's own views on western Canadian history and 
opened up a new space for francophones to challenge the Saskatchewan political community. 
Although education was a key portfolio for francophone activism and political aspirations in 
western Canada between 1970 and 1980, the campaign to have French recognised as an official 
language at the provincial level increased in importance between 1980 and 1988. As the 
Association culturelle franco-canadienne de la Saskatchewan (ACFC) declared in 1980: "We 
want to be clear at the outset that in speaking of linguistic rights we are not alluding only to the 
right to instruction in French. Rather we refer to an ensemble of rights in different fields, the aim 
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of which is to guarantee the normal development of a linguistic and cultural group."
7
 Official 
bilingualism meant that French could be a public language, giving francophones access to an 
array of services in French from the provincial government.
8
  
 For the francophone communities in western Canada, the bilingualism cause went much 
deeper, however, than mere policy decisions. The quest for official bilingualism was a matter of 
principle, symbolism, and history.
9
 In fact, Father Mercure was not the first Fransaskois to 
challenge Saskatchewan's seemingly straightforward, English-only language regime. As early as 
1975, for example, Fransaskois historian and community activist René Rottiers went to court 
over the status of French but was unsuccessful.
10
  
 As a principle, official bilingualism meant, for the Fransaskois, political equality with 
English-speakers in the province. The symbolism of the Mercure case was more complex. For 
the francophone communities of Saskatchewan and Alberta, Mercure was a direct challenge to 
the unilingual political community and cultural makeup of both provinces. It represented not 
only an opportunity to have full, legal recognition of French in major public institutions, but also 
full recognition of the French-Canadian interpretation of western Canadian history.
11
 The fight 
                                                 
7
 ACFC, "Brief presented to the Members of the Cabinet of the Government of Saskatchewan," December 1980; 
also, for example, ACFC, "Brief presented to the Government of Saskatchewan in Regina, Wednesday May 31, 
1978," Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan, D.L. Faris Fonds. See also Education chapter.  
8
 Founded on the idea of "institutional completeness," first coined by Fransaskois sociologist Raymond Breton, the 
idea of institution- and service-based francophone community development stretches as far back as 1969. See 
Raymond Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Minorities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants," 
American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 2 (September 1964), 193-205. By the 1980s, the debate over francophone 
community development was at the centre of francophones' relationships with provincial and federal governments. 
See Martin Normand, Le développement en contexte: Quatre temps d'un débat au sein des communautés 
francophones minoritaires (1969-2009) (Sudbury: Prise de Parole, 2012), 29-48.  
9
 "Symbols are conveyors of meanings. They serve as vehicles for concepts, ideals, worldviews, and collective 
identities, and as such, can become sources of conflict. At the heart of the conflict is not the object or document 
itself, but the concepts or ideals that it represents." Raymond Breton, Ethnic Relations in Canada: Institutional 
Dynamics (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 150.  
10
 "L'être ou ne [PAS] l'être," L'Eau Vive, 21 avril 1975, 1 and 5. 
11
 A number of briefs and documents used by the ACFC when dealing with the provincial government bear witness 
to this preoccupation. A 1983 document presented to provincial Cabinet, for example, underlined that "Dans le 
domaine du patrimoine, les Fransaskois veulent la reconnaissance et la mise en valeur du rôle qu'ils ont joué dans le 
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for bilingualism during the 1980s was about much more than narrow legal and constitutional 
questions: it was about whose memory, and whose interpretation of history, would be 
recognized.
12
 Legal recognition of the francophone historical interpretation would therefore be a 
major victory for francophones in both Saskatchewan and Alberta. If political recognition for the 
Fransaskois vision of history and society was close to impossible through the parliamentary 
system, the legal system provided an avenue through which the community could further press 
and legitimize its political demands. Winning a bilingualism case in the Supreme Court of 
Canada would be about much more than simply expanding or bolstering bilingualism -- it meant 
receiving the highest judicial endorsement for their vision of society and history.    
 For the English-speaking community and the Saskatchewan government, victory in 
Mercure meant a vindication of the status quo and reassurance that bilingualism was not 
compulsory in a province where it was viewed with suspicion or hostility. It is important to note 
that prairie opposition to bilingualism was not entirely a function of "right-wing 
authoritarianism" or bigotry as some authors have argued.
13
 While it is true that some leaders and 
supporters of the western Canadian political right disliked bilingualism out of bigotry towards 
French Canadians, the real opposition to French as an official language in the West arose from 
the idea that it was simply incompatible with the political community and history of the region. 
Indeed, the Saskatchewan government's reaction to the Mercure decision was indicative of the 
power of a certain ideal of western Canadian history and society. In its handling of the Mercure 
decision, Saskatchewan demonstrated the pervasiveness of unilingualism in western Canada.     
                                                                                                                                                             
développement de la province." ACFC, "Sommaire du mémoire présenté au Cabinet provincial de la Saskatchewan," 
16 février 1983. [PAS], Conseil culturel fransaskois Fonds.  
12
 Here it is useful to quote Breton's characterization of the dynamics and symbolism of constitutions and policies: 
"Although they may have the practical purpose of regulating behavior or allocating resources, they are primarily 
affirmations of particular values in society. They signify principles of social and political organization and cultural 
identity, and refer to the history and projected future of the collectivity." Breton, Ethnic Relations in Canada, 151. 
13
 See for example Hébert, Manitoba's French-Language Crisis.  
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Early Rumblings: Fransaskois Activism Awakens 
 The push for official bilingualism in Saskatchewan began not only with provincial 
initiative but also with federal political pressure in the mid-1970s. The Fédération des 
Francophones Hors Quebec (FFHQ), founded in 1975 following years of protracted discussions 
amongst francophone communities in the nine provinces
14
, promoted revitalization of Canada's 
francophone minority communities and provided for a united political voice in national politics. 
In its second volume of The Heirs of Lord Durham
15
 (Les héritiers de Lord Durham), published 
in 1977, the FFHQ emphasized the poor track record of western Canadian governments on 
French language rights throughout the region's history. French Canadians had been treated by the 
majority as little more than "white niggers" despite "masks of liberality and good faith."
16
 It was 
time for a solution, an end to linguistic assimilation. The first recommendation of the FFHQ was 
that Saskatchewan make French an official language, giving it equal status with English.
17
 
Saskatchewan should recognize official bilingualism, the document affirmed, as it fell under the 
category of "fundamental rights" and would aid the community's cultural development. This 
pressure on Saskatchewan from the FFHQ was joined by the Secretary of State, who argued that 
                                                 
14
 Michael Behiels offers a comprehensive account of the founding years of the FFHQ in Canada's Francophone 
Minority Communities, 3-52. The principal mandate of the FFHQ was to pressure all levels of government to expand 
French-language rights and help further the interests of francophone minority communities. It also acted as a support 
network to the various provincial francophone representative groups, helping them to shore up political and financial 
support for a number of activities. 
15
 Les héritiers de Lord Durham was a manifesto that condemned past federal and provincial governments for 
playing key roles in the disappearance and assimilation of francophone minority communities. Published in two 
volumes,  Les héritiers de Lord Durham also declared that "we will not be used as pawns by the federal 
government" and "our firm intention to enter the debate [on national unity] with all the strength of our one million 
people, and to make our fundamental aspirations clearly known to the entire country." FFHQ, The Heirs of Lord 
Durham: The Francophones outside Quebec speak out (FFHQ, 1978), 17. The manifesto underlined the need for a 
constitutionally enforceable status for French in the provinces since "official recognition of French in some 
provinces does not go beyond wishful thinking and statements of good intentions." Ibid, 19.     
16
 The term references Pierre Vallières' classic, radical treatise on the condition of francophones in Quebec, Nègres 
blancs d'Amérique (White Niggers of America) (Quebec: Éditions Partis pris, 1968). See "French said treated like 
'white niggers'," Saskatoon StarPhoenix, 26 May 1977, 8. 
17
 ACFC, "Communiqué de presse, le 25 mai 1977," [PAS], Conseil culturel fransaskois Fonds.   
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an "equal partnership" between French and English speakers was impossible in Canada without 
strong provincial commitment in favour of official bilingualism.
18
  
 If Premier Allan Blakeney's government had concerns about political fallout related to 
provincial bilingualism, it was careful not to adopt a strong public position on the question. As a 
nation, Canada was still working through many of its issues related to language rights. With the 
election of René Lévesque's Parti Québécois in 1976, the Quebec question continued to dominate 
federal politics. Saskatchewan would have to work with the federal government and show its 
willingness to make compromises and promote bilingualism for the cause of national unity. On 
the other hand, Saskatchewan supported stronger provincial control over languages within 
provincial jurisdiction in order to gain Quebec's support on the natural resources question, which 
dogged intergovernmental relations for Canada and Saskatchewan during the 1970s.
19
 Given 
surging regional discontent in the West, Saskatchewan would cooperate on bilingualism if 
Quebec agreed to leave the resources question alone.
20
  
 The Saskatchewan government was quietly concerned, however, about the zeal with 
which the Fransaskois insisted that French still enjoyed official status in provincial government 
institutions.
21
 In a 1980 briefing note on the legal status of French in Saskatchewan the civil 
service noted that "In the past, our position has been that s. 110 has no continuing effect. The 
legal position is not that clear. At the moment there are no clear-cut answers to the legal 
                                                 
18
 Sheila Arnopoulos, "Provinces told to improve French status," Montreal Star, 19 April 1977.  
19
 Roy Romanow, John Whyte, and Howard Leeson, Canada...Notwithstanding (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 
2007), 1-16.  
20
 As Premier Blakeney himself noted in 1981, "During the referendum debate, I argued that the West must be 
prepared to recognize the aspirations of Quebec. I also argued that the West needed constitutional assurances of our 
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[[PAA] ], PR1985.401), vol. 300.  
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 In Alberta the government was concerned about the language question right up to the Mercure decision in 1988. 
In a 1987 memo to Premier Getty, Alberta Attorney General James Horsman complained that other French-language 
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Getty, 13 October 1987. [[PAA] ], Don Getty Fonds, File 235.   
  
248 
 
questions in this area."
22
 The brief recommended that the premier and ministers make no public 
comment on the question; privately, the government's position should be that "there are no 
entrenched language rights in this province; s. 110 of The North-West Territories Act was not 
continued by The Saskatchewan Act."
23
  
 The increasing aggressiveness of Fransaskois political action, especially the 
strengthening of links between the FFHQ and the ACFC, made the government uneasy.
24
 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba had strong reservations about the federal government's 
promotion of official languages in the provinces, which was seen as an attempt to undermine 
traditional parliamentary powers of the provincial legislatures and western Canadians' right to 
decide language and cultural policies.
25
 Making concessions for French in education was one 
thing, but for French to enjoy official status along with English in the legislature, courts, and 
government was another matter entirely. Official bilingualism in areas outside of education 
threatened to give the language debate a new dimension. Bilingualism put into question the 
historical and cultural character of the Saskatchewan. It presupposed that Saskatchewan was, 
perhaps, not as different from eastern Canada after all. This notion was offensive to many 
westerners. Bilingualism policy also presumed that the francophones were somehow more 
special than other groups who had also worked hard to found western Canada.
26
 As such, the 
Saskatchewan government remained deeply suspicious of official bilingualism.
27
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 Saskatchewan, "Briefing Note: Legal Status of French in Saskatchewan," May 1980. [PAS], Allan Blakeney 
Fonds.  
23
 Ibid.  
24
 As Laurence Ready, the Associate Deputy Minister of Education wrote in 1978: "If l'A.C.F.C. is going to use that 
national organization [the FFHQ] which is committed to militancy and confrontation to promote its objectives in 
Saskatchewan, then the value of continuing consultation with l'A.C.F.C. may well be questioned." L.M. Ready to 
Don Faris, 30 May 1978. [PAS], D.L. Faris Fonds.  
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 Romanow, Whyte, and Leeson, Canada...Notwithstanding, 13.  
26
 Smith, The Regional Decline of a National Party, 109, 113, and 133.  
27
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Memory in Competition: Government and Fransaskois Historical Understandings 
 When Father Mercure launched his legal challenge, bilingualism was as politically 
explosive in western Canada as it was a century earlier. During the 1970s Saskatchewan had 
been able to brush the language question aside for the most part by arguing that it had already 
made efforts towards arresting assimilation and fostering national unity by improving French-
language education. The province also attempted to mitigate political fallout from the expansion 
of official bilingualism by spinning it as part of its multiculturalism policies, with limited 
success. The multiculturalism-bilingualism position became more and more difficult to maintain, 
however, as the francophones demanded that provincial statutes be translated and that the 
Legislature and courts be recognized as officially bilingual.
28
  
 The importance of memory in the Mercure case was evident in the political strategies of 
both the francophone community and the Saskatchewan government. Both were conditioned by 
how each interpreted the history of western Canada. In the Fransaskois case, the memory of an 
older western Canada -- the  bilingual North-West Territories, when French speakers enjoyed 
demographic prominence, strong clerical representation, and separate schools -- fuelled the 
contemporary drive towards an officially bilingual province. The memory of a bilingual West 
was explicitly articulated and perpetuated by francophone community leaders, not only to 
provide historical justification for bilingualism but also to justify the existence of the community 
and the ACFC themselves. Memory not only recalls history, it justifies the present. In other 
                                                                                                                                                             
Canada', presumably with a special antagonism towards 'French Canada'." Eager, Saskatchewan Government, 188. 
See also Smith, The Regional Decline of a National Party, 129.  
28
 The link between school rights and official bilingualism should not have surprised the government, since 
throughout the 1970s the ACFC continually linked educational advances with the "need for a global government 
policy re French language and culture" and "recognition of the French fact in Saskatchewan." Saskatchewan, "Notes 
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words, the francophone interpretation of Saskatchewan history placed the community in a 
political-temporal space and situated the community within the broader political community of 
western Canada. The official history of the ACFC published in 1977, for example, argued that: 
Bien souvent, lorsqu'on parle des droits du français en Saskatchewan, ou de 
l'enseignement en français, une bonne partie des nôtres ignorent les fondations de 
ces revendications. Souvent aussi, lorsqu'il est question du rôle, des buts, des 
activités de l'A.C.F.C., on réalise mal le travail gigantesque que notre association 
a effectué depuis sa fondation, et l'importance pour tout Fransaskois de lui 
accorder sa collaboration et son appui total.
29
 
 
It was politically important for the Fransaskois to ensure that bilingualism was seen as more than 
a passing fad in federal politics. In the West, the ACFC believed, bilingualism had real historical 
roots. The idea of two founding nations was not a modern invention, the ACFC affirmed; rather, 
it was something recognized and proven by a number of legislative provisions for official 
bilingualism in the North-West.
30
 Bilingualism in the North-West Territories, the ACFC argued, 
even withstood repeated attacks on its status. When the Territorial Assembly led by Frederick 
Haultain attempted to abolish official bilingualism in 1892, its efforts were in vain since 
Lieutenant Governor Joseph Royal apparently never proclaimed Haultain's resolution to abolish 
the use of French in the Territorial Assembly: 
Il est donc permis de conclure aujourd'hui en l'absence manifeste de la Sanction 
Royale que l'amendement apporté en 1892 à l'article 11 de l'Acte des Territoires 
du Nord-Ouest de 1877, n'est jamais devenu loi, et que le français est donc resté 
depuis lors -- il y a cent ans de cela à la date où nous écrivons -- langue officielle à 
la Législature des Territoires du Nord-Ouest. Il n'a jamais cessé de l'être non plus 
devant tout tribunal de la Saskatchewan (et de l'Alberta).
31
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 Rottiers, Soixante-cinq années de luttes, i. Rottiers also launched a series of historical articles consisting of an 
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Determined to prove its historical legitimacy as a founding people of western Canada, the 
Fransaskois community used this interpretation of Saskatchewan and western Canadian history 
to its advantage on a number of occasions even before the Mercure case was launched.
32
 The 
historical interpretation itself was not entirely new. The ACFC history actually built on a number 
of studies published as part of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and as 
part of the general interest in language rights during the 1960s. These works suggested that 
French was still an official language in both Saskatchewan and Alberta because section 110 of 
the North-West Territories Act, 1877 had been carried over into Saskatchewan and Alberta in 
1905.
33
 Nobody was completely certain if the statute was still in operation, or if it had been 
constitutionally entrenched. After all, English was simply assumed to be the official language of 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, and the courts had not yet dealt with the question in a definitive 
manner.
34
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 The Saskatchewan government also used different historical interpretations and 
"memories" of western Canada in order to justify its language policies.
35
 The government 
interpretation of western Canadian history was quite different from that of the Fransaskois 
community. It consisted of a reflection of the values of western Canadians forged over time and 
through unilingual institutions, multicultural ideals, and pitched battles with Ottawa in a number 
of areas.
36
 As such, the Saskatchewan government was skeptical of the Fransaskois community's 
interpretation of the status of French in the province. In a 1978 review of the legal status of 
French in Saskatchewan undertaken by the executive council, the government acknowledged the 
existence of bilingualism in the North-West Territories after 1877 but noted that any idea that the 
old statutes were still in force rested on an "extremely tenuous argument."
37
 Other studies 
commissioned by the provincial government on non-English language education in 1966 and 
again in 1978 supported this view and re-affirmed that Saskatchewan held exclusive jurisdiction 
over language in education and the workings of the Legislature.
38
 The government strongly 
believed that these were provincial matters and was confident that its interpretation of history 
was the correct one. No further action would be necessary on official bilingualism in 
Saskatchewan.  
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 The ACFC could not accept a political status quo on language, especially one based on an 
interpretation of history that denied rights to the francophone community. The organisation 
continued to look into the history on French status and usage in the province. In December 1979 
the ACFC commissioned a legal study by Fransaskois lawyer Raymond Blais in order to clarify 
the Saskatchewan language question "without equivocation."
39
 His conclusions were 
diametrically opposed to the provincial government's 1978 briefing. Blais suggested that French 
remained an official language in Saskatchewan and could be used before the province's courts, 
Legislature, and in the printing of provincial statutes.
40
 This rendition of the legal history of 
French was good news to the Fransaskois community, whose resolve to test the status of French 
was growing by the day.   
 With Saskatchewan continuing to deny that official bilingualism had any historical or 
legal foundation in the province and the ACFC affirming the opposite, the stage was set for a 
conflict of memory and history. The status of French would have to be decided in the courts, and 
now with Father Mercure's speeding ticket, a constitutional challenge could be launched.
41
     
 
Action-Reaction: Activism, Negotiations, and Mercure Before the Courts  
 The ACFC wasted little time using the Mercure case to keep official bilingualism on the 
provincial political agenda. In January 1981, less than a week before the challenge was heard by 
the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, the ACFC met with Premier Blakeney and members of 
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the provincial cabinet and asked that French be recognized along with English as an official 
language.
42
 With official bilingualism should come funding for government services in addition 
to "des structures nécessaires pour l'exercice de ce droit."
43
 The government took the case 
seriously. In a 1983 briefing to the new Progressive Conservative Minister of Justice Gary Lane, 
the Constitutional Branch of the Department of Justice noted that ."..the file indicates that both 
Premier Blakeney and Mr. Romanow took a very active interest in the case, presumably because 
it raised the broad and important issue of the status of the French language in Saskatchewan."
44
 
Both the Blakeney and Devine governments took similar positions on the question. 
Saskatchewan was not, in the opinion of either government, a bilingual province.  
 The Provincial Court of Saskatchewan rendered its decision in Regina v. Mercure in 
April 1981. Judge Deshaye rejected Father Mercure's request to have the provincial statutes 
relevant to his case translated into French and for a French-language trial. At the same time, 
though, Deshaye ruled that section 110 had never been repealed by the Saskatchewan legislature 
and as a result Mercure could use French before the province's courts with the aid of a 
translator.
45
 Deshaye also rejected the government's argument that section 110 of the North-West 
Territories Act was no longer in force in the province. Rather, Deshaye explained, the question at 
issue was the extent to which s. 110 was still valid in Saskatchewan, and what obligations it 
placed on the provincial government.
46
 
 Deshaye's ambivalent decision emboldened the Fransaskois community. L'Eau Vive 
called it a "moral victory."
47
 ACFC president Irène Chabot, in solidarity with Father Mercure, 
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found herself in court a month later for refusing to pay an English-only ticket because "l'article 
110 de l'Acte des Territoires du Nord-Ouest existe toujours."
48
 The ACFC moved to adopt a 
more official and organized approach to the Mercure case. On 20 June the ACFC board met to 
discuss what further action was necessary to help Father Mercure win, and voted unanimously to 
support the case morally and financially.
49
   
 Francophone activism surrounding the Mercure case borrowed from earlier strategies 
used to support education, communications/media, and politics.
50
 The Fransaskois first 
mobilized regional political networks in western Canada in order to boost Mercure's chance of 
success. The ACFC began with its Albertan counterpart, the Association canadienne-française de 
l'Alberta (ACFA), and was delighted when the ACFA immediately announced its own 
unanimous support for Mercure's case.
51
 With this moral solidarity came an immediate payment 
of $1000 from the ACFA to kick off a fund for Father Mercure's legal costs, in addition to a call 
for Franco-Albertans to provide further donations.
52
 This campaign for donations harkened back 
to the early history of the ACFC when the organization sought financial support from French 
Canadians as far away as Montreal in order to counter the provincial government's repression of 
French-language education. Franco-Albertan generosity prompted Chabot and the ACFC to 
announce a second instalment of "Opération Solidarité" on 29 September 1981. The first 
Opération Solidarité campaign, unveiled in September 1980, successfully raised over $5000 
from community donors in order to support a group of parents in Prince Albert and Vonda who 
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were using the courts to gain better access to French-language education.
53
 The second 
campaign, aptly titled "Faites monter le Mercure!" (let's raise the Mercury!) sought to raise 
$10000 in one year. Between September 1981 and February 1982 close to $4000 was gathered in 
donations from across Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Canada.
54
  
 The prospect of using political pressure on the provincial government seemed to improve 
in 1982. Progressive Conservative Premier Grant Devine, who won the provincial election in 
April by a landslide over Allan Blakeney's NDP, made few real commitments towards official 
bilingualism in Saskatchewan. He did, however, make an attempt at open dialogue with the 
Fransaskois community by agreeing to regular meetings between ACFC leaders and cabinet. The 
ACFC continued to use these meetings as an opportunity to reiterate the organisation's 
perspective on western Canada's history and the Fransaskois' pioneering role in creating the 
province.  
 In February 1983 the ACFC met with the provincial government in order to talk about 
how the Fransaskois might "vivre comme citoyens à part entière de la Saskatchewan."
55
 In order 
to do so, the Fransaskois required "la reconnaissance et la mise en valeur du rôle qu'ils ont joué 
dans le développement de la province" in addition to "des services publics sociaux, de santé 
juridique, etc...en français."
56
 This particular meeting was a mild success, although Irène Chabot 
was disappointed with Justice Minister Gary Lane, whose absence made it impossible for the two 
sides to discuss the ongoing Mercure case.
57
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 There is little evidence that either the ACFC or the provincial government made attempts 
at negotiating the legal and historical questions of the Mercure case outside of the courts. It is 
probable that both the Fransaskois and the Saskatchewan government wished to avoid any 
unnecessary backlash from an out-of-court settlement; it is also probable that both parties 
believed they had much more to gain from a judicial victory in the courts rather than a political 
compromise. The government was certainly concerned with the potential outcome of the case. In 
a briefing to Minister of Justice Gary Lane, the Department of Justice stressed Mercure's "legal 
significance and political sensitivity."
58
 More unsettling was the briefing's final thought: 
The government's legal position is that (except for the language of education 
rights in s. 23 of the Charter) French is on the same footing as any other language 
(except English) in Saskatchewan. In other words, French enjoys the same legal 
status as German or Ukrainian...it is by no means certain, however, that we will 
win this case. Like Quebec and Manitoba before us, it is possible that the Court 
will render a decision which is quite supportive of the legal status of French in our 
Legislature and courts. If this happens you will have to decide whether to appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Canada and what, if any, legislative action is appropriate. 
 
The situation in neighbouring Manitoba was just as troubling. Simmering regional tensions over 
language came to a head in that province in 1983-1984. Howard Pawley's provincial NDP 
government attempted to expand French-language services to the local population following 
negotiations with the Société franco-manitobaine.
59
 Progressive Conservative opposition to any 
extension of bilingualism beyond the bare legal minimum ignited a political firestorm that almost 
shut down the government. The Fransaskois looked on with dismay and saw the Manitoba 
language dispute as yet another example of history repeating itself: "à 1890, 1917, 1929, etc., il 
faut maintenant ajouter 1983-84."
60
 The Manitoba case demonstrated to the Fransaskois 
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community that negotiations and political niceties would not yield much in terms of results. The 
courts were the best answer, and perhaps the only one.
61
 
     The increasing trend towards using the courts for francophone activism was reflected in 
the ACFC public message to the Fransaskois. In January 1985 the organization published a 
number of advertisements in L'Eau Vive encouraging the Fransaskois to openly contest speeding 
tickets, parking tickets, red light tickets -- any traffic offenses wherein they could "Demande[r] 
que la justice soit rendue dans votre langue."
62
 Why? "Vous aiderez ainsi les Fransaskois à 
obtenir des services en français dans les cours et à aider le cas MERCURE."
63
 In order to help 
francophones willing to challenge English-only tickets the ACFC also drafted and published a 
"Trousse d'auto-défense en cour" which detailed the proper procedures for filing legal 
grievances, legal arguments which could be used in court, and points being raised by the 
Mercure case.
64
    
 By 1985 relations between Devine's government and the Fransaskois had broken down 
on virtually all questions related to French in the province. A request for funding for adult 
French-language courses at Collège Mathieu was met with a "NON catégorique."
65
 As for the 
status of French in the courts, the government invited the Fransaskois community to simply 
challenge its position regarding English-only trials for criminal cases. The community was more 
than happy to oblige but demanded that Saskatchewan pay its legal fees.
66
 It was an ostensibly 
political move by Devine. If the government lost, it could say that it did its best to defend its 
point of view and blame the courts for giving a decision favourable towards the francophones; if 
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the government won, its point of view would simply be confirmed. The courts were, in many 
ways, a win-win avenue for the provincial government in defending its vision on language. As 
Justice Minister Gary Lane told the Fransaskois, the government of Saskatchewan had no legal 
basis to provide any services in French.
67
  
 
One Province, Two Histories: Mercure on Appeal  
 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal handed down its decision on the status of French in 
Saskatchewan on October 28, 1985. It was another symbolic victory for Father Mercure. Justice 
Bayda fully upheld the lower court's 1981 ruling that section 110 was still in force in 
Saskatchewan because it had never been explicitly or implicitly repealed by the provincial 
government. The law, however, did not require the province to provide a French-language trial.
68
 
Saskatchewan was also under no obligation to proclaim and print its statutes in both English and 
French. Rather, Bayda explained, the legislative dispositions in s. 110 were statutory powers of 
the Legislature rather than duties imposed by the constitution.
69
 The intentions of Parliament in 
enacting s. 110 were to give a permissive bilingualism to the North-West Territories rather than a 
compulsory one.
70
 In other words, even if the legal and historical record showed the existence of 
official language provisions for both French and English, these measures were quite limited and 
under no circumstances did they impose a requirement on the province.  
 On January 27, 1986 the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal to Father 
Mercure, thereby agreeing to hear his challenge and rule on whether or not French enjoyed equal 
status with English in Saskatchewan. Less than a month later, on February 15, the ACFC board 
                                                 
67
 Pierre Brault, "Selon Gary Lane '...nous n'avons pas l'obligation légale de fournir des services en français," L'Eau 
Vive, le 16 octobre 1985, 2.  
68
 Regina v. Mercure, [1985] 15 W.C.B. 329.  
69
 Ibid., para. 29-30.  
70
 Ibid., para. 37.  
  
260 
 
voted unanimously to intervene directly in the case.
71
 Outside Saskatchewan, the case also 
continued to garner attention. In Alberta, the ACFA sought intervenor status following a legal 
study that recommended the organisation step up to defend Franco-Albertan interests.
72
 The 
ACFC was hesitant about its Albertan counterpart being involved and worried about losing full 
control over the direction of the case, but legal costs were high and it would be difficult for the 
Fransaskois to shoulder the financial burden on their own. As a result, the ACFC began tripartite 
discussions with the ACFA as well as the FFHQ to see how the three organizations could 
intervene together and split the costs evenly. In early March, the President of the FFHQ, Gilles 
Le Blanc, informed the ACFC and ACFA that it would also intervene in the case and would 
assume its share of legal costs.
73
 Over the following months, the three organizations maintained 
close contacts on legal strategy, public relations, and financing of the case.
74
   
 But these positive developments were overshadowed by a major problem: Father 
Mercure's health was failing. In 1984 he was diagnosed with cancer. On April 29, 1986 he 
passed away at 64 years of age, leaving the case in uncertainty. Was it over? Would the Supreme 
Court allow the challenge to continue if the ACFC and the Fransaskois were willing to carry on 
the case in his name? From both the Fransaskois' and the provincial government's point of view, 
the trial should continue. Both parties wanted to put an end to the debate once and for all.
75
 The 
Supreme Court heard arguments in mid-June as to whether the appeal should be heard given the 
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plaintiff's death, and agreed in August that the questions were important enough that the case be 
allowed to continue.
76
   
 Both Saskatchewan and Alberta took a hard line during their late November 1986 
presentation to the Supreme Court. The Saskatchewan attorney general argued that the history of 
western Canada showed that section 110 was no longer of any force in the province. As of 1670, 
English was the official language of the entire territory that would later become Saskatchewan.
77
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, massive immigration to the North-West Territories 
had reduced francophones to a tiny minority and led to the disappearance of the French language 
in Courts and the Legislature. The Saskatchewan Attorney General also argued that the 
Saskatchewan Act, which contained no explicit references to language rights, reflected this 
historical fact: 
Parliament included no language provisions in The Saskatchewan Act. The 
significance of that omission is obvious. It is submitted that Parliament would 
have made express provision if it had intended to carry forward, even without 
special status, so specific and significant a provision as section 110 and to apply it 
in the context of a new province...Denominational education and language rights 
were the constitutional pre-occupations of the era. The lack of any reference to 
language rights strongly suggests that the provisions of section 110 were not 
carried forward.
78
 
 
Regardless of the status of French before 1905, Saskatchewan explained, the weight of history at 
the turn of the twentieth century made its official use in the new provinces completely irrelevant. 
Immigration from Europe changed the face of Saskatchewan, eliminating the dual English-
French character of the province and region.
79
 
 
                                                 
76
 "Le cas Mercure: la Cour suprême dit 'oui'," L'Eau Vive, le 6 août 1986, 2.  
77
 Saskatchewan, "Factum of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan, Respondent." [[PAA] ], PR0015.0011, box 5, 
92.31. 
78
 Ibid.  
79
 Ibid.  
  
262 
 
 This argument was representative of the subtraction by multiculturalism perspective, 
which posited that the existence of many different ethnic groups in Saskatchewan made 
favouring or giving special rights to one particular minority group problematic, since all groups 
were founding members of the province. This argument was not a denial that the francophones 
formed part of Saskatchewan society, nor that bilingualism existed in the past. Rather, it held that 
the Fransaskois were not special among the many minority groups in the province.    
 The Attorney General of Alberta argued that the history of western Canada simply did 
not support Father Mercure's legal argument. Although section 110 provided for bilingualism in 
the North-West Territories after 1877, by 1890 this provision was not accepted by the territorial 
public:   
...the sentiment of the people of the Northwest Territories was, as evidenced by 
the petitions read before the House of Commons during the 1890 debates, firmly 
against the dual language provisions. Additional evidence of the unsuitability of 
French language guarantees for the Northwest Territories in 1905 can be found in 
the fact that the Parliament of Canada repealed section 110 in 1905 concurrently 
with the passage of the Saskatchewan Act.
80
  
 
It was an interesting angle for the Alberta government when Canada was attempting to find a 
place for Quebec and French Canadians within the nation. It was also an explicit rejection of the 
two founding nations ideal as it pertained to western Canada. Western Canada's early political 
history served as justification for its contemporary English-speaking character. Contemporary 
Alberta thus reflected the ideals expounded by its first political leaders in favour of one language 
and one people. The success and singular dominance of this vision, Alberta argued, could be 
seen in the fact that the French-language question had never been raised in over seventy-five 
years of provincial history in both Alberta and Saskatchewan. People accepted the founding 
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principle of unilingualism for provincial institutions. The early ideal of one language, one people 
suited the contemporary conditions reigning in the province.
81
 
 The factum presented by the ACFC, FFHQ, and ACFA gave an entirely different 
interpretation to the Court. During the Hudson's Bay Company's rule in the North-West, they 
argued, judges were bilingual and linguistic proficiency was a criteria in their selection. 
Institutional bilingualism, they explained, existed right up to the creation of Manitoba in 1870. 
This context, the francophones argued, was the spirit in which s. 110 should be interpreted and 
understood. It was not a statute invented out of context by someone in Ottawa. It had real 
applicability in the North-West Territories when it was adopted, and it responded to a local 
reality.
82
   
 Secondly, the francophones implored the Court to take a second look at the status of the 
French language at the time of Saskatchewan's entry into Confederation. Parliament, the 
francophones argued, wished to maintain existing law in the Territories: 
Il est donc clair qu'au moment où la Saskatchewan fut crée, les parlementaires 
connaissent la portée de l'article 110 et voulaient en étendre l'application aux 
nouvelles provinces de la Saskatchewan et de l'Alberta, tant pour ce qui est des 
nouveau tribunaux que de la publication des lois. Ils ne voyaient rien 
d'incompatible entre l'article 110 de la Loi sur la Saskatchewan.
83
  
 
Contrary to what Saskatchewan and Alberta believed, Parliament knew that it was carrying 
language rights over into the new provinces. Furthermore, because section 110 was in force 
when the Saskatchewan Act was adopted in 1905 and the latter act was annexed into the new 
Constitution Act in 1982, s. 110 should be treated as a constitutional disposition, not a statute 
which could be amended. Because s. 110 outlined the fundamental institutions of the province it 
should not, and could not, be modified by the Legislature. Finally, because the substance of the 
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rights outlined in the section were the same as those in Manitoba, all of Saskatchewan's English-
only laws should be declared invalid by the Court.
84
 
 
Victory? The Mercure Decision and its Discontents 
 On 25 February 1988 the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision. Rather 
than give a resounding victory to either the Saskatchewan government or Father Mercure, the 
Court was equivocal. The Court recognized that French was still, legally speaking, an official 
language in the province. Owing to section 16 in the Saskatchewan Act, 1905, section 110 of the 
North-West Territories Act remained in operation in Saskatchewan because the statute had never 
been repealed. Both Saskatchewan and Alberta had attempted to argue that because of the 
region's history, and because French had fallen into disuse as an official language, section 110 
was no longer valid. Justice La Forest rejected this legal reasoning:  
At all events, it does not strike me as a particularly attractive argument to put 
before a court of justice that a majority can destroy the rights of a minority by 
simply acting in violation of those rights. Thus, at least as it relates to the 
language of statutes and proceedings in the courts, s. 110 remained fully in effect 
at the establishment of the province of Saskatchewan.
85
 
 
In other words, the fact that western Canada's history followed a trajectory towards the disuse of 
French as an official language did not mean that French ceased to be an official language in 
Saskatchewan or Alberta. The assumption of unilingualism could not be the basis for its legal 
justification.  
 For the Fransaskois and the Franco-Albertans, it was a stunning victory. The ACFA 
called the Mercure decision "a victory for Francophone Albertans after 83 years of injustice."
86
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The ACFC also viewed the decision as nothing less than a major coup in affirming the 
francophone historical presence in western Canada: 
As they welcome this victory, the Fransaskois acknowledge the historic role 
played by Louis Riel and the Métis in the shaping and formulating of their rights 
in the Canadian West. February 25, 1988 will go down in history as a memorable 
day for the Fransaskois and for all of Saskatchewan. The highest court in the land 
has confirmed that French has always been and remains an official language in 
our province. Even though it has been ignored in the 83 years of Saskatchewan's 
history, our province is officially bilingual.
87
 
 
Proponents of official bilingualism in federal politics also saw the decision as "confirming the 
vested rights of French-speaking Canadians living in Saskatchewan, rights they have had since 
1905."
88
 Indeed, the western Canadian francophone interpretation of history had finally been 
recognized in the country's highest court. French was still an official language in both provinces.  
 The Supreme Court, however, placed a significant caveat on this conclusion: the 
provincial legislatures of Saskatchewan and Alberta had the option to repeal the statute if they 
wished. The court explained that in 1905 Parliament left the question up to the provinces. 
Because section 110 was a statute and not a constitutional disposition, it could be repealed.
89
 
Thus the Mercure decision was also very much a government victory. Saskatchewan and Alberta 
could decide for themselves how to deal with the French-language question since, as the court 
ruled, official languages in both provinces fell exclusively within provincial jurisdiction. This 
reasoning fit well with contemporary ideas on official bilingualism in 1988. Quebec wanted the 
authority to decide its own provincial language regime; Saskatchewan and Alberta, feeling the 
heat from anti-bilingualism political parties such as the Western Canada Concept Party, were 
pleased to know that they could not be blamed for Ottawa imposing bilingualism on them. 
French-language rights would be decided by the provincial majority rather than by the federal 
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government. In this regard Mercure was a government victory, since it allowed the provinces to 
decide for themselves how to proceed.     
 The Saskatchewan government's reaction to the decision was ready for some time. 
Ironically, the same day that Mercure was handed down, the Interdepartmental Committee on 
French-Language Services delivered briefing notes to Devine on how Saskatchewan should offer 
a limited bilingualism. A few months earlier in a speech to the ACFC, Devine had promised to 
revive the committee and expand French within the provincial government.
90
 The February 25 
brief outlined three options on provincial bilingualism:  
a) do-nothing approach - identify and support existing services; probably not 
acceptable in light of federal-provincial cooperation and francophone minority 
pressure, and expectations raised by your speech. 
 
b) general bilingualism approach - preferred by ACFC - not practical in 
Saskatchewan for financial, cultural, and political reasons. 
 
c) moderate in-between position (recommended) - improve French-language 
services where possible and where most needed; more than legally required 
minimum, not as much as ACFC wants.
91
 
 
The third option became the official policy of the government following Mercure. True to the 
ideal of "bilingualism for everyone" established under Blakeney's government, it would provide 
services to "target groups" who were not only francophones, but also French-speaking 
anglophones (including French immersion teachers) and civil servants working in 
intergovernmental relations.
92
 If Saskatchewan was going to have to make its way towards 
official bilingualism, it could at least argue that it was taking a universal approach to service 
delivery rather than giving special rights or favours to the Fransaskois.  
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 Alberta's approach to dealing with Mercure resembled the Saskatchewan "in-between" 
ideal. On 2 March 1988 the Attorney General's office laid out three options for responding to the 
decision: 
1. Comply with s. 110. This would mean all current and future legislation 
(including regulations) would have to be enacted, printed, and published in both 
languages.  
 
2. Repeal s. 110 and declare all provincial statutes valid notwithstanding that they 
were enacted in English only. This repeal and declaration must be contained in 
bilingual legislation in order to be valid.  
 
3. Repeal s. 110 and replace it with legislation setting out French language rights 
which would exist in relation to the Legislature and the Courts. (Comment: 
Regardless of Alberta's actions, pending federal legislation will require that 
individuals accused of Criminal Code offenses after January 1, 1990 have the 
right to the use of French in proceedings in the criminal courts in Alberta.)
93
 
   
More important, however, was the brief's recommendation that Alberta coordinate its response to 
Mercure with Saskatchewan since it "May be helpful if both provinces were reasonably 
consistent in their approaches."
94
 With great potential for national fallout, it would be better for 
both provinces to show a common front on the language question. Saskatchewan and Alberta 
continued to consult one another in the several months following Mercure. After Saskatchewan 
adopted Bill 2, for example, Devine's Associate Deputy Minister Norman Riddell notified 
Alberta Attorney General Deputy Minister A.G. McDonald that "Saskatchewan legislation 
allows for more French after the bill than before, that practical things have been done in 
Saskatchewan, [and] that Premier Bourassa is supportive of the Saskatchewan legislation 
because the legislation improves the situation."
95
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 The ACFC strategy towards the Mercure decision had been formulated since the early 
weeks of 1987. The ACFC knew that a favourable ruling would underline the historical 
statement the Fransaskois were making and constitute a "confirmation de ce que nous avons 
toujours cru." The most important aspect of victory would be "le principe du bilinguisme, de la 
dualité canadienne."
96
 In the event of success before the Supreme Court, the ACFC saw its 
primary goal as consolidating Fransaskois community support for negotiations on how 
bilingualism would be carried out; it should also "use the visibility and respectability of legal 
decisions" to reinforce the organization's political legitimacy within the province.
97
 Moreover, 
"un jugement favorable, même s'il n'entraine pas la livraison de services, pourrait donner une 
meilleure credibilité à notre cause, raviver l'espoir chez les Francophones, donner lieu à une 
démonstration de solidarité."
98
 Given this perspective, the ACFC's principal strategy was 
reaching out to the various Fransaskois communities across the province in order to ensure that 
they knew about the case and to build consensus surrounding its outcome. Secondly, a media 
strategy would work to minimize backlash amongst the anglophone population and ensure that 
people knew about the Fransaskois. As it had since 1981, the ACFC would assume leadership on 
behalf of the Fransaskois in lobbying and applying political pressure on the provincial and 
federal governments.
99
  
 The rapidity of events following the Mercure decision meant that the ACFC, ACFA, and 
FFHQ would have to move quickly as well. They opted to directly call on the government to act 
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and make Saskatchewan officially bilingual.
100
 In a letter to Grant Devine, ACFC President 
Rupert Baudais explained that Mercure simply confirmed what the Fransaskois knew all along: 
that bilingualism had historical roots in western Canada. As such, Baudais wrote, Saskatchewan 
should confirm official bilingualism by appropriate legislation, especially given that the federal 
government was trying to have the provinces ratify the Meech Lake Accord.
101
 Baudais also 
understood the major legal and national implications of the decision and sensed the danger for 
his community: 
The Supreme Court ruling confirms that from the very beginning of settlement in 
this area of the country, french speaking citizens had access, in their own 
language, to the major public institutions existing at the time. It is possible, from a 
strictly legalistic point of view, for the province to modify these rights 
unilaterally. However, to do so, would be tantamount to the province turning its 
back on the bilingual nature of Canada and to ignore the evolution of the nation. 
Such a step would deny the Fransaskois access, at a fundamental level, to their 
provincial government. It would also block the future development of a proper 
relationship between the provincial government and citizens of both official 
languages. Diminishing the rights recognized by the Supreme Court, would also 
land very little credibility to the Saskatchewan's signature to the Meech Lake 
Accord. The Accord contains a commitment to preserve and protect official 
minorities in every province.
102
 
 
A week later, still trying to ensure that the Fransaskois perspective was heard, the ACFC 
submitted a draft bill in both French and English to the provincial government.
103
 The bill's 
preamble called for the government to recognise "the cultural heritage of Francophones in 
Saskatchewan" and official bilingualism in the legislature and the courts. It also called for the 
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creation of an "Office responsible for Francophone affairs."
104
 In order to avoid the acrimony 
over statute translation which caused a political crisis in Manitoba only a few years earlier in 
1983-1984, the draft bill included an escape clause: 
All Acts adopted prior to 1988, are confirmed and continue to have force and the 
same effects as though they had been originally adopted in English and in 
French.
105
  
 
The draft bill also gave the province a five-year limit to translate all of the province's laws still in 
force rather than provide for a blanket legislative bilingualism.
106
 It was a compromise. The 
Fransaskois were not demanding that all of the province's laws be translated immediately, but 
that official bilingualism begin as of 1993. Translating statutes was less important than offering 
French-language services. The ACFC hoped that any funds saved from not having to translate 
every law could be put towards the establishment of provincial government services aimed 
specifically at the francophone population.
107
   
 Not knowing precisely how the government planned on tackling the language question 
and the Mercure decision, the ACFC requested a meeting with Devine to discuss the ACFC draft 
bill. Devine agreed. But the meeting between Minister of Justice and Attorney General Bob 
Andrew and the ACFC executive was a failure. To the dismay of the Fransaskois, Andrew gave 
the impression, according to Baudais, that the "government intends to effectively abolish all 
French language rights with respect to legislation, subject to reintroduction of a few bills in both 
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languages...Your present intentions, as outlined by us, are squarely inconsistent with the equal 
status of French and English recognized by the Supreme Court ruling."
108
 
 
Walking Into Bilingualism? The Debate Over French and Bill 2 
 The government's intentions became clearer on 4 April 1988 when Bob Andrew 
introduced Bill 2, An Act respecting the Use of the English and French Languages in 
Saskatchewan in the Legislature. It was full of ironies and contradictions. It needed to be enacted 
in both English and French in order to be valid, even though it was repealing the bilingual 
requirement laid out in the 1877 statute. It also made no declaration on the province's official 
language. Laws could be enacted in English only, or in both English and French, but never in 
French only.
109
 In laws that were designated as bilingual, the French and English versions had 
equal authority. Power to designate any law bilingual was vested in the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council rather than the Legislature. Bill 2 also provided for the use of English or French before 
the provincial courts and in debates of the Assembly, but declared that rules and procedures of 
the Assembly, in addition to Hansard, could be published in English only or in both English and 
French. Finally, and most importantly, it repealed s. 110 of the North-West Territories Act.
110
 
 The key goal of the proposed legislation was evident in section 3, which declared that all 
of Saskatchewan's pre-1988 laws were valid even though they were enacted and printed in 
English only. This move not only removed any doubt as to the validity of the province's laws, but 
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also avoided the type of crisis that plagued Manitoba from 1979 to 1984.
111
 Shoring up the 
English-only character of Saskatchewan's government and laws was crucial.  
 Bill 2 made few concessions to official bilingualism, which was no small feat given the 
political climate surrounding the Meech Lake Accord. Bill 2 made no effort to overturn the 
cumulative effects of decades of non-compliance with official bilingualism in government 
institutions. It affirmed the dominance of English and allowed the status quo to continue. It 
repealed the federal statute which made bilingualism compulsory in the province. All of these 
factors made it popular with English Canadians fed up with hearing about national unity, 
bilingualism, and the demands of French Canada. In Saskatchewan, Devine could show the 
majority of the population that he was getting tough with the French Canadians and ensure that 
he did not lose votes.  
 On the other hand, the limited provisions providing for official bilingualism allowed the 
provincial government to portray the law as a positive step towards provincial bilingualism. With 
Bill 2 came a full-on public relations campaign which cast it as balancing national unity, 
Canada's bilingual character, and the different political culture of western Canada. It was a 
"middle ground" that Devine's government sought. In a press release dated 4 April 1988, the 
Saskatchewan government justified the act as a "balanced and pragmatic response to the Mercure 
decision" which dealt with French-language rights "in a manner that is both fair and 
responsible."
112
  
 Bill 2 set off a furor in provincial and national politics and divided province and country 
yet again over language. Letters of support poured in from across Canada to Premier Devine's 
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office, many of them congratulating him for "standing up to Ottawa" and "doing the right thing 
for English-speaking Canada."
113
 The note from Jack Scowen, a Saskatchewan Progressive 
Conservative Member of Parliament, was representative of this support: 
Congratulations and best wishes on the stand your government took on Bill 2. 
Your position reflects the thinking not only of the people in the province of 
Saskatchewan, but across this country. I am hopeful that other provinces will 
follow Saskatchewan's lead. My support for you is there and please do not hesitate 
to contact me should I be able to assist you in any way. Your Bill is in full accord 
with the federal Bill C-72, referring to significant demand.
114
 
 
In Saskatchewan, Devine was viewed as drawing a line on an important issue. Outside of the 
province he was the champion of English Canada, of the principle of majority rule and 
democracy.
115
 Devine's stance on bill 2 quickly gained him the image of a politician with 
courage, with the guts to stand up to the nonsense of official bilingualism.    
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Brian Gable, "Evolution of Minority Language Rights." Globe and Mail, 6 April 1988. The Globe criticized 
Devine's position on language rights in Saskatchewan and published several caricatures on the topic throughout the 
week. 
 
 Bill 2, however, was also a political thorn in Devine's side. It was difficult for people not 
to see the law for what it really was: a restriction of official bilingualism in the province. The 
President of La Société Franco-Manitobaine, Lucille Blanchette, denounced the law as similar to 
what the Manitoba government did to its francophone population in 1890.
116
 The FFHQ called it 
"une insulte aux Fransaskois et aux francophones de l'extérieur du Quebec puisqu'il ne respecte 
pas le minimum de l'engagement constitutionnel et moral pris par le gouvernement de la 
Saskatchewan dans l'Accord du Lac Meech."
117
 The Fransaskois community panned the bill. In a 
communiqué released the same day it was tabled, the ACFC noted that the Fransaskois were 
"truly humiliated" and called the legislation a denial of rights: 
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Le gouvernement conservateur de la Saskatchewan abolit le français dans cette 
province, un droit vieux de 102 ans. L'Honorable Grant Devine, un des principaux 
architectes de l'Accord du Lac Meech et chef du premier gouvernement 
anglophone à le ratifier, vient aujourd'hui d'en trahir les principes mêmes.
118
 
 
Rupert Baudais was furious: "Ce projet de loi est une insulte, flagrante, non seulement aux 
Fransaskois, mais à tous les francophones du pays, parce qu'on nous traite comme si on n'existait 
pas."
119
 Devine simply replied that "I think that the Francophone community might want more, 
faster."
120
 Bob Andrew took the lower road, publicly calling Baudais' criticisms "dishonest," 
"foolish," and "driven by the fact that he's a Liberal."
121
  
 The Saskatchewan government's legislation also annoyed the federal government. 
Official Languages Commissioner D'Iberville Fortier argued that its adoption would be "un triste 
jour dans l'histoire du Canada parce qu'après tant d'années d'attente, ce projet n'assure toujours 
pas la pleine égalité de statut du français et de l'anglais en ce qui a trait au processus 
législatif."
122
 Mulroney wrote to Devine to remind him that  
...the issues raised in the Supreme Court decision go well beyond the borders of 
Saskatchewan. They have implications for all provinces. Indeed, they go to the 
essence of the Canadian federation...The Language Bill which your government 
has recently tabled may, of course, be viewed from two different perspectives. It 
may be seen as a first step towards the implementation of long-neglected rights 
and guarantees...Taking the other perspective, however, the proposed 
Saskatchewan Language Bill diminishes existing legal rights...in the absence of 
guarantees that all laws and regulations of public importance will be adopted in 
both languages, your government's response is perceived by many Canadians as 
constituting a reduction of existing rights...we were disappointed and would have 
preferred if your government had done more, more quickly.
123
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 In Saskatchewan the Opposition parties lambasted Devine and his government's handling 
of the Mercure decision. NDP Leader Roy Romanow argued that Bill 2 had national implications 
and could be a violation of the Meech Lake Accord. He also slammed the government's lack of 
consultation with the francophone community and the federal government.
124
 Devine replied that 
Bill 2 actually gave francophones in Saskatchewan more rights than they enjoyed previously and 
that the government's position was reasonable and moderate: 
...the legislation does precisely what we wanted it to do as a result of the Meech 
Lake accord. With the Mercure decision you had three alternatives. You could say 
no to everything; or you could say yes, it's all going to be bilingual all at the same 
time all today, and rewrite the past; or you can do something in the middle that 
will give us time to get it done...Now you can't have it all French, all at once, right 
now, because it's virtually and physically impossible. We cannot do that...This is a 
bilingual country. We accept that. But in Saskatchewan we have to walk into 
that.
125
         
 
Saskatchewan was going to move towards official bilingualism at its own pace and on its own 
terms. For Devine, it was important to be as clear as possible on this question, to use it as an 
opportunity to show the limits of federal power. While Canada was explicitly recognized by 
Devine as a bilingual country, this definition of the country was not entirely applicable to the 
West. Saskatchewan had to find its own solution which fit with how the region identified itself 
and its history. It was possible that bilingualism could work in the West, but it would have to be 
defined and laid out by westerners, not by Ottawa. It certainly could not be imposed by an old 
1877 federal statute leftover from the territorial days. That method of achieving bilingualism, 
which was the centrepiece of Fransaskois historical memory and political activism, was precisely 
the sort of thing that enraged western Canadians.  
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 Devine's comments during the Bill 2 debate were representative of the unilingual 
interpretation of Saskatchewan history. Devine presented official bilingualism as a historical 
aberration, as a policy out of sync with the character and history of the province. To be fully 
bilingual, to make French an official language in provincial institutions, would be tantamount to 
rewriting history. It would mean denying the history of the West as many western Canadians 
understood it. The history of western Canada was not one of bilingualism, but of pluralism and 
an agreed-upon assimilation to the English language.
126
 The francophones, a small minority 
group, were not an exception to this rule. They could not simply "re-write history" according to 
their own interpretation of the region and country. In the same vein, Devine noted that 
Saskatchewan would have to proceed slowly with bilingualism given the province's political, 
cultural, and historical character. The small francophone minority population simply did not 
justify a quick move towards bilingualism, if any move at all in that direction.
127
 
 Alberta took a similar approach to dealing with Mercure, following the lead of 
Saskatchewan as it had throughout the process following the Supreme Court decision in 
February. Three days after Bill 2 was tabled in the Saskatchewan legislature, Alberta Attorney 
General Jim Horsman announced that the province would cooperate with the federal government 
on bilingualism but "laws affecting Alberta will be made by Alberta legislators."
128
 Horsman 
also admitted that Saskatchewan and Alberta had discussed how to approach the legislation and 
that Saskatchewan had offered its advice to Alberta on the best strategy for moving forward.
129
 
In the coming months before Alberta adopted its own language legislation, Saskatchewan would 
continue to advise the Albertan cabinet as to what actions to take and media strategies to 
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endorse. Copies of Saskatchewan's legislation were even sent to presidents of local Albertan 
Progressive Conservative associations.
130
   
 Parliament debated taking action on Saskatchewan's legislation. The federal debate, 
however, took on a much different tone than the one occurring in Saskatchewan. In Parliament 
controversy over Bill 2 had little to do with constitutional history of western Canada and 
Saskatchewan; rather, it focused on its implications for national unity and the future of the 
Meech Lake Accord. Former Prime Minister John Turner, now Leader of the Opposition, called 
Bill 2 "a step backwards in terms of national unity."
131
 The real leader of opposition to bill 2 in 
Parliament, however, was Jean-Robert Gauthier. Member for Ottawa East, Gauthier was an 
experienced MP who had held office during the Trudeau years. He was the Liberal point man on 
official language issues. Gauthier characterised the Saskatchewan legislation as technically legal, 
but morally questionable. He also did not buy Devine's justification of the proposed legislation:  
This action is legal, there is no doubt about that...But is it fair? We'll see...we 
should not overlook the fact that the Saskatchewan Legislature adopted a 
resolution stemming from the Meech Lake Accord...introducing Bill 2 to repeal 
Section 110 Saskatchewan reduces the basic rights. This is clearly a step 
backward and no step forward in that matter. This is clearly a setback for 
fundamental rights, the rights of access to the legislature and the courts in that 
province, in French and English. The irony here, Madam Speaker, is the 
wonderful rhetoric of the province saying that this Bill might not be the solution 
to this problem but it is a step in the right direction.
132
 
 
Rather than criticize Saskatchewan, the Mulroney government defended Devine. Mulroney was 
certainly in a difficult position as his main electoral support bases -- western Canada and Quebec 
-- were both sensitive to language and national unity issues. In the case of Bill 2 it was easier for 
Mulroney to allow Devine to repeal bilingualism rather than denounce him. Repealing 
bilingualism was a popular move in western Canada. Even Quebec did not oppose it since that 
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province was also trying to assert more power over official languages within its provincial 
borders. Moreover, Devine was one of Mulroney's strongest supporters on a number of thorny 
regional-national questions since 1984.
133
  
 Mulroney's response to Bill 2 also fit with the government's overall view that provinces 
held exclusive jurisdiction over language use in provincial institutions. When Gauthier asked 
what the federal government was going to do about official bilingualism in Saskatchewan, 
Minister of Justice Ray Hnatyshyn argued that it was a question of provincial jurisdiction.
134
 
Hnatyshyn even gave credit to Devine for making "a very important statement with respect to the 
position he sees for Saskatchewan" and for "moving toward Saskatchewan becoming a part of a 
bilingual Canada."
135
 Mulroney himself took up the Saskatchewan discourse: "Premier Devine 
has set out his wish that Saskatchewan become bilingual. I think it is an important step forward 
for Canada that a Premier of a western province make that statement."
136
 
 As Parliament debated the national implications of Bill 2, Quebec Premier Robert 
Bourassa began a scheduled three-province tour of western Canada. Like Mulroney, Bourassa 
was also a strong proponent of the provincial approach to language rights defended by Devine 
and Alberta Premier Don Getty. Before his meetings with Getty and Devine, Bourassa noted 
publicly that he had no intention in interfering with Saskatchewan or Alberta over their 
impending language legislation: "I don't think I would be justified in interfering in the powers of 
other provincial jurisdictions, just as I hope that, in Quebec, we can take care of our problems on 
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our own."
137
 Expanding on this idea in a more boisterous manner, Getty affirmed that "We don't 
want Mr. Bourassa telling us how to deal with the French language issue in Alberta and we don't 
try and tell him how to deal with it in Quebec."
138
  
 Saskatchewan also remained confident that Bourassa would not pose too great a problem. 
Devine's team advised him to hold his ground by telling Bourassa that "Saskatchewan has acted 
fairly and reasonably in responding to Mercure...Bill 2 represents, in practical terms, genuine 
progress for francophones in Saskatchewan."
139
 In any case, the brief continued, Bourassa could 
say or do little regarding the Saskatchewan approach since ."..he will then leave himself 
vulnerable to criticisms regarding Quebec's treatment of its Anglophone minority."
140
 As it 
turned out, the Saskatchewan government had little to worry about, as a few days earlier 
Bourassa had already called the Act "slight progress" for the province's francophones.
141
 
 Meanwhile, Mulroney continued to flip-flop on the Bill. He met with Rupert Baudais and 
Fransaskois representatives in Saskatoon but made no promises. Baudais, now desperate to stop 
Devine's government from enacting the legislation, wrote to Mulroney denouncing Devine's 
position on French-language rights in the province: 
L'attitude du gouvernement de la Saskatchewan dans cette affaire a de quoi 
inquiéter tous les Canadiens soucieux du respect des droits des minorités. D'une 
part, vos propres démarches de même que la grande flexibilité que nous avons 
démontrée dans notre position se sont heurtées à un refus catégorique de modifier 
un tant soit peu ce projet de loi qui abolit les droits qui existent depuis 102 ans. 
D'autre part, le Premier ministre de la Saskatchewan clame sa volonté de 
consacrer des dizaines, voir même des centaines de millions de dollars, à la 
promotion du bilinguisme.
142
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Mulroney's answer would not come until several months later, well after Bill 2 passed into law.  
 
English Confirmed: Adopting Bill 2  
 In Parliament, the Opposition continued to assail Prime Minister Mulroney and demand 
that he take a firm position denouncing Devine's plan. Mulroney refused on the grounds that 
members of the federal cabinet were busy negotiating how to increase access to French services 
and bilingualism in Saskatchewan with the provincial government. Jean-Robert Gauthier replied 
that "the Fransaskois who were here today told us they were not involved in current talks 
between the federal government and Saskatchewan. They felt left out of negotiations that, after 
all, concern their fundamental rights and their future."
143
 The government made no promises 
however, replying simply that "We think it is important that we have the Association's point of 
view as we discuss the matter with the Province of Saskatchewan."
144
  
 With the nation's eyes on Saskatchewan, Bob Andrew moved second reading of Bill 2 on 
21 April 1988. His speech attempted to justify why the province would adopt the legislation 
without amendments. His remarks were more an attempt to justify the province's unilingual 
political culture rather than a genuine attempt to create a "bilingual" Saskatchewan. Andrew 
began by arguing that during Parliamentary debate over the Saskatchewan and Alberta autonomy 
bills in 1905, Canada decided not to adopt a clause similar to section 23 of the Manitoba Act.
145
 
The fact that even Sir Wilfrid Laurier did not justify the use of French in the provinces, Andrew 
argued, demonstrated that French was not a constitutional right in Saskatchewan. He noted, "I 
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believe [it] to be a very significant and important historical fact."
146
 For Andrew, the symbolism 
of western Canadian history mattered: Saskatchewan was not meant to be bilingual and never 
was. Bilingualism did not fit the character of the province or region, and even if it did, the 
provinces were given the final word on whether or not they would embrace it. It was a fitting 
historical interpretation and legislative justification for unilingualism in a region suspicious of 
Ottawa and convinced of its historical mistreatment by central Canada.  
 In Andrew's view, the history of Saskatchewan also justified the new legislation because 
French was never very present in the province in the first place. French fell so far into disuse in 
Saskatchewan and was so insignificant in the province, Andrew noted, that the Legislature had 
not even bothered to debate it up until the Mercure decision in 1988. There was little question as 
to what the province's real official language was during Saskatchewan's earliest years: "Mr. 
Speaker, there is and can be no doubt that it was assumed by all concerned, or virtually all 
concerned, that English was the functioning language."
147
 Even if the Territories were bilingual 
before 1905, fundamental changes brought by immigration at the turn of the twentieth century 
justified the denial of exclusive rights to francophones. Bilingualism did not work for 
Saskatchewan because  
...different provinces provide different bilingual dimensions to their respective 
provinces. The services the bilingual dimension has provided in Quebec is 
different to what is provided in British Columbia. What is provided in New 
Brunswick is different to what is provided in Nova Scotia. What is provided in 
Manitoba is different to what is provided in Alberta. And, Mr. Speaker, there's 
reason for that, and we must recognize that as a reality of this country. There are 
both constitutional reasons, and there are population reasons, and there are 
historical reasons as to why that is a fact.
148
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Interpreted this way, official bilingualism had its limits and the language rights given to the 
Fransaskois in Bill 2 were limited by the history of the region. Interestingly, the multiculturalism 
and immigration argument were used to justify the status quo of English as reigning official 
language. Diversity required management on a policy level. On a philosophical level, it also 
implied that no single minority ethnic group could be elevated above another. The prairie 
compact -- the very idea of living in isolation on the frontier, in difficult social, economic, and 
climactic conditions -- required assimilation to one language in order for society to function.
149
 
Andrew argued that even the Fransaskois had never bothered to raise the language question in 
the legislature: 
...look at the last 83 years of history in this province where many people of 
francophone ancestry represented seats in this Assembly and held positions of 
authority in this legislature during times when the language issue was far more 
heated than it is today. Not once was that matter raised. Not once was the idea 
debated in this Assembly. And that, Mr. Speaker, tells me something about the 
custom and the tradition and the history of this Assembly.
150
 
 
It was a bold statement even for Andrew, who had already publicly attacked the chief political 
representative of francophones in the province. It was also untrue. On a number of occasions in 
the early political history of Saskatchewan, the place of the French language in Saskatchewan 
society had been debated in the legislature.
151
 At this level of analysis, however, it is less 
important to insist on the historical accuracy of Andrew's comments than on the implication of 
his argument. English, Andrew asserted, was the unquestioned official language of the province 
by the "custom and the tradition and the history of the Assembly."
152
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 Not everyone accepted this interpretation of Saskatchewan's history. The predominance 
of English, the myth of unilingualism, also had to compete with other myths in Saskatchewan 
political culture. The province's official opposition, for example, did not object to the legislation 
or Andrew's speech on the grounds that they were anti-French or anti-bilingualism, but rather 
that they were anti-diversity. NDP member Ned Shillington characterized Andrew's speech as  
occasionally bordering on an accurate interpretation, but not often. Out of his 
lengthy discussion of the Saskatchewan history, he drew the conclusion that 
English had become the language of this province; that is, Saskatchewan's 
language, and he drew the conclusion that this province is a unilingual English 
province. And that's the conclusion he drew from his view of Saskatchewan's 
history. Mr. Speaker, that is not, I think, an accurate rendition of Saskatchewan's 
history, and that is not Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan, Mr. Minister, Mr. Speaker, 
as is the case with much of Canada, is a multicultural province. We have people 
from all lands, each of whom have made their contributions...
153
   
 
In Shillington's view, the error of Bill 2 was to ignore multiculturalism and the importance that 
the francophone community placed on language. Shillington objected less to repealing French-
language rights than to not making positive steps towards minority language rights for all ethnic 
groups. Official bilingualism in Saskatchewan, Shillington believed, was a step in the right 
direction for all minorities in the province. The francophones were like any other non-English 
ethnic group in Saskatchewan trying to preserve their culture. What Shillington found stunning 
with Bill 2 was the government's lack of consultation with the francophones and other minority 
communities seeking to preserve their cultures.
154
 In other words, the problem with Bill 2 was 
not that it repealed French-language rights in Saskatchewan, but rather that it failed to recognize 
and support multiculturalism in the province: 
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...the minister spoke about a bilingual Canada and a unilingual Saskatchewan. He 
spoke of Saskatchewan's history as though the only culture, the only language, the 
only reality, had always been English, and English alone. But I submit to you, the 
minister's view is at variance with the multicultural heritage and the multicultural 
history of Saskatchewan. His view is at variance with the multicultural nature of 
Saskatchewan today, for that view fails to acknowledge the hundreds of thousands 
of men and women of wide and varying ethnic backgrounds who came from the 
four corners of the globe to settle Saskatchewan, and who have contributed so 
much to this province.
155
 
 
The Fransaskois community was not particularly fond of this argument because it conflicted with 
its historical interpretation of the region and reduced them to simply another "ethnic group". 
Shillington meant well but the Fransaskois certainly did not believe that the road to full, official 
bilingualism was through multiculturalism. If multiculturalism justified English as the province's 
sole official language, as Andrew implied during the part of his speech on immigration, than 
there was some doubt as to whether multiculturalism could also justify bilingualism as 
Shillington was trying to argue.  
 Saskatchewan Liberal leader Ralph Goodale's criticism of the Bill emphasized its 
national implications rather than its direct impact on the Fransaskois community. This argument 
was more to the liking of the francophones as they also used the national unity angle in order to 
further their opposition to the bill. In a memorandum sent to all Saskatchewan MLAs, for 
example, the ACFC reminded members of the national controversy that Devine's government 
was stirring up: 
We, the Fransaskois, wish to bring to your attention the reaction of many 
Saskatchewan and Canadian citizens, politicians and press members, which 
clearly indicates their opinion that Bill 2 (which you are presently addressing in 
the legislature) does not respect the spirit of the Meech Lake Accord nor the hopes 
or expectations of the Canadian population as a whole...It must be amended so as 
to better respect the rights of the Fransaskois as stated in article 110 of the North 
West Territories Act as well as to foresee an administrative structure which 
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reflects the official bilingualism of Canada and which would guarantee minimum 
services and reasonable time limits.
156
 
 
Goodale took a similar approach and panned the government for failing to live up to its 
commitments under the Meech Lake Accord. Like Shillington, Goodale also believed that the 
proposed legislation failed to "pay attention to our multicultural heritage, to the deep roots in our 
province of a wide variety of ethnic and cultural groupings."
157
 Goodale argued in favour of the 
"bilingualism within a multicultural framework" narrative, explaining that "it should still be 
possible to respect minority language rights in Saskatchewan" in addition to "the realities of what 
makes up Saskatchewan's population mixture."
158
 But could the two be reconciled?  
 The government's reply to its critics was that education was the best pathway towards 
official bilingualism. Translating statutes into French was not useful to the francophone 
minority, nor was it financially or politically feasible. Canora MLA Lorne Kopelchuk argued 
that the growth of French immersion and some services in French showed respect for official 
bilingualism, the law, and the Meech Lake Accord.
159
 Again, however, it was a certain idea of 
the history of Saskatchewan that drove the debate. Bill 2, Kopelchuck explained, was about more 
than respecting the francophones' wishes. It was also about recognizing all minorities and 
ensuring that the reality of Saskatchewan history and politics was not forgotten. Canada was a 
bilingual country but that idea was problematic in Saskatchewan. If Canada was bilingual, it was 
also multicultural, and Saskatchewan was living proof of this reality:  
As a Ukrainian Canadian I recognize, accept, and endorse the fact that Canada is a 
bilingual nation. I am also grateful that the constitution of our country recognizes 
that we are also a multicultural nation. Due respect is to be paid the Ukrainians, 
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the Germans, the Italians, indeed all of our ethnic minorities...every person in this 
Assembly must recognize that while this nation is bilingual, in practice very few 
of our people speak French...But let it be done as it has been done with the French 
language education; let it be done without compulsion, without loud vitriol; let it 
be done in a measured, managed way, and we will achieve greater successes.
160
 
  
Kopelchuk's remarks demonstrated how multiculturalism could be applied to support a variety of 
perspectives in favour of or against one sole official language. Shillington used multiculturalism 
to undermine the government's assumption of the supremacy of English, while Goodale used it in 
order to criticize the government's lack of openness to official languages and minority language 
rights. Both Bob Andrew and Lorne Kopelchuck appealed to multiculturalism to remind the 
Opposition that in their view, the francophones were getting more than they deserved as one of 
Saskatchewan's many ethnic groups.  
 Bill 2 passed without amendments and received royal assent the following day on April 
26.
161
 It was the end of section 110 in Saskatchewan, of the old North-West's hold on the 
political character of the new Saskatchewan. But like the Mercure case, Bill 2 was about much 
more than establishing language policy or deciding what laws would be translated. It was about 
questions that struck at the very heart of Saskatchewan's political community. What is the history 
of Saskatchewan? How should that history be recognized? What is Saskatchewan? It is English? 
Is it bilingual? Is it multicultural? Who ought to decide? Bill 2 demonstrated that the 
francophone interpretation of western Canadian history was simply unacceptable to political 
leaders in the region, in addition to many members of the general public. As the Prairie 
Messenger noted in a scathing editorial, 
The difficulty lies not with political parties but with the narrowmindedness of 
Saskatchewan people. We refuse to see the value of official bilingualism. We 
refuse to see it in terms other than dollars and cents. And, of course, in cold 
economic terms it is a waste of money to translate our laws -- nobody reads them 
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in one language, let alone two. But our nation is built not on economics but on the 
pledge of two cultures understanding and accepting each other -- a pledge which 
should make us sensitive to the needs of minorities...If we proclaim that the 
French culture has a central place in our land, we must be ready to give the French 
language an official position in our government.
162
  
 
But it was not to be. The government had spoken on the issue, and it was done. French was no 
longer an official language in the Saskatchewan legislature, courts, and legislation. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Mercure case and the debate over Bill 2 demonstrate the competing visions of 
western Canada and western Canadian history. The Fransaskois community and the 
Saskatchewan government sought to legitimize their respective visions of contemporary 
language rights in the region through antagonistic historical-legal arguments. These visions of 
history, had major implications for the outcome of the Mercure case but also for language policy 
in Saskatchewan during the 1980s. Presented with a choice by the Supreme Court, both 
Saskatchewan and Alberta chose to repeal section 110 rather than perpetuate it. 
 The Fransaskois interpretation of official bilingualism in the past and present dovetailed 
well with the contemporary national thrust towards official languages and a "two nations" 
definition of Canada under the Trudeau and Mulroney governments. Many people in 
Saskatchewan, including provincial political leaders, found this definition of western Canadian 
history and contemporary Canada to be completely unacceptable. The history of the West was 
not one that echoed the antagonistic French-English conflict that so characterized central 
Canada's past. The West was different, and westerners resented the implication that they were 
simply another version of Ontario, or simply another version of Ontario and Quebec. The West 
had been settled over time by people from all over the world, including French Canadians; no 
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minority group could be seen as above one another because the western Canadian vision was one 
of equality and partnership in building the "new nation." Biculturalism simply did not apply in 
either historical or contemporary terms, as English remained the unquestioned official language 
of Saskatchewan.  
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CONCLUSION 
Fragment and Frontier, Continuity and Change: Pathways of Community, Language, and 
Politics 
 
 Does the history of bilingualism, the Fransaskois, and the French language in 
Saskatchewan matter? Based on the findings of this dissertation, the answer is a definitive "yes." 
As one famous Canadian historian observed, the French language question in western Canada 
was "as prolonged and bitter as anything in Canadian history."
1
 From the early territorial days, 
when western Canada and Saskatchewan began debating the nature of regional society, the "dual 
language" question mattered. It coloured the creation of Manitoba in 1870. It infiltrated territorial 
politics after the 1885 rebellion and was the first priority of territorial political leaders when the 
Legislative assembly of the North-West Territories met for the first time in 1888. It exploded 
into a national crisis in 1905 when Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, then Conservative 
member of Parliament Frederick Monk, tried to have separate schools and the French language 
fully protected in the Saskatchewan constitution. It cast a shadow over early Saskatchewan 
politics from 1905 until the 1930s, when J.T.M. Anderson's government made French language 
education illegal. It polarized and divided neighbours and citizens between 1970 and 1990 as the 
province debated opening the education system to more French instruction. It was one of the 
vexatious issues in Saskatchewan politics between 1971 and 1982. The challenges of 
bilingualism in Saskatchewan were finally realized with the Mercure case between 1980 and 
1988, when the provincial government had every chance to affirm French as an official language 
-- most notably, a favourable federal government environment for official languages and a 
Supreme Court decision confirming the francophones' arguments -- but stubbornly refused.  
 Yet, toward the end of the twentieth century, the Fransaskois could look back on the past 
twenty years with pride. They scored a major victory before the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
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Mercure decision. They were busy establishing the province's first francophone schools in what 
would soon be a francophone-run school system. They proved to the provincial government that 
the Fransaskois vision of Saskatchewan history and society could not be ignored by the English-
speaking majority, even if francophones represented a small portion of the province's population.  
 The Fransaskois could also look back upon the 1968 to 1990 period as one of struggle 
and bitter defeat. The Saskatchewan government's multicultural definition of the province, 
politically and historically unacceptable to the Fransaskois, was popular. The Supreme Court of 
Canada's decision in Mercure confirmed French as an official language in Saskatchewan, but 
also allowed the province the opportunity to repeal it. French-language education was a tiresome 
quest which pitted francophones against the government and school boards. To this day, the 
community continues to argue with the government over adequate funding to francophone 
education, alleging that since the inception of the Conseil des écoles fransaskoises (CEF) in 
1995, the Fransaskois education system has never received adequate funding from the province. 
 Why did the French-language question persist in Saskatchewan politics? What made it 
important from day one? Here the power of separate visions of political community, of 
competing memories, must be taken into account. Within reason, governments can do whatever 
they want. The Westminster parliamentary system tends to centralize power within the 
Executive, vesting wide powers in premiers, prime ministers, and cabinet ministers. But 
government and politics are not everything, and in the case of the Fransaskois, even a small 
community with few political and economic resources can make its voice heard. Language is 
about much more than who may speak what in the legislature, about what history is taught in 
schools, or about who controls a school system. These parts of the French-language question are 
merely the visible elements of a deeper nexus of history, symbolism, meaning, memory, and 
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political community. The French-language question in Saskatchewan goes to the core of the 
history and values of the Saskatchewan political community.  
 Ideas and beliefs do not appear or disappear overnight. Nor do they remain the same after 
major battles or conflicts. People learn from the past and from their mistakes; they can forget, but 
they also remember. The ideas and beliefs from the formative period of Saskatchewan history 
helped to determine the outcomes of language politics between 1968 and 1990. The 1870-1930 
era created, then nurtured, the idea that official bilingualism went against the desired definition 
of the region. What made western Canada different, at least in the minds of many early 
Saskatchewan political leaders, was that it would leave behind the never-ending struggles 
between French and English-speakers. Later between 1968 and 1990, while different 
Saskatchewan provincial governments were not openly "anti-French" in the way they carried out 
language and cultural policies, they remained firm in their resolve that official bilingualism 
simply did not correspond with the western Canadian identity. In other words, the early years of 
Saskatchewan history developed a "political pathway" for the language question. Subsequent 
provincial governments, owing to the weight of history, legislation, and cultural values, remained 
dependent on the path forged decades earlier. The formative period of western Canadian history, 
including that of Saskatchewan's first three decades as a province, trended strongly towards 
linguistic and cultural conformity. Assimilation to the English language and British values were 
central to the ideal political community in Saskatchewan between 1870 and 1931. This drive to 
create a British West did not singularly affect francophones, as many other minority groups -- 
Germans, Ukrainians, Doukhobors, for example -- suffered discrimination against their 
languages and cultures. But the francophones were a different kind of threat, a most urgent one. 
Not only did francophones desire to keep their language and culture, they also represented 
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another idea of Canada, one that was well articulated by some French-Canadian political leaders. 
The francophones reminded British Canadian political leaders of the influence of Quebec in 
national political matters, and of the power struggles between the federal government and the 
West. According to the Anglo-Canadian view, Ottawa, for example, imposed bilingualism on the 
North-West Territories; it also imposed separate schools on the young Saskatchewan. In both 
cases, the francophones and their compatriots in Quebec were to blame. The solution was 
stronger provinces, greater autonomy, and less Ottawa.  
 Later, between 1968 and 1990, western anger over Quebec's influence in federal politics 
and the singular dominance of the language question on the federal stage led, among other 
things, not only to the demise of the Liberal party in the region, but also a great deal of 
difficulties on official bilingualism. As well-intentioned as provincial governments might have 
been between 1968 and 1990, bureaucratic inertia, cultural baggage from the past, and majority 
opposition to bilingualism made measures to expand French education and services difficult. Of 
course, it helped little that the Saskatchewan government demonstrated open hostility to Ottawa's 
cultural policies, opting instead to adopt its own understanding of western Canadian history.  
 Path dependency and continuity of a unilingual English political community is one of the 
themes of this study. Another is the persistence of the French-Canadian memory of a bilingual 
western Canada. If during the early period of Saskatchewan politics, British Canadian victories 
only confirmed the need to ensure English was the province's only official language, the 
francophone community viewed its defeats stoically, always maintaining that opponents of 
bilingualism were wrong. History would vindicate the francophone community; the past could 
not, at least to francophones, be denied.  
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 The strength and power of the memory of the bilingual West cannot be understated. It 
took many forms and motivated a number of political causes. During discussions with the Allan 
Blakeney government, for example, the Fransaskois repeatedly insisted that "nous ne sommes 
pas comme les autres", and that the Fransaskois community was exceptional. Even though it was 
a small linguistic and cultural minority, it could claim the earliest European historical roots in the 
region. Indeed, history and memory were the cornerstones of Fransaskois activism during the 
1968 to 1990 period, as they were also fundamental to political arguments used by Joseph Royal 
and Henri Bourassa to support the French cause in western Canada between 1870 and 1905. 
Between 1968 and 1990, as attempts to further entrench the "two founding nations" ideal in the 
Canadian constitution waxed and waned, the Fransaskois used this favourable context to shore 
up and continue in their insistence that they were right all long: the West was colonized by both 
French and English-speakers, and this history meant that contemporary equality of the two 
languages ought to be recognized.   
 These continuities must also, however, be reconciled with major changes and differences 
between the two periods. Between 1870 and 1931, it was a commonly-held assumption that 
Canada was a British country, and that British Canadians occupied the summit of the 
civilizational hierarchy. Assimilation of minority groups into British Canadian society was not 
only good for Canada and the well-being of the minority groups themselves. It was viewed as a 
duty that fit into the overall trajectory and goals of the British empire. After the 1960s, however, 
Canadian nationalism changed substantially towards a more diverse and properly "Canadian" 
identity. This change necessitated changes in cultural policy -- a turning away from assimilation 
and British Canadian ideals towards an ideal of diversity and accommodation. The question of 
whether or not this shift in cultural policy was successful remains to be debated.  
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 Another key area of change outlined in this study is francophone community activism. 
Between 1870 and 1931, the francophones of Saskatchewan rarely openly defied the provincial 
government. Fearing the ire and power of an aggressive British Canadian majority, francophones 
opted for behind-the-scenes activism and sought to preserve whatever semblance of bilingualism 
that they could. During the early period of western Canadian history, the Catholic clergy played 
an important role in developing and maintaining this strategy. This early period made later 
activism between 1968 and 1990 look radical by comparison. During the latter era, the 
Fransaskois were vocal. Like before, they were a small minority; by 1968, however, they had 
lost patience and used a variety of means to cajole the Saskatchewan government into action. 
They publicly embarrassed premiers Blakeney and Devine on several different occasions. They 
appealed to other francophone organizations across the country for help in putting pressure on 
political leaders. They spoke to English-language media outlets and made their case to the 
public.  
 Were the Fransaskois successful? Here, the questions of language regime and political 
community are important to consider. The early period of Saskatchewan history -- 1870 to 1931 -
- created and embedded a language regime that supported English as the province's sole official 
language. Although there were some critical junctures or key moments where this status was 
challenged or threatened, the primacy of English remained. This early history created a certain 
amount of path dependency or governmental inertia towards bilingualism which had important, 
latent effects on how debates over the place of the French language in Saskatchewan between 
1968 and 1990. Even if provincial governments during the latter era could be interpreted as 
doing their best to promote French -- and, as this dissertation argues, that was not always the 
case -- they still remained unable to get the public to accept official bilingualism in 
  
296 
 
Saskatchewan. The language regime of Saskatchewan, established during the early period of 
provincial history, remained remarkably stable and withstood repeated, systematic challenges by 
the francophone community in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Devine government's 
reaction to the Mercure decision is a useful illustration of this reality. Bob Andrew's defense of 
Bill 2 justified the present language regime choice by invoking the early vision of Saskatchewan 
that won out during the autonomy bill debates in 1905 -- a province of one language. 
 Government and the state are not the sole drivers of society. They do, however, play an 
important role in supporting and shaping political communities. In this vein, Saskatchewan's 
unilingual language regime, combined with a certain vision of history promoted by the provincial 
government, helped perpetuate a political culture hostile to official bilingualism. Conversely, 
varying viewpoints or ideas on the place of French in Saskatchewan’s political community 
helped to create and shape the place of French within governmental institutions. To say that ideas 
and beliefs exert an influence on institutions is not to argue that they are the only factors in 
determining institutional outcomes. Political culture and its relation to institutions, as political 
scientist Nelson Wiseman argues, is a complex relationship of numerous societal factors which 
include historical events, institutions, and social mores. In the case of the French language, 
however, the question of ideology in shaping institutional understandings and policies on 
bilingualism cannot be ignored. The idea that there was no place for the official recognition of 
one particular minority in western Canada, for example, which was reiterated over the course of 
the early era of Saskatchewan history, was again reinforced by the province's multiculturalism 
policies of the 1970s. Diversity was for everyone, or it was for no one. Although 
multiculturalism recognized the equality and existence of all cultures in the province, the policy 
was crafted in opposition to Ottawa's French-English bilingualism policies, again reinforcing the 
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idea in Saskatchewan political culture that French speakers were unexceptional, merely one 
minority among many. And, as this dissertation also shows, the political implementation of 
multiculturalism or bilingualism depended on whose version of memory and history won out. 
For the francophones, multiculturalism was unacceptable; for many more people in 
Saskatchewan, the idea that the francophones were special was unacceptable. For the 
francophones bilingualism in government and schools was a must, based on historical and 
contemporary understandings of Canadian society; for Saskatchewan provincial governments, 
there were other factors to consider.  
Since 1870, the persistence of competing ideas and memories of western Canada has led 
to numerous pitched battles between the Fransaskois and the province. In many respects, the 
Fransaskois have, through their attempts to have their own vision of society recognized publicly, 
helped create a crisis of identity in the provincial state. Fransaskois vision and activism in past 
and present has always forced different provincial governments to search themselves and try to 
determine and define the Saskatchewan identity. On this level of debates over the place of 
French in Saskatchewan institutions and society, the Fransaskois actually held an advantage over 
the provincial government. The persistent historical identity of the Fransaskois community 
differed from the changing identity trends and regional/national pressures exerted on 
Saskatchewan provincial governments. After 1968, for example, Saskatchewan could no longer 
identify itself as British as it had before. But the government’s need to maintain linguistic and 
cultural stability during changing economic, social, and political times meant preserving certain 
institutional and cultural definitions of the province, such as English as the only official 
language.  
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 In the end, the Fransaskois could not “have it all French, all at once." Saskatchewan is not 
a bilingual province. The Fransaskois understanding of history, shared by the Franco-Albertan 
community, has seen numerous rejections not only from society in general, but the courts as 
well.
2
 Whatever gains the francophone community achieved took a long time and a great deal of 
effort. But the Fransaskois would have francophone education, a key victory finally realized in 
1995 when Roy Romanow’s NDP government amended the Education Act to provide for 
Fransaskois school governance.
3
 The Fransaskois achieved governance not only because of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but because throughout history they refused to give 
up. They have never let go of the bilingual dream. The Fransaskois’ refusal to assimilate -- 
giving up their language and culture -- is another important continuity that cannot be denied. To 
this day, the Fransaskois have survived, and their survival is a testament not only to the vigour 
and dedication of their political activism, but also to the power of ideas and memory in shaping 
society. In 1925 ACFC President Raymond Denis could only have dreamed that one day the 
Fransaskois community would have its own schools run by French speakers. That dream is now 
a reality, brought about by years of hard work, dedication, vision, and memory.  
 But Saskatchewan political leaders had their own ideas and memories as well which 
were, in many ways, irreconcilable with those of the francophone community. Herein lies the 
core of past and present controversies between the Fransaskois and the provincial government. 
Both hold strong views on the history of the province which continue to inform their respective 
understandings of bilingualism and language rights. And, although the Fransaskois have 
achieved school governance, they continue to yearn for political equality in major provincial 
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institutions. So the debate over the history and nature of Saskatchewan and western Canada will 
continue, perhaps until one vision triumphs over the other once and for all.   
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Note on Sources 
 
Because this study deals with questions of bilingualism and the French language, both English 
and French language documents figure prominently in the analysis. For the sake of consistency 
documents in English are noted and quoted in English, while for French documents I have also 
preserved the original language. The months and dates from the Fransaskois newspaper L'Eau 
Vive, for example, are noted in French. Any correspondence in French is also noted in that 
language; for example, a letter from Irène Chabot to Premier Grant Devine is noted as "Irène 
Chabot à Grant Devine, 23 janvier 1983." 
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